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A Democracy of Readings  
and Objects :  
Roger Odin’s Contribution to 
the Theory of Film
Vinzenz Hediger
Odin, R., Spaces of Communication: Elements of Semio-Pragmatics. With an Introduction by 




Semio-Pragmatics, an approach to the study of f ilm and audiovisual media 
f irst proposed by Roger Odin in the early 1980s, shifted the focus from 
textual analysis to the interaction of text and context and to institutional 
modes of framing and reading which shape the viewer’s engagement with 
the f ilm. A response to an impasse in post-1968 f ilm semiotics and semio-
psychoanalytical approaches to f ilm spectatorship, semio-pragmatics 
contributed signif icantly to the further development of f ilm studies 
alongside such approaches as Cultural Studies, neo-formalism, historical 
reception studies and the phenomenology of f ilm. At the same time, by 
expanding the scope of inquiry beyond the dispositive of cinema from the 
outset to include home movies or mobile phone f ilms, semio-pragmatics 
defined f ilm studies as a f ield rather than a discipline exclusively focused 
on the cinephile canon, thus anticipating the current shape of that f ield 
by more than two decades.
Keywords: Film theory, f ilm semiotics, non-theatrical f ilm, media theory, 
communication theory
The last thing a new discipline acquires, Alfred North Whitehead once 
wrote, are its foundations. The purpose of this book series, which makes 
key texts from the history of f ilm theory available to a broad academic and 
non-academic audience, is to offer some contributions towards that goal 
for the still fairly young discipline of f ilm studies. The inclusion of Roger 
Odin’s Spaces of Communication, which f irst appeared in French in 2011 and 
was translated into German in 2019, fulf ils the series’ purpose in exemplary 
fashion.1 Spaces of Communication is a book that condenses the intellectual 
trajectory of one of the foundational f igures of f ilm studies into a relatively 
short and accessible volume. It is a book that testif ies to the author’s deep 
and rich intellectual engagement with a vast array of objects ranging from 
the classics of the cinephile canon to television news programmes, home 
movies and mobile phone f ilms. But it is also text which has the potential to 
contribute towards the growth of f ilm and media studies for years to come.
In this Introduction I want to offer a brief discussion of the position of the 
book in relation to Odin’s intellectual trajectory. I will then situate Odin’s 
work with a view to both the institutional history of f ilm studies and the 
1 Roger Odin, Kommunikationsräume. Einführung in die Semiopragmatik. Trans. by Guido 
Kirsten, Magali Trautman, Philipp Blum, Laura Katharina Mücke, (Berlin: oa books, 2019).
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history of f ilm theory since the 1960s, with a particular view to the concept 
of communication. Finally, I want to discuss how Odin’s work intersects and 
communicates with some of the most important current developments in 
the f ield of f ilm and media studies.
What We Make of Images and Sounds: Semio-Pragmatics as 
Approach and Method
One way of accessing Spaces of Communication is to follow the instructions of 
the subtitle and read the book as a concise introduction to semio-pragmatics, 
the theoretical approach to f ilm and media which, for all practical purposes, 
bears Odin’s name. Film semiotics focused primarily on semantics and 
syntactics, i.e., the meaning-making properties of image and sound and 
their articulation in narrative and other temporal sequences. The semantics 
of the Western, to cite Rick Altman’s classic semiotic analysis of the genre, 
concern themselves with the iconographic lexicon of cowboys in rugged 
landscapes, horses, cattle, guns, coffee and beans; the syntactics focus on 
recurring plot structures.2 As the name indicates, semio-pragmatics shifts 
the focus from semantics and syntactics to what in linguistics is the third 
leg of the f ield, pragmatics or the usage of signs. Or, to stay with the example 
of the Western: pragmatics concerns what we make of all those plots, hats, 
horses, guns, coffee cups and beans.
Odin inaugurated semio-pragmatics as a theoretical approach in his “thèse 
d’état,” which he completed in 1982.3 He further developed his approach in 
various essays and his subsequent books, Cinéma et production de sens (1990), 
an introduction to the semiotics of f ilm from a semio-pragmatic point of 
view, and De la fiction (2000), which, as the title says, takes the problem of 
f iction and non-f iction as its focus.4
2 Rick Altman, “A Semantic/Syntactic Approach to Genre,” Cinema Journal, 23/3 (Spring 1984), 
pp. 6–18.
3 The “thèse d’état” is a substantial written work which comes after the dissertation proper 
and used to be the formal requirement for the qualif ication for thesis supervision. In 1984, it was 
replaced with the “habilitation à diriger des recherches,” analogous to the German “Habilitation,” 
which qualif ies the holder for full professorship positions.
4 Roger Odin, Cinema et production de sens (Paris: Amand Colin, 1990); Roger Odin, De la fiction 
(Bruxelles: De Boeck Université, 2000). For a survey of Odin’s trajectory see the Introduction by 
Frank Kessler and Guido Kirsten to the German translation of Spaces of Communication and 
the comprehensive bibliography and f ilmography compiled by Hans-Jürgen Wulff and Ludger 
Kaczmarek in the Appendix to this volume.
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To simplify, semio-pragmatics argues that meaning is not just a matter 
of text, but of context. What a f ilm means depends not only on what it says 
and how it says it, but also on where and when it says it and to whom. Far 
from opening another French theory door to the twin evils of subjectivism 
and relativism which critics of post-structuralism so heartily decry, the 
“where,” “when” and “whom” of semio-pragmatics are not indeterminate 
variables. Rather, they consist in highly specif ic institutional framings and 
settings. These determine to a signif icant extent how viewers will approach 
a f ilm or set of moving images, and how they will read them. Accounting 
for these specif ic variations, Odin spells out his theory of the production 
meaning f irst in a typology of “modes de lecture,” of modes of reading and 
the viewer’s engagement with the world of the f ilm.
A mode of reading can be more accurately described as a mode of produc-
ing meaning and affect. It consists of a set of specif ic, repeatable cognitive 
and affective operations, which are applicable to different types and bodies 
of work. These operations constitute a body of (largely) implicit knowledge 
which the viewer activates when dealing with a f ilm or program, a com-
municative competence which can be culturally and situationally specif ic 
but remains relatively stable over time.
Apart from the problem of text and context, an important impulse for 
Odin to develop his approach came from his thinking about documentary. 
When documentary theorists in the 1980s and 1990s argued that the line 
separating documentary from f iction had become blurry,5 they responded 
to new types of documentary, but also to an underlying conflict within 
f ilm theory. Bill Nichols had developed an influential typology of modes of 
documentary practice in the mid-1970s, which he has since further developed 
to accommodate new trends.6 But in f ilm theory, and particularly in France, 
the line separating documentary from f iction had never been clearly set. 
Instead, two equally totalizing and seemingly mutually exclusive claims 
competed with each other, one which associated cinema with reality, the 
other which associated it with the imaginary. These claims reflect, in a way, 
the grand struggle between Lumière and Méliès in French f ilm history: 
Lumière, the inventor of documentary, vs. Méliès, the inventor of the f iction 
f ilm – or the other way around, as Jean-Pierre Léaud famously argues in 
Godard’s La Chinoise from 1968, in which he references Henri Langlois to 
5 See for instance Michael Renov, The Subject of Documentary (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2004).
6 Bill Nichols, Introduction to Documentary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 
pp. 99–138.
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suggest that Lumière was a painter of sorts and the last great impressionist 
and Méliès a purveyor of current news.
Bazinian ontologies – sometimes implicitly, often explicitly – awarded a 
privileged connection to reality to all f ilmic representations as they defined 
the photographic image as trace, index or “natural image,” i.e., a sign which 
participates in the being of the object and re-presents reality in an emphatic 
way.7 Different from Bazinian reality, the Lacanian real was not present in 
the image. It was defined precisely as that which could not be represented. 
Accordingly, Lacanian accounts stressed the lack of reality in the cinematic 
signif ier and the viewer’s relation to the screen, which was merely a replay 
of the child’s discovery of the mirror, i.e., the imaginary relationship of 
the self to its own image. Christian Metz summarized this position most 
forcefully, when he declared in The Imaginary Signifier that “every f ilm is 
a f iction f ilm.”
A young psychologist from Belgium, Jean-Pierre Meunier had tried to 
solve the problem in 1969 by offering a typology of f ilm experiences which 
associated the three stages of Sartre’s phenomenological conception of the 
imaginary with the home movie, the documentary and the f iction f ilm 
respectively. But his book went largely unnoticed at the time and resurfaced 
only in the context of home movie research in the 1990s and again in more 
recent debates about the phenomenology of f ilm.8
To answer the question of how we understand a documentary f ilm, Odin 
made a more radical move. He applied Ockham’s razor to the underly-
ing assumptions of the debate so far and cut both the concepts of reality 
and the imaginary out of the equation. Neither did he rely primarily on 
classif ications of textual properties of the kind offered by Bill Nichols. 
Instead, Odin argued that whether a f ilm was a documentary was a mat-
ter of labelling and processing or framing and reading. He proposed the 
concept of a “documentarizing reading” and further suggested that certain 
f ilms lent themselves to such readings, or rather advertised themselves 
to invite such readings.9 In a carefully worded retort to Metz’s claim that 
every f ilm was a f iction f ilm – a retort which can be read as a condensed 
summary of the systematic difference between Metzian semiotics and 
7 Vinzenz Hediger, “Das Wunder des Realismus. Transsubstantiation als medientheoretische 
Kategorie bei André Bazin,” in: Montage AV 18/1 (2009), pp. 75–107.
8 Cf. Daniel Fairfax, Julian Hanich (eds.) The Structures of Film Experience by Jean-Pierre 
Meunier: Historical Assessments and Phenomenological Expansions (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2019).
9 See also Frank Kessler, “Fakt oder Fiktion? Zum pragmatischen Status dokumentarischer 
Bilder,” in Montage AV 7/2 (1998), pp. 63–78.
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semio-pragmatics –, Odin even claimed in a 1984 essay that every f ilm could 
be read as a documentary f ilm.10 What made a documentary, then, was the 
meeting of a certain mode of reading with a suitable text – which is not a 
tautology, but a precise instruction for textual analysis and the modelling 
of the viewer’s activity from a pragmatic point of view.
The third important impulse for the development of semio-pragmatics, 
apart from the problems of text and context and documentary and f iction, 
came from Odin’s interest in home movies.11 Jean-Pierre Meunier can claim 
to have published the f irst work of f ilm theory in which home movies f igure 
prominently. But the “f ilm-souvenir,” the memory f ilm, as Meunier called it, 
served mostly as a steppingstone to a theory of the f iction f ilm, which was 
the real focus of his interest.12 For Odin, on the other hand, home movies 
were a genuine “theoretical object” in the sense of Hubert Damisch, an 
object which “obliges one to do theory.”13 Home movies are a ground zero 
of semio-pragmatics because in dealing with them, no other approach 
to textual or semiotic analysis makes much sense. Devoid of the formal 
and textual properties which provide the basis for auteurist and other 
work-centred approaches to analysis and interpretation, the meaning of 
home movies lies almost exclusively in the uses their makers make of them.
From the comparison between f iction, documentary and home movie 
readings, Odin developed a typology of eight distinct modes of reading, a 
list which slightly varied over time: the spectacular, the f ictionalizing, the 
energetic, the private, the argumentative/persuasive (which in Spaces of 
Communication has been replaced by the discursive mode), the artistic and 
the esthetic modes. While Odin’s typology remains open to the inclusion 
of additional modes – more recently, his thinking has included a “making 
of”-mode –, the modes of reading are in themselves fairly consistent and 
quite distinct from each other. To borrow an analogy from sociology, they 
have roughly the consistency of Weberian ideal types. They owe their relative 
stability to an important extent to that of their corresponding institutional 
frameworks – e.g., the cinema, the art world, the school, the family.
10 Roger Odin, “Film documentaire, lecture documentarisante,” in: Roger Odin, Jean-Charls 
Lyant (eds.) Cinémas et réalités (Saint-Étienne: CIEREC, 1984), pp. 263–277.
11 Roger Odin (ed.) Le film de famille: Usage privé, usage public (Paris: Méridiens Klincksieck, 
1995).
12 See the interview with Meunier in Fairfax, Hanich, Meunier.
13 Yve-Alain Bois, Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss and Hubert Damisch, “A Conversation with 
Hubert Damisch,” in: October 85 (Summer 1998), p. 8. See also Alexandra Schneider, “Theorie des 
Amateur- und Gebrauchsf ilms,” in: Bernhard Groß, Thomas Morsch (eds.) Handbuch Filmtheorie 
(Wiesbaden: Springer, 2021), pp. 225–242.
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As Odin further developed the question of the relationship of text 
and context, he came up with a concept which ties together the various 
ensembles or assemblages of frameworks, settings, and modes of read-
ing. He moved to embed the modes of reading in what he proposes to 
call “spaces of communication,” which constitutes the key conceptual 
innovation of the book which we are presenting here, and which provides 
its title.14
Signif icantly, as readers of this book will discover, the list of modes of 
readings and of spaces of communications includes academic readings of 
f ilm and the space of the university. By placing the work of professional 
interpreters of f ilm on equal footing with, for instance, home movie screen-
ings, Odin subtly undercuts claims to hermeneutic privilege and authority 
even as it validates academic readings on their own terms. Semio-pragmatics 
proposes what we might call a democracy of meaning making, built on 
the idea of the equality and diversity of a wide array of possible modes of 
reading. But this democracy of meaning making is also one of objects. If 
semio-pragmatics awards no special privilege to academic readings, neither 
does it award one to theatrical f iction f ilms.
Odin is of course not oblivious to the persistence of social hierarchies and 
power differentials. Of the major French f ilm theorists, he is the one who is 
closest in spirit to Bourdieu, as his discussion of the coercive aspects of the 
institution of the nuclear family or the legacies of French colonialism in this 
book shows. Odin’s democracy of objects and readings has political thrust 
but deploys it at the level of methodology. Like the epoché in phenomenology 
it serves to bracket certain aspects of reality. By suspending established 
stratif ications and distinctions, it manages not to replicate them in research 
designs and theoretical frameworks, squarely putting them in the focus of 
analysis instead. Through the democracy of readings and objects, in other 
words, semio-pragmatics turns the stratif ied f ield of culture into a level 
f ield of inquiry.
To understand the point of the concept of “spaces of communication” 
and of semio-pragmatics’ continuing and potentially growing relevance to 
contemporary f ilm and media studies, it is useful to take a short look back 
and place Odin’s contribution in the larger context of semiotics and f ilm 
theory. Specif ically, semio-pragmatics can be understood as the solution 
to one of the key problems of the semiotics of f ilm as it f irst emerged in 
the 1960s and 1970s, even as it addresses some of the shortcomings of the 
14 Odin had f irst used the term “f ictional space of communication” at the end of the 1980s, but 
only returned to the concept of “spaces of communication” for the publication of this book.
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approaches which emerged in cinema studies in response and as alternatives 
to the semiotics of f ilm in the 1980s and 1990s.
Establishing a Discipline, Cultivating a Field: Roger Odin and 
Film Studies in France
Born in 1939, Roger Odin belongs to the generation of f ilm scholars who 
grew up in and were formed by the culture and atmosphere of post-war 
cinephilia.15 A linguist by training, a f ilm club activist and a consummate 
amateur f ilmmaker, Odin became the f irst f ilm scholar to ascend to a full 
professorship in cinema studies in a French university when he moved to 
Paris 3-Sorbonne Nouvelle from Saint-Étienne in 1983.
Film scholars had, of course, worked in French research institutions 
before. Christian Metz held a position in the École des Hautes Études en 
Sciences Sociales, a research institution in Paris which includes disciplines 
ranging from history to anthropology and economics, and which has also 
been the home of scholars such as Claude Lévi-Strauss, Pierre Nora, Jacques 
Derrida or, more recently, Thomas Piketty. Raymond Bellour had joined 
the Centre National de la Recherche Scientif ique, another non-university 
“grand établissement,” at the invitation of Edgar Morin in 1964. Marie-Claire 
Ropars-Wuilleumier created a department of cinema from within French 
literature at the experimental university of Paris-Vincennes in the early 
1970s, an important step towards f ilm studies as a discipline. In Spaces of 
Communication, Roger Odin pays tribute to her work with a subchapter 
dedicated to a re-reading of Ropars-Wuilleumier’s pioneering publications 
of that time. Furthermore, historians like Pierre Sorlin, Michèle Lagny or 
Marc Ferro focused their research on cinema from their respective positions 
in sociology and history departments.
But the department of cinema and audiovisual media at Paris-3 was to 
become the first proper f ilm studies department in a French university. Odin 
moved quickly to expand the department with chairs in f ilm aesthetics for 
former Cahiers critic Jacques Aumont and in f ilm history for Michel Marie, 
who had written his dissertation under Ropars-Wuilleumier’s and Metz’s 
supervision and joined Paris-3 as a maître de conference (assistant professor) 
for cinema in 1974. Together with Aumont and Marie, Odin continued 
to expand the scope and size of the department during his twenty-year 
15 Antoine de Baecque, La cinéphilie. Invention d’un regard, histoire d’une culture, 1944-1968 
(Paris: Pluriel, 2013).
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tenure as its director, to the point where the department is now the largest 
of its kind in the world in terms of full professor positions, including one 
exclusively dedicated to the study of the economics of cinema currently 
held by Laurent Creton.
Odin was also instrumental in the creation of a doctorate in f ilm stud-
ies at the national level. Decisions concerning the shape and structure of 
academic disciplines in France are in the hands of the national ministry 
of tertiary education and research rather than in the hands of individual 
universities. The doctorate as granted by the ministry is the birth certif icate 
of a discipline. Roger Odin led a committee which developed a curriculum 
in cinema studies comprised of optional courses in secondary education, as 
well as undergraduate, graduate and doctoral degrees at the tertiary level. 
Following the committee’s recommendation, the ministry created f ilm 
studies doctorate in the early 1990s.16 This emancipated cinema studies 
from the neighbouring disciplines of literature, art history and history 
and secured its place among established subjects for tertiary education 
and research. It granted a license to universities across France to institute 
doctoral programs and departments in cinema studies. In quick succession, 
with Lyon-2, Rennes, Bordeaux and Montpellier among others emerging as 
new centers of f ilm studies from the 1990s onwards.
Throughout his tenure at Paris-3 and beyond, Roger Odin has always 
insisted that he considered cinema studies to be a f ield rather than a dis-
cipline. This is an important distinction both in the light of the history of 
cinema studies in France and with a view to its development in a broader 
perspective. It is also a distinction which helps us understand how Odin’s 
work as a theorist intersects with his work as an institution builder.
One of the countries that lay claim to the invention of cinema, France 
has always had a uniquely vibrant f ilm culture. It was built and fostered by 
institutions such as the ciné-club movement, which started in the 1920s and 
in which Roger Odin actively participated as a programmer and presenter 
during his years in Saint-Étienne. It was also built around institutions like 
the Cinémathèque française, which Henri Langlois established in the early 
1930s just as f ilm archives sprung up around the world as salvage institutions 
for f ilm history in the wake of the introduction of sound. French film culture 
was further sustained by a f ilm criticism striving to elevate f ilm to equality 
with the other arts, an effort best exemplif ied by the work of André Bazin 
16 Roger Odin, “Zur Etablierung der Filmbildung in Frankreich – Ein Erfahrungsbericht,” in: 
Malte Hagener, Vinzenz Hediger (eds.) Medienkultur und Bildung. Ästhetische Erziehung im 
Zeitalter digitaler Netzwerke (Frankfurt: Campus 2015), pp. 295–312.
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and the Cahiers du cinéma in the 1950s. Since the 1920s, the operative concept 
which brought all facets of French cinema culture together had been the 
notion of the director as auteur. First introduced to distinguish French 
f ilms from the American competition in the 1920s, it became a selection 
criterion that served to distinguish art from mere merchandise and build 
canons of signif icant works in a global perspective from the 1930s onwards.
However, the f irst attempt to establish f ilm studies in France had little 
to do with cinephilia or auteurism. The Filmology movement of the 1940s 
and 1950s was organized by producer/philosopher Gilbert Cohen-Séat at 
the Sorbonne, with help from Étienne Souriau, an eminent philosopher 
and France’s foremost aesthetic theorist at the time, and Henri Wallon, a 
leading developmental psychologist who f irst described the mirror stage, 
which later made the fame of Jacques Lacan.17 As a top-down effort to study 
and control the social effects of cinema in the wake of the Second World 
War, Filmology initially met with scorn from cinephiles. A young Jean-Luc 
Godard signed up to quell the concerns of his Swiss bourgeois parents 
about his lack of interest in academic study, but he appears to never have 
attended classes. In 1951, André Bazin published a f ierce polemic against 
the “f ilmologues” and their ignorance of cinema in the Cahiers under the 
pseudonym of Florent Kirsch (combining the f irst name of his son and the 
maiden name of his wife).18 The controversy petered out towards the end 
of the 1950s, when Filmology shifted its focus to television and eventually 
morphed into mass communication effects research in France and Italy.
When f ilm studies f inally found its place in the French university system 
in the 1980s the cinephile canon constituted the core of the curriculum. 
Universities are conservative institutions. Once a plausible claim could 
be made that cinema had produced a body of work equivalent to that of 
national literatures – a claim which the Cahiers critics had established and 
which Stanley Cavell strategically repeated in 1971, when he wrote in the 
Introduction to The World Viewed that classical Hollywood cinema had 
brought forth more masterpieces than the Elizabethan period in literature19 
– chances improved for cinema studies’ acceptance as a discipline. Absent 
17 Edmund Lowry, The Filmology Movement and Film Studies in France (Ann Arbor: UMI Press 
1985); François Albéra, Martin Lefebvre (eds.) La filmologie, de nouveau, double issue of CINéMAS: 
Revue d’études cinématographiques/Journal of Film Studies, 19/2-3 (spring 2009); Vinzenz Hediger, 
Guido Kirsten (eds.) Filmologie (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, forthcoming).
18 Florent Kirsch [André Bazin], “Introduction à une f ilmologie de la f ilmologie,” in: Cahiers 
du cinéma, 5 (1951), pp. 33–38.
19 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1971).
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mandarin champions of the stature of Souriau and Wallon, it was ultimately 
the combination of a solid grounding in the academic rigor of structuralist 
linguistics and semiotics and cinephile culture which created the condi-
tions of acceptance for f ilm studies as an academic subject. Incidentally, 
this applies to both France and the United States, and in both cases the 
path to success led through Paris. Through his seminars at the EHESS, 
Christian Metz had taught the f irst generation of university professors 
“what research was,” as Jacques Aumont once put it.20 Metz’s students also 
included numerous young American scholars, who would become the f irst 
and second generation of f ilm professors in the United States. In the US, 
f ilm studies emerged from literature departments, with the department of 
romance studies at Iowa with Dudley Andrew, a biographer of André Bazin 
and specialist in French cinema, playing a particularly important role in 
training the f irst generation of cinema studies PhDs.21
Roger Odin is part of that group – a student of Christian Metz’s who is 
nothing if not f irm in his command of the cinephile canon. Yet even as 
he emerged as a pivotal f igure in the consolidation of cinema studies as 
a discipline focused primarily on the history and aesthetics of f ictional 
theatrical f ilms as art, he continued to insist that f ilm studies is a f ield rather 
than a discipline. Film Studies’ cinephile pedigree had distinct advantages, 
of course. It connected the new academic discipline to a dynamic set of 
cultural practices, including highly sophisticated forms of f ilm criticism as 
art criticism, which kept cinema studies from prematurely veering off into 
scientist pretensions even as it demonstrated the standards of rigor required 
of an accredited member of academia. But Odin managed to translate this 
energy into a broader set of potentials. Explicitly referencing f ilmology as a 
model and strategically naming the new department “Cinéma et audiovisuel,” 
Odin kept the door open for the inclusion of new methodologies and objects 
of inquiry beyond cinema, and he contributed to this opening through his 
own work. One of Odin’s most widely quoted and translated essays, which 
he co-wrote with Francesco Casetti, is “De la paléo à la néo-télévision” from 
1990, a text which analyses a major shift in television aesthetics and mode 
of address from the 1960s to the 1970s and continues to be a key reference 
20 Personal communication with Jacques Aumont.
21 For a survey of Metz’s role in the formation of academic f ilm theory and his intellectual 
legacy cf. Dominique Chateau, Martin Lefebvre, “Dance and Fetish: Phenomenology and Metz’s 
Epistemological Shift,” in October 148 (Spring 2014), pp. 103–132; Margrit Tröhler, Guido Kirsten 
(eds.) Christian Metz and the Codes of Cinema: Film Semiology and Beyond (Amsterdam: Am-
sterdam University Press, 2018).
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in television studies.22 And as the department in Paris-3 grew, additions 
include permanent positions for television studies.
But insisting on a def inition of f ilm studies as a f ield rather than a 
discipline also creates a problem. Scientif ic disciplines emerge and coa-
lesce around well-def ined objects. Biology as a discipline only comes into 
existence with the theory of evolution, which defines life as a continuous 
historical process, a def inition further corroborated by the description of 
the cell as the smallest unit and building block of life as a self-organizing 
process. The cinephile canon is cinema studies’ theory of evolution: a simple, 
neat def inition which separates its object from that of other, neighboring 
disciplines. Stressing the f ield character of f ilm studies means to abandon 
the safety afforded by that def inition. One other way of understanding 
semio-pragmatics is as a solution to this epistemological conundrum: the 
concepts of modes of reading and of spaces of communication provide an 
epistemological bracket, a principle of unity, for the diversity of readings 
and objects to which semio-pragmatics ascribes equal value. Or, to put it 
differently: these concepts broaden the scope of inquiry beyond a singular 
object and its corresponding discipline, while at the same time securing 
the coherence of the f ield.
In that sense, there is in Roger Odin’s work as a theorist and an institution 
builder a remarkable and, for an academic, rather unique convergence of 
thought and action, of theory and practice. But to fully appreciate the contribu-
tion of semio-pragmatics to the f ield of f ilm studies it is important to also 
situate Odin’s approach more specifically within the history of f ilm theory.
Moving Semiotics Forward: Semio-Pragmatics and Film Theory 
since the 1960s
In retrospect, the original promise of semiotics can probably best be 
described as that of a prima philosophia for media culture and, in fact, for 
culture understood as a set of practices of meaning making more generally. In 
the able hands of authors like Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco or Yuri Lotman, 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s concept of the sign worked like a Swiss Army knife of 
cultural analysis: easy to handle and variable in use, it cut across everything, 
from comics to novels, movies and magazine covers to car designs and 
spaghetti packaging, so long as the object in question could be described 
22 Francesco Casetti, Roger Odin, “De la paléo- à la néo-télévision,” in Communications 51 
(1990), pp. 9–6.
22 Vinzenz Hediger 
as a text and broken down into relationships of signif ier to signif ied. And 
even though the connection of signif ier to signif ied remained arbitrary (at 
least in the case of non-indexical signs) and many of the meanings created 
through that connection turned out to be deeply troubling, the concept of 
the sign provided a philosophically soothing sense of unity not just of an 
object of study upon which one could build a discipline, but unity in the 
face of the increasingly bewildering diversity of contemporary culture and 
society and its signifying practices.
Following close on the heels of Barthes and others – but also borrowing 
some of his key concepts and insights from Étienne Souriau and Filmology –, 
Roger Odin’s teacher and mentor Christian Metz inaugurated the semiotics 
of f ilm in a double move: he narrowed the focus of analysis to the dominant 
mode of narrative cinema and its technological infrastructure and social 
frameworks, and he stressed the linguistic origins of semiotics. “La grand 
syntagmatique du cinema” was an attempt to spell out in rigorous scientif ic 
terms the implications of André Bazin’s famous throw-away line at the 
end of his essay on the ontology of the photographic image: “On the other 
hand, cinema is also a language.”23 As it turned out, the language of cinema 
did not quite have the structural consistency of a natural language. But 
semiotics still prevailed.
Spreading from France to other parts of Europe, the anglophone world 
and the Global South (and with signif icant additional lines emerging from 
Eastern Europe and the Tartu school) semiotics became the dominant 
paradigm in f ilm theory in the 1960s and 1970s. Metz, Baudry, Bellour and 
Kuntzel in France and Laura Mulvey, Stephen Heath and others in Great 
Britain and the US combined it with Lacanian psychoanalysis and, in some 
strains, with Althusser’s neo-Marxist analysis of the ideological effects of 
the state apparatus to build a critical analytics of f ilm spectatorship which 
resonated strongly with the political outlook of post-68 cinema culture.24 
In the hands of Mulvey the combination proved to be particularly potent. 
Mulvey provided an account of the regressive politics of gender in classi-
cal Hollywood cinema which continues to reverberate in debates about 
intersectional feminism and queer theories of spectatorship to this day.25
23 André Bazin, “Ontology of the Photographic Image,” transl. Hugh Gray, in: Film Quarterly, 
13/4 (Summer 1960), pp. 4–9.
24 For a comprehensive history of post-68 French f ilm culture and f ilm theory see Daniel 
Fairfax, The Red Years of Cahiers du Cinéma (1968-1973): Volume I. Ideology and Politics (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2021); Volume II. Aesthetics and Ontology (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2021).
25 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” in: Screen, 16/3 (1975), pp. 6–18.
A demoCrACy of reAdingS And objeC tS  23
However, the very feature that made the combination of semiotics and psy-
choanalysis so compelling as an elegy of the failed revolution of 68 turned out 
to be a liability in the long run. The emphasis on the ideological determinism 
of the “apparatus” restricted the spectator’s subjectivity to a mere afterthought 
of a pernicious interplay of technology and text. To many scholars coming up 
in the 1970s and 1980s particularly in anglophone film studies, this no longer 
seemed to be a useful account of spectatorship. In succession, Cultural Studies, 
a combination of neo-formalism and cognitive science, historical reception 
studies, the phenomenology of f ilm experience and Deleuzian approaches 
to the philosophy of f ilm emerged as compelling alternatives.
Cultural Studies is a multi-faceted f ield which covers some of the same 
territory as semiotics and emerges at the same time, to the extent that it 
could be seen as its British counterpart: what the Citroen DS is to Barthes, 
dime novels and television are to Raymond Williams. At its intersection 
with media studies Cultural Studies offered an alternative to the linear 
models of communication and media effects in communication research. 
Stressing the activity and agency of the viewer, Stuart Hall highlighted the 
possibility of oppositional readings of (mass) media texts and the ability 
of the viewer to engage with normative representations of ethnicity and 
gender even as they maintained their sense of identity and difference.26 
This approach became highly influential in anglophone television studies of 
the 1980s and 1990s, as well as in studies of f ilm stars and popular cinema.
The combination of neo-formalist f ilm analysis and cognitive psychology, 
which took shape in the United States and Germany in the 1980s through 
the work of authors like David Bordwell, Peter Wuss and Hans-Jürgen Wulff, 
offered another account of the active spectator, albeit one that was willingly 
oblivious to questions of context, identity and difference. Particularly in 
Bordwell’s formulation it proposed a model of spectatorship as a largely 
disembodied mode of information processing. Bordwell even claimed at 
one point that it was perfectly possible to build a model of how audiences 
understand a f ilm without accounting for the role of affect and emotion – a 
point that was disproven not least by a subsequent generation of cognitivist 
scholars like Murray Smith and Ed Tan in their work on spectatorship and 
emotion.27
26 Stuart Hall, “Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse,” in: Meenakshi Gigi 
Durham, Douglas M. Kellner (eds.) Media and Cultural Studies: Keyworks (Hoboken: Wiley, 2009), 
pp. 163–174; Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Cinematic Representation,” in: Framework 36 
(1989), pp. 68–81.
27 David Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction Film (London, New York: Routledge, 1985); Murray 
Smith, Engaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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Another response to the disembodied and decontextualized concept of 
spectatorship proposed by early cognitivist theories consisted in historical 
reception studies, an approach pioneered by authors such as Janet Staiger, a 
co-author with Bordwell and Kristin Thompson on the groundbreaking 1985 
book The Classical Hollywood Cinema, or Annette Kuhn.28 Historical recep-
tion studies reconstruct the viewer’s experience from reviews, scrapbooks, 
diaries and other historical sources.
In a more theoretical vein, the phenomenology of f ilm experience, which 
Vivian Sobchack pioneered in opposition to the then dominant semio-
psychoanalytic paradigm, stresses the corporeal and tactile dimensions 
of spectatorship, substituting for the transcendentalist notion of the gaze, 
which had been a cornerstone to Lacanian notions of spectatorship, the 
viewer’s engagement with the body of the f ilm.29
And finally, Gilles Deleuze offered a critique of both the semiotic concept 
of the sign and the psychoanalytic concept of the gaze in his two books 
on cinema.30 Both sign and gaze, Deleuze argued, stood for absences and 
implied a lack – of the object depicted, and of the object desire by the subject 
of the gaze. They were transcendentalist notions which offered an abstract, 
impoverished account of cinema, which a philosophy of f ilm should replace 
with an account of the image in its immanence.31 Following through on his 
critique Deleuze did away entirely with the concept of the spectator and 
replaced it with a typology of images inspired by pragmatist philosopher 
and semiotician Charles Sanders Pierce (even though some of his readers 
argued that his notion of the fold could be read as a theory of spectatorship, 
of the folding of the viewer into and out of the image32).
One way of describing the place of semio-pragmatics in the history of 
f ilm theory is to say that Roger Odin set out to solve the same problem 
1995); Ed S. Tan, Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film: Film as an Emotion Machine (London, 
New York: Routledge, 1996).
28 Janet Staiger, Interpreting Films: Studies in the Historical Reception of American Cinema 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Annette Kuhn, An Everyday Magic: Cinema and 
Cultural Memory (London: J.B. Tauris, 2000); Daniel Biltereyst, Richard Maltby and Philippe 
Meers (eds.) The Routledge Companion to New Cinema History (London, New York: Routledge, 
2019).
29 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press).
30 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013); Gilles 
Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time Image (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013).
31 Gilles Deleuze, Deux régimes de fous. Textes et entretiens (Paris: éditions de minuit, 2003), 
pp. 263ff.
32 Raymond Bellour, “Le dépli des émotions,” in Trafic 43 (2002), pp. 93–128.
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to which this succession of models and approaches responded, but from 
within semiotics. How can we escape the narrow focus and determinism of 
a semio-psychoanalytic model of spectatorship in the classical dispositive 
of cinema? Metz himself had opened a pathway in his inf luential essay 
“The Fiction Film and its Spectator.” Quite against the grain of some of 
his more determinist readers, he described his theory of spectatorship as 
site-specif ic and situated. It applied mostly, Metz wrote, to the cinephile 
culture of Paris, but it may not apply in the same way to other settings. 
“We have only attempted one ethnography of the spectator, among others 
remaining to be done,” Metz wrote. As a note of caution, he added that going 
forward Freudian notions would “be perhaps less helpful and certainly 
less directly useful, since they were established, despite their pretensions, 
in an observational f ield with cultural limits.”33 Semio-pragmatics can 
be understood as a systematic exploration of the f ield of inquiry which 
that admission opened up. Maintaining the original framework and 
rigor of Metzian f ilm semiotics but shifting the focus to pragmatics, Odin 
developed the concept of modes of reading as an account of spectatorship 
which is highly differentiated, but also clearly delineated, i.e., attuned 
to specif ic constellations of sound and image in varying institutional 
and pragmatic settings – constellations which include, but are far from 
limited to the dispositive of the cinema and the practices of cinephilia. 
Furthermore, semio-pragmatics is concerned with specif ic f ilms, and 
with the surface of f ilms rather than with depth. In a discussion of the 
difference between Bellour’s concept of “blocage symbolique” and his own 
notion of the “mise-en-phase,” the viewer’s phasing in with the formal 
operations of the f ilm, Odin argues that Bellour stresses the importance 
of deep-seated cultural meanings and scenarios, such as the patterns of 
sexual desire in modern societies of the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
whereas semio-pragmatics proposes to have the closest possible look at 
how such orders manifest themselves on the surface of a given f ilm, i.e., 
in the relations inside the diegesis and the relation between a viewer and 
f ilm.34 Surfaces, singularities, site specificities: if the problem of semiotics 
is indeed the transcendentalism of the concepts of sign and gaze, what we 
may describe as the three “s” of semio-pragmatics provide the contours of 
an immanentist approach to f ilm from within pragmatics itself.
33 Christian Metz, “The Fiction Film and Its Spectator: A Metapsychological Study,” trans. 
Alfred Guzetti, in New Literary History, 8/1 (1976), pp. 75–105, here p. 100.
34 Roger Odin, “Mise en phase, déphasage, performativité,” in Communications 38 (1983), 
pp. 213–238.
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Film theory is not a horse race, and while paradigm skirmishes broke 
out among the various approaches which I just sketched out in the 1980s 
and 1990s,35 contemporary f ilm studies is a surprisingly harmonious f ield, 
at least by the standards of larger and more consolidated disciplines like 
literature, philosophy or sociology, where paradigm wars structure much of 
the disciplinary debates. But since our aim here is to understand the place 
of semio-pragmatics in the broader f ield of f ilm theory, it can still be useful 
to engage in a brief exercise of compare and contrast.
Cultural Studies maintained a focus on mass media and popular culture 
and proved to be particularly productive in the analysis of television and later 
fan cultures and fandom; semio-pragmatics’ scope of inquiry encompasses 
practices ranging from cinephile and the art world to marginal media 
practices like home movies or educational f ilms. Cognitivist approaches 
focus on a binary relationship of f ilm and viewer; semio-pragmatics de-
velops a ternary model: each mode of reading and space of communica-
tion includes text, context and viewer, which means that spectatorship 
is necessarily situated. Historical reception studies focus on historical 
practice; semio-pragmatics maintains a strong focus on theory and with 
it the ability to respond and adapt to emergent new media practices and 
modes of spectatorship. Phenomenological and Deleuzian approaches stress 
the embodied and immanent nature of spectatorship and the engagement 
with the image; semio-pragmatics offers an account of spectatorship as 
embodied and situated by spelling out for each space of communication 
the specif ic constituents of its ternary model.
Another axis along which these approaches can be compared concerns 
the degree of freedom and spontaneity they assign to the viewer. At one 
end of this spectrum we f ind the ideological determinism of post-68 semio-
psychoanalysis, which largely shares with Adorno the assessment that 
mainstream cinema is an assembly line for commodif ied subjectivities. At 
the other end we f ind Cultural Studies, and more specif ically fan studies. 
Textual Poachers, the title of Henry Jenkins’s 1992 book,36 which was based 
on his dissertation under the supervision of one of the pioneers of Cultural 
Studies, John Fiske, makes this point: if cinephilia is a form of reverence 
35 David Bordwell and his school were particularly vocal in their criticism of what they perceived 
to be the then-dominant paradigm of psychoanalytic f ilm theory and hermeneutic approaches 
to f ilm. Cf. David Bordwell, Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of 
Cinema (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); David Bordwell, Noel Carroll (eds.) 
Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996).
36 Henry Jenkins, Textual Poachers: Television Fans and Participatory Culture (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1992).
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for the text, fans approach popular texts with a mixture of dedication and 
irreverence. Their f idelity is to their own emotional response to the text 
rather than to the text itself, which they treat as a resource for their own 
artefacts and inscriptions. Fandom is a transgressive form of meaning 
making, an extractive rather than a pious form of devotion – hence “textual 
poaching.” Semio-pragmatics occupies a middle ground between these two 
poles. It is heedful of the strictures which text and context, or cinematic form 
and institutional framing, impose on a given mode of reading or space of 
communication. But it also allows for, and helps us understand, re-framings 
and reappropriations in a highly specif ic way.
An example may serve to illustrate this balance.
Almost twenty years ago, I curated a program of movie trailers for a video 
art festival in Basel, Switzerland. The pièce de résistance of the program 
was a ten-minute trailer for Cecil B. DeMille’s The Ten Commandments from 
1956. Produced as a multi-purpose short f ilm which could be screened as a 
trailer in theatres and as an educational short in 16mm prints in schools, this 
trailer features Cecil B. DeMille in a wood-panelled office delivering a lecture 
on the historical sources of his f ilm. DeMille addresses his audience with 
paternalistic aplomb: this is America’s f ilmmaking history teacher speaking. 
One by one, he produces for the camera objects ranging from papyrus scrolls 
to a scale model of Michelangelo’s sculpture of Moses and a replica of the 
marble plates on which the Ten Commandments were supposedly incised. 
The short f ilm ends with a selection of scenes from the f ilm, over which 
DeMille voices a series of questions, following a standard template of trailers 
from the 1950s. Having appeared on camera in similar fashion in his trailers 
since the 1920s, DeMille in his wood-panelled off ice cuts a familiar f igure 
for contemporary American audiences – so familiar, in fact, that Alfred 
Hitchcock chose to advertise The Birds with a parody of DeMille’s The Ten 
Commandments trailer, in which he can be seen delivering a lecture about 
“our feathered friends.” In my trailer program, the Hitchcock trailer followed 
immediately after the Ten Commandments short. But the audience did not 
need to be educated about possible divergent readings of DeMille’s trailer. It 
chose to develop one itself, spontaneously. To every new object the audience 
responded with roaring laughter, for the full ten minutes of the film’s run time.
In her work on genre theory and reception history, Janet Staiger has shown 
how f ilms can change their genre over time – or rather how they can be 
gradually re-classif ied and re-labelled.37 But there is nothing gradual about 
37 Janet Staiger, Perverse Spectators: The Practices of Film Reception (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000), pp. 61ff.
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the re-classif ication the Basel audience operated on the DeMille short f ilm. 
Theirs is also not a camp reading. Theorists like Benjamin Buchloe think 
that camp is a form of mockery of the ruling order. But there is “no position 
of superiority in camp,” as Juliane Rebentisch argues: “The camp relation 
to its objects of choice is, to the contrary, one of siding with failure and 
decay.”38 The Basel audience was not laughing with or in support of DeMille, 
but at him, and however old and decaying he may have been in 1956, he 
was clearly sitting at the top of a social hierarchy which had lost little of its 
purchase on people’s lives since then. So mockery of the ruling order yes, 
camp reading no. What it was is an audience of festival goers watching a 
program in an evening sidebar, ready for entertainment after a hard day’s 
work of engaging with serious video art and experimental f ilms. What they 
collectively chose to do is pick up on a structural feature of the f ilm, the 
regular intervals at which DeMille produced his historical artefacts. They 
chose to respond to the educational short much as they would to a sitcom 
episode, in which gags are spaced out at similar intervals.
This experience demonstrates an insight from one of Odin’s earlier texts, 
which is key to the entire project of semio-pragmatics: namely that the 
“traitement f ilmique,” the cinematic form, functions in a certain way, but 
has no determined function (“Tout en ayant un fonctionnement spécif ique, 
le niveau du traitement f ilmique n’a pas de fonction specif ique”39). Far from 
prescribing their position in any def initive way, it engages the viewer’s 
affects and moves her along in the process of constructing the world of the 
f ilm. But the element of indeterminacy remains. The fact that the cinematic 
form functions in a certain way, but is not fully determined in its function, 
allows the viewer to phase out, for instance to be bored and lose interest, 
or to phase in with a different set of affects. The options, however, remain 
limited and prescribed by the way the f ilm functions.
This exactly describes the actions of the Basel audience. Rather than be 
educated, they chose to be entertained – they were, after all, sitting in a 
cinema, in the evening, after a full day of work. They chose to relabel the 
text and approach it in accordance with the label they chose. But in their 
contrarian preference for entertainment, they remained faithful to the 
text, or at least to what it ineluctably prescribed – not, admittedly, to its 
tone, but to its structure. Neither cinephiles nor fans, not engaged in pious 
or extractive devotion, they behaved rather like a group of scrupulous 
38 Juliane Rebentisch, “Camp Materialism,” pp. 242–243.
39 Roger Odin, “Mise-en-phase, déphasage, performativité,” in: Communications 38 (1983) 
p. 214.
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semioticians having a ball. As radical as their reframing and repurposing 
of the DeMille short may seem, it is well within the boundaries def ined by 
the text and the context, and well within the boundaries of the space of 
communication of the festival.
A key criterion for the validity of a theory is elegance, and semio-
pragmatics certainly offers the most elegant explanation of what a festival 
audience did with, or rather to, a DeMille f ilm on that night in Basel twenty 
years ago.
Beware of the Crypt: Semio-Pragmatics and the Question of 
Communication
We have noted the alignment of thought and action in Odin’s work as a 
theorist and an institution builder. We have also noted his pioneering 
work on home movies, amateur f ilms and, most recently, mobile phone 
f ilms.40 This is another area of convergence of theory and practice in 
Odin’s work. Odin was always a f ilmmaker as well as a theorist. His body 
of work includes more than f ifteen short f ilms, mostly documentaries. On 
6 December 2020, Odin uploaded a twenty-minute video f ilm shot with 
a mobile phone to YouTube entitled Méfiez vous de la crypte!41 The f ilm 
consists of observations in the style of diary entries, commented by Odin 
himself in voice-over. It covers the period from March to November 2020, 
i.e., the f irst eight months of the COVID-19 lockdown, which Odin and his 
wife Andrée spent in their country home, a modest restored farmhouse in 
a rural section of the Haute-Loire. The video chronicles Odin’s work in and 
around the house, his viewing of television news, his readings (of Francis 
Ponge, among others), etc. It is both a diary f ilm and the work of a theorist 
in action, a work of reflection on the lockdown and its mediated condition 
through the format of the video/mobile phone f ilm. Odin, we are given to 
understand at the outset, f ilms almost like he breathes. If the writer’s motto 
is to never spend a day without writing – “nulla dies sine linea” –, the f ilm 
theorist/f ilmmaker Odin’s motto is to never spend a day without f ilming.
The film’s climax consists in a montage of shots of an empty white bathtub 
which has been repurposed as a drinking trough for cows and graces a green 
40 Roger Odin, “Spectator, Film and the Mobile Phone,” in: Ian Christie (ed.) Audiences (Am-
sterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), pp. 155–169; Laurence Allard, Laurent Creton, 
Roger Odin (eds.) Téléphonie mobile et création (Paris: Armand Colin, 2014).
41 https://youtu.be/ZpsUJoeAnrs
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pasture near Odin’s house. Odin records that he returns to the bathtub and 
f ilms it every day, and sometimes even at night. “The videos testify to a 
transfer upon that object, to a proper f ixation,” Odin comments. “There is a 
coherence to this choice of object, and my way of filming it.” The images make 
him understand that the space of confinement of the lockdown defines his 
way of f ilming. And he recognizes what draws him to the tub and what he 
sees in it: himself. Unable to focus on writing during the lockdown, his head 
had been empty (“J’avais la tête vide”). Instead, he was drawn to the bathtub 
and started to f ilm it obsessively. Citing psychoanalysts Nicholas Abraham 
and Maria Török, Odin describes the bathtub as a repository of experiences 
which cannot be represented and assimilated into conscious memory: a crypt.
Recently, John Mowitt has also used Abraham’s and Török’s concept of 
the crypt to raise the question of communication and f ilm in a discussion 
of David Bowie’s last video work, “Lazarus.”42 Film scholars have tended to 
avoid the concept of communication, not least to distinguish themselves and 
their object from the f ield of mass media and communication studies. As 
Christian Metz put it, cinema “goes beyond communication strictly speak-
ing” since “it does not authorize the immediate play of bilateral exchange.” 
But then, Metz continues, “it is not the only semiotic system to behave in 
this way; nothing directly responds to a myth, to a folk tale, to a ritual, to a 
culinary or a clothing system, to a piece of music.”43 The reversal of terms in 
Metz’s observation is striking: what moves cinema beyond communication 
is not the lack of response from its semiotic system; it’s the lack of direct 
response from the viewer.44
That we must nonetheless speak of communication is one of the underlying 
assumptions of Odin’s work, one which he makes explicit with the concept 
of “spaces of communication.” In Metz’s seminar, Odin had found an ally in 
Francesco Casetti, who broadened the scope of film semiotics in his 1984 book 
Dentro lo sguardo (translated into English as Inside the Gaze in 1999)45 to study 
the ways in which films directly address spectators and take their engagement 
42 John Mowitt, Tracks from the Crypt (Lüneburg: meson press, 2019). https://meson.press/
wp-content/uploads/2019/11/978-3-95796-003-0-Mowitt.pdf
43 Christian Metz, Language and Cinema. Translated by Donna Jean Umiker-Sebeok (The 
Hague and Paris: Mouton & Co., 1974), p. 288.
44 Having f irst stated his stance on cinema and communication in the late 1960s, Metz continued 
to elaborate his take through the 1980s. Cf. Christian Metz, “Théories de la communication 
vs. Structuralisme. Sur la notion de communication,” in: Mise au Point 8 (2016), https://doi.
org/10.4000/map.2121.
45 Francesco Casetti, Inside the Gaze: The Fiction Film and Its Spectator. Translated by Nell 
Andrew, with an Introduction by Christian Metz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).
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into account. Metz, in turn, responded to both Casetti and Odin in his last 
book, Impersonal Enunciation, or The Place of the Film (originally published in 
1993 and translated in 2016),46 in which he insisted that a thorough analysis 
of the f ilm’s enunciatory patterns was suff icient to understand how f ilms 
are understood, and no account of the viewer’s engagement was required. 
Against Metz, and moving beyond Casetti’s focus on the f iction f ilm, Odin’s 
semio-pragmatics consistently focused on how the viewer does respond, 
if indirectly, to the semiotic system of the f ilm. The concept of “spaces of 
communication” further embeds the semiotic system of the f ilm in specif ic 
settings and framings. German sociologist Niklas Luhmann has emphasized 
what he called the “improbability of communication.” As Daniel Lee writes, 
“regardless of how much people believe they have in common […] it is not 
due to their regional, national or cultural backgrounds” that they manage 
to successfully communicate and build a society. Rather, it is “by employing 
established systems of communication, building new understanding upon 
what was successfully communicated in the past.”47 Semio-pragmatics offers 
a f ine-grained analysis of such established systems of communication, 
and the Basel experience illustrates, among other things, how little shared 
background matters for a group of people to successfully communicate with 
each other over and through a f ilm. But the DeMille example exemplif ies 
not just the improbability of communication and how it is overcome. It also 
points towards an element of indeterminacy, which implies a possible failure 
to communicate. That is, in a way, also the message of the empty bathtub. 
It marks an internal boundary in the space of communication. “Méf iez 
vous de la crypte!” means that we must not just be able to account for the 
improbable event of communication. We must also account, in the spaces of 
communication, for that which goes beyond communication, the possibility 
that communication is, strictly speaking, not possible.
After the Elegy of Cinema: Semio-Pragmatics and the State of 
Film Studies
As it emerged from cinephilia and established itself as an academic disci-
pline, f ilm studies rephrased Bazin’s argument about the ontology of the 
46 Christian Metz, Impersonal Enunciation, or The Place of Film. Translated with an Introduction 
by Cormac Deane, afterword by Dana Polan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
47 Daniel Lee, “The Society of Society.: The Grand Finale of Niklas Luhmann,” in: Sociological 
Theory, 18/2 (2000), p. 323.
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photographic image in the language of semiotics and def ined cinema as 
a photochemical image technology with a privileged bond to reality (and 
index), a site of public projection, which also happens to encapsulate a 
model of the modern public sphere as an open, accessible, but ultimately 
homogeneous space (the dispositive),48 and a limited body of works from 
directors from a limited number of countries (the canon).
Cinema is currently undergoing a transformation that can be described as 
a triple crisis of the index, the dispositive and the canon.49 Digitization has 
turned the photographic image from an index into a graph. The moving image 
has always also been an image in movement, but it has become more so in the 
age of digital devices, platforms and streaming.50 Whereas the cinema used to 
be a model for the modern public sphere, moving image culture now consists 
of a multitude of publics in different, interconnected but distinct spaces,51 
which – illustrating Sarah Sharma’s point that while publics used to be “almost 
solely understood as spatial constructs, they are also temporal”52 – also means 
different temporalities. As a consequence, we can also no longer deny that the 
history of film has long included much of which even the most knowledgeable 
gatekeepers of Western film culture have been unaware.
We now live, so the diagnosis goes, in an age of post-cinema – a formula 
which appears to capture one of the key aspects of the transformation, but 
also conveys a melancholy attachment to cinema’s classical dispositive.53
To the triple crisis of index, canon and dispositive many f ilm theorists 
of Odin’s generation have responded with books and essays which either 
diagnose an “explosion” of cinema54 and a “cinema éclaté”55 or offer elegies 
48 Miriam Hansen, Babel and Babylon: Specatorship and American Silent Film (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994). See also the discussion of cinema and public sphere in Heide 
Schlüpmann, Raum geben – der Film dem Kino (Berlin: Vorwerk 8, 2020).
49 Vinzenz Hediger, “Illusion und Indexikalität,” in Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 
(2006), pp. 1–10.
50 Frank Kessler, “The Multiple Dispositifs of Early Cinema,” in: Cinémas 29/1 (Fall 2018), 
pp. 51–66.
51 Among the f irst to diagnose and account for this transformation apart from Roger Odin – and 
from within a Habermasian rather than a semio-pragmatic framework – was Miriam Hansen. 
Cf. Miriam Hansen, “Early Cinema, Late Cinema: Permutations of the Public Sphere,” in: Screen 
34/3 (Autumn 1993), 197–210.
52 Sarah Sharma, In the Meantime: Temporality and Cultural Politics (Durham, London: Duke 
University Press, 2014), 146.
53 See for instance José Moure and Dominique Château (eds.) Post-cinema: Cinema in the 
Post-art Era (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020).
54 Francesco Casetti, The Lumière Galaxy: Seven Key Words for the Cinema to Come (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2015).
55 Guillaume Soulez (ed.) Le Cinéma éclaté. Formes et theories (= Cinémas 29/1, Fall 2019).
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for cinema in its former shape and form.56 Roger Odin has written no such 
book. Instead, he has published books on mobile phone f ilms, and he has 
written Spaces of Communication. It is a book which offers an approach 
to all kinds of objects which would not traditionally have been identif ied 
as “cinema.” It is also a book which accounts for a wide variety of spatial 
arrangements of moving images beyond the cinema dispositive, without 
imposing a hierarchy. It is a book which endorses a democracy of spaces of 
communication and helps us account for their different, interconnected, 
but distinct temporalities.
Among many younger f ilm scholars, the response to the transformation 
of cinema has been to similarly broaden the scope and redefine the objects 
of f ilm studies to include non-theatrical f ilms, “useful cinema” and other 
configurations of f ilm beyond the dispositive of cinema.57
But Roger Odin has been at this for a long time.
When Odin insisted that f ilm studies is a f ield rather than a discipline, 
and when he f irst developed semio-pragmatics as an approach to identify 
and analyse a broad variety of modalities of the moving image including, 
but not limited to, the cinema, he marked out what may at the time have 
seemed like a marginal position. But he was anticipating the shape of cinema 
studies to come. If semio-pragmatics can be read as a response to a key 
56 For instance, Dudley Andrew, What Cinema Is! Bazin’s Quest and Its Charge (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2005); Raymond Bellour, La querelle des dispositifs. Cinéma – installations, expositions 
(Paris: P.O.L, 2012); Jacques Aumont, Que reste-t-il du cinéma? (Paris: Vrin, 2013); Schlüpmann 
(2020).
57 See for instance Vinzenz Hediger (ed.) “Gebrauchsf ilm 1”; “Gebrauchsf ilm 2” (= special issues 
of Montage AV, 14/2 (2005), 15/1 (2006); Valérie Vignaux, Jean Benoit-Lévy ou le corps comme utopie. 
Une historie du cinéma éducateur entre les deux guerres (Paris: AFRHC, 2007); Vinzenz Hediger 
and Patrick Vonderau (eds.) Films That Work: Industrial Cinema and the Productivity of Media 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009); Charles Acland and Haidee Wasson (eds.) 
Useful Cinema (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2011); Dan Streible, Devin Orgeron and 
Marsha Gordon (eds.) Learning with the Lights Off: Educational Film in the United States (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Yvonne Zimmermann and Pierre Emmanuel Jacques 
(eds.) Schaufenster Schweiz. Dokumentarische Gebrauchsfilme 1896-1964 (Zürich: Limmat, 2011); 
Eef Masson, Watch and Learn: Rhetorical Devices in Classroom Films after 1940 (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2012); Pascal Laborderie, Le cinema éducateur laique (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2015); Oliver Gaycken, Devices of Curiosity: Early Cinema and Popular Science 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Scott Curtis, The Shape of Spectatorship: Art, 
Science, and Early Cinema in Germany (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); Marsha 
Gordon and Allyson Nadia Field (eds.) Screening Race in American Non-Theatrical Film (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2019); Florian Hoof, Angels of Efficiency: A Media History of Management 
Consulting (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).
Vinzenz Hediger is professor of cinema studies at Goethe University Frankfurt am Main.
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problem of f ilm theory and the semiotics of f ilm in the period after 1968, 
the solution Roger Odin proposed has been such that f ilm studies is now, 
in a way, f inally catching up with him.
This is why the English translation Spaces of Communication could not 
come at a more auspicious and appropriate time.
***
A complete bibliography and f ilmography of Roger Odin’s works compiled 
by Ludger Kaczmarek and Hans-Jürgen Wulff with a presentation by Guido 
Kirsten can be found here: https://mediarep.org/handle/doc/13732




 Foreword and Acknowledgements
My reflections on semio-pragmatics began in the 1980s and have continued 
up to this day without interruption, thus giving rise to quite a number 
of publications (see the bibliography for some of these). However, what I 
have to say in this book is fundamentally new. Even though the themes 
here are similar to those I have explored in previous publications, the 
way I approach them, but also the argument itself are, as a general matter, 
different. This is not only because I happened to change my mind on one 
or another point, and not only because since publishing previous books 
I have continued to work and thus to clarify certain points, but because 
the axis of reflection that runs all the way through this work requires that 
issues be addressed in a different light: this is the f irst time I have tried to 
theorize the notion of a space of communication and to show how it can 
be used in analyses.
I have long resisted the idea of writing a book on semio-pragmatics. 
Articles are more flexible – better suited to a process of reflection that is 
still in the making. A book makes the presentation of content more rigid and 
more conclusory – to say nothing of the risk of presumptuousness when one 
ventures to present one’s approach. However, there comes a time where it 
seems necessary to try to make at least one provisional point, if only to take 
stock more precisely of where I am in the process of reflection. (Articles – and 
this is where their f lexibility pays off – allow a certain vagueness when it 
comes to overall consistency, whereas a book does not). And still I had to 
make the decision to throw myself into the project.
This book would not exist without a kind request from Bernard Miège.
The proposal to publish it as part of a series on communication certainly 
helped things along: I initially conceived of semio-pragmatics as an ap-
proach that could work for all types of production, but up to then I had 
stuck almost exclusively to cinema and broadcasting. Publishing in this 
series has prompted me to work on more-varied output. Although there 
are still plenty of references to my own professional domain, I have also 
tackled other areas. I have greatly enjoyed writing this book, and I hope 
the general aim of the “model” I have set out will be clear.
Odin, R., Spaces of Communication: Elements of Semio-Pragmatics. With an Introduction by 
Vinzenz Hediger. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022
doi 10.5117/9789462987142_FW
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I cannot give enough thanks to those students and colleagues who had to 
put up with my various attempts at theorizing in various seminars, whether 
at the University of Paris III – Sorbonne Nouvelle, elsewhere in France, or 
abroad, and who, with their questions and their comments, and sometimes 
just by listening, allowed me to look back at my work and move forward 
with my research.
I would like to thank Isabelle Pailliart, Bernard Miège and Pierre Mœglin 
for reading the book with such a critical eye. I have taken full account of 
their comments, and even where I have not followed their suggestions, I 
have always benef itted from them one way or the other. It is rare in this 
day and age to f ind a book series that affords its authors critical readings 
of such high quality.
“Without a machine, one is sure, from the start, to see nothing.”
– Christian Metz

 Introduction: The Semio-Pragmatic 
Model
There is a rather surprising observation to be made right at the starting 
point of semio-pragmatics: a great many theorists seem to have enormous 
diff iculties deciding where they stand with regard to these two major 
paradigms: the immanentist and the pragmatic.
A look back at a couple of def initions:
The immanentist approach posits the text or language [langage] as an 
entity endowed with permanent structural characteristics (a system in 
which each term has meaning only in relation to the system), an entity 
that it describes without reference to what lies outside it. As Ferdinand 
de Saussure put it: “Language [la langue] is a system that knows only its 
own order.”1 Classical semiology was built on these foundations.
Conversely, pragmatic approaches hold that a sign, a word, a statement 
and a text make sense only in relation to the context in which they are 
sent and received. Theorists have different conceptions of what we are 
to understand by “relationship with the context.” I regard pragmatics as 
comprising those approaches that put the context at the starting point 
of the production of meaning – that posit the context as regulating this 
production.
On the Difficulty of Getting Away from Immanence
A number of attempts by theorists to move away from the immanentist 
paradigm and enter the pragmatic have ended up running aground in a 
return to the immanentist.
1 Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique Générale (Paris: Payot, 1986), p. 43.
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This is true, for instance, of the theory of enunciation that was initially 
constructed as the analysis of the relationship between enunciation and 
the set of parameters in the communication setting (the sender, the 
receiver and the context, and the spatio-temporal circumstances, as well 
as the conditions of the production and reception of messages) – that is, 
as a pragmatic approach. This theory quickly gets to the point where it is 
boiled down to an analysis of “the imprint of the process of enunciation 
on the utterance.”2 This return to immanentism is often made in the 
awareness that one is missing something: Catherine Kerbat-Orrechioni3 
thus observes: “We are methodologically bound to the problematic of 
traces” [my emphasis].
The same goes for the pragmatics of speech acts (Austin, Searle), which 
are limited to studying how a text affects the reader. Thus the text still 
comes f irst. In the f ield of f ilm studies, this movement is evident in the 
book Western Graffiti (1983) by Daniel Dayan, who, even as he shows his 
willingness to “move from one type of analysis oriented towards the text 
of a f ilm to another oriented towards the viewer”4 (a statement that seems 
to fall within the pragmatic paradigm), is devoted in fact “to the study of 
the effects of the utterances” on the viewer.5 Moreover, the subtitle of the 
book is “Image Games and the Programming of the Viewer in John Ford’s 
Stagecoach.” We do not get away from the immanentist paradigm.
Here is one last example: the case of Umberto Eco, a theorist who, in 1962 
[1989], wrote a book, The Open Work, which begins with this statement: “It is 
a fact that production and consumption may be at the origin of two objects 
that are strangers to one another.”6 It thus announces itself as a precursor 
to the pragmatic approach to texts. And there he is again in 1990, in The 
Limits of Interpretation, dedicating one of his f irst chapters to “an apology 
of the literal sense”7 and setting himself the goal of “knowing what one has 
to protect in order to open it” [my emphasis].8
2 Oswald Ducrot and Tzvelan Todorov, Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage 
(Paris: Seuil, 1972) p. 405.
3 Catherine Kerbrat-Orechioni, L’énonciation. De la subjectivité dans le langage (Paris: A. 
Colin, 1980), p. 32.
4 Daniel Dayan, Western graffiti. Jeux d’images et programmation du spectateur dans La 
chevauchée fantastique de John Ford (Paris: Clancier-Guenaud, 1983), p. 269.
5 Ibid.
6 Umberto Eco, The Open Work, Trans. by Anna Cancogni (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, (1989) [1962] ), p. 11 [my emphasis].
7 Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 
p. 53.
8 Ibid., p. 55 [my emphasis].
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On the Difficulty of Staying Within Immanence
One might think that, if it is hard to get away from immanence and turn to 
pragmatics, staying within immanence poses no problem – but that is just 
not so. Theorists who say they are adherents of immanence still f ind just as 
many diff iculties staying within the immanentist paradigm as the theorists 
who seek a pragmatic approach in trying to escape the immanentist one. 
The world of theorists is really quite complicated….
The work of the semiologist Christian Metz is a remarkable illustration 
of this second movement. Few theorists, indeed, have claimed so vigorously 
that they belong to the immanentist paradigm. He has claimed that he has 
prioritized the study of systems, used a method based on the study of internal 
differences (distributional or componential analysis), and established typolo-
gies and taxonomies: a taxonomy of sequential constructs likely to appear 
in f ilms (the famous grand syntagmatic [1968]), a taxonomy of languages 
[langages], a taxonomy of various types of “system,” a taxonomy of the 
“codes” of cinematic language…. And the list could go on. His last book, 
Impersonal Enunciation, or the Place of Film (2016 [1991]), is an immanentist 
manifesto if ever there was one. Metz states not only that the enunciator 
and the addressee are “parts of text”9 but that, “in principle the reader only 
decodes what the writer produces, yet their respective activities move in 
opposite directions.”10
The paradox is that the first gesture Metz made in founding the semiology 
of cinema was to construct cinematographic language as a “language without 
a language system” [un langage sans langue] (1968) and thus to place this 
approach from the get-go alongside the models of performance and pragmat-
ics: “one f inds oneself thrown back from the outset onto judgements that 
correspond to instances of acceptability (performance models) that come into 
play in the reception of the socio-cultural classes of users and the broadcast 
of f ilm genres.”11 In Metz’s f irst articles (1968), references to the work the 
viewer does to produce meaning f igure prominently (cf., for example, the 
notion of “induction current,” which suggests that the viewer projects a 
narrative relationship between two shots). Even the grand syntagmatique, 
which is always cited as a model of the immanentist structural approach, 
was conceived to work for a class of f ilms (f iction f ilms) that is delimited 
9 Christian Metz, Impersonal Enunciation, or the Place of Film (New York: Columbia University 
Press, (2016) [1991]), p. 20.
10 Ibid.
11 Christian Metz, Essais sémiotiques (Paris: Klincksieck, 1977a), p. 118.
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historically (classic f iction f ilms produced from 1930 to 1955 or thereabouts). 
External (that is, not immanent) considerations thus determine the construc-
tion of the model. At f irst glance, Langage et Cinéma (1971) would seem to be 
farther from these pragmatic concerns. In it, Metz insists, however, that even 
if cinematographic language can be described as a combinatory of codes, only 
the notion of the subcode can explain how it works at any given point in its 
history. If the codes are the locus of the problems that every director has to 
resolve (how to frame? how to organize a sequence of images? how to link 
up moving images?), there are indeed many ways to answer these questions. 
The subcodes are specifying “the same coding problem.”12 For example, the 
issue of montage leads to different answers depending on the period, the 
author, aesthetic currents, and genres: montage of attractions (Eisenstein), 
invisible montage, montage-collage, “forbidden” montage (Bazin), and so 
on. The notion of the subcode is without doubt pragmatic.
More generally, for Metz, “linguistic-analytical capture” is “from the start 
a socio-historical project.”13 In The Perceived and the Named,14 he shows that 
“the perceptual object” is a “socially constructed” entity. The transition to 
the psychoanalytic approach (1975) becomes part of the same movement 
by integrating the unconscious determinations into the process of reading 
movies and into the construction of the cinematic signif ier itself. Metz 
points out in closing that the way he has described how the cinematographic 
signifier works “concerns…only certain geographical forms of the institution 
itself – those used in Western countries.” And he adds: “The entire f ilm as 
a social fact, and thus also the psychological state of the ordinary viewer, 
may entail aspects that are very different to those we are used to. Only 
one ethnography of the f ilmic state has been attempted, among others 
that have yet to be tried.”15 The contextual, pragmatic approach is not 
even absent from Impersonal Enunciation, or the Place of Film (2016 [1991]). 
Metz points out several changes in the way the configurations he studies 
work, depending on the communicative contexts they are operating in. He 
observes, for instance, that the gaze of the camera “was capable of taking 
forms one would not think of.” The viewer of primitive cinema would see 
it as something normal, because at that time “it is a set-up [dispositif ] that 
differs profoundly from what prevails today.”16
12 Christian Metz, Language and Cinema (The Hauge, Paris: Mouton & Co., 1971b), p. 193.
13 Metz, Essais sémiotiques, p. 186.
14 Ibid., pp. 127–161.
15 Ibid., pp. 132–133.
16 Christian Metz, L’énonciation impersonnelle ou le site du film (Paris: Méridiens Klincksieck, 
1991), p. 41.
introduC tion: tHe Semio -prAgmAtiC model 45
In short, the analyses Metz offers are based on the conviction that external 
constraints determine the cinema’s conditions of possibility. Beyond its 
immanentist proclamations, we can say that the entire work of Metz reflects 
concerns from pragmatics.
Vacillation
Some works vacillate between the two paradigms. I will give just one 
example. Gianfranco Bettetini’s 1984 book La conversazione audiovisiva 
invites us to look at conversational analysis, one of the major trends in 
linguistic pragmatics. Yet, from the beginning, Bettetini explains that 
the notion of conversation cannot have the same meaning in f ilm as in 
linguistics: not only is f ilm a mono-directional medium that does not allow 
an authentic exchange, but the f ilm text itself cannot be modif ied during 
the conversation. There is thus no real interactivity. On the other hand, the 
audiovisual conversation in question takes place between two entities, both 
of which are identif iable through a set of marks inscribed in the text itself: 
the enunciator and the addressee. It is, in a word, a conversazione testuale 
(this is the title of Chapter 4).17 At the same time, Bettetini recognizes that 
it is essential to step back from the text and to extend his investigations 
to concrete situations in which communication takes place. In this way, 
he begins a typology of the various constitutive instances of the empirical 
enunciating subject (il soggetto empirico) – instances that may speak in the 
communicative f ield: the editorial, the author, the major genres18 and an 
analysis of the extratextual enunciative marks (paratexts, a TV schedule, 
indications about genre, and so on).19 Two conceptions of enunciation are 
thus posited – one, textual (enunciation in the classic sense of the term, 
which falls under the category of immanence); the other, whose status is 
pragmatic, external.
At other times, Bettetini shows that the empirical viewer can be registered 
in the textual conversation only by putting themselves in the shoes of the 
subject of the enunciation that the text offers them, a symbolic subject 
who works as a “prosthesis”20 on which the viewer must rely in order for 
17 Gianfranco Bettetini, La conversazione audiovisiva. Problemi dell’enunciazione filmica e 
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the communication to work. Now, because the f ilmic text has a f ixed and 
immutable structure that includes in its semiotic articulation “the represen-
tation of its standards of use and of the mode of access to its meaning,”21 it is 
ultimately this text which, through the enunciative prosthesis, programmes 
the empirical viewer. Once again, the movement therefore goes from text to 
viewer. There is a return to immanence. But Bettetini also recognizes that 
the empirical spectator cannot content themselves with putting themselves 
in the shoes of the viewer produced by the text – that they are stuck between 
two projects: the project of the text and their own project, or at least the 
project that they def ine under the constraint of the external determina-
tions that weigh on them. It may happen, then, that external, contextual 
determinations outweigh the textual determinations.
There is thus a constant back and forth going on in the book between 
the immanentist and the pragmatic paradigms. No one is more aware of 
these switches than Bettetini, who, in his presentation, talks about the 
“dialectical tension”22 that is at the heart of his thinking. It is obvious that he 
wants to renounce neither the immanence that reassures him theoretically 
(it is immanence that, in his view, establishes semiotic relevance), nor the 
consideration of the pragmatic dimension that he strongly senses cannot be 
expunged without being cut off from the actual workings of communication.
For an Articulation between the Two Paradigms: Semio-
Pragmatics
My view is that the diff iculty theorists have in escaping immanence, such 
as Metz’s position in extolling immanence while developing a pragmatic 
approach, or Bettetini’s vacillation, should neither be condemned as incon-
sistent nor dismissed as signs of theoretical weakness, but, on the contrary, 
should be taken quite seriously as the mark of a very real phenomenon: 
what if neither paradigm could be escaped?
Everything happens as though both paradigms were still there, at the 
same time, present in theorists’, but also in everyone’s, minds: at the same 
time, there is the belief in the text and its independent existence, and the 
recognition that the meaning of a text changes with the context.
In L’implicite (1986), Catherine Kerbrat-Orrecchioni describes the existence 
of this dual belief with a bit of humour. She begins by quoting Bob Wilson, 
21 Ibid., p. 101.
22 Ibid., p. 8.
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who was interviewed about Einstein on the Beach: “I handle images as a 
composer would. You are free to interpret them as you like.” But a little 
later on, in response to the question, “What does this building represent? 
Is it a school?”, he protests, outraged. “What? No! Not at all!” And Catherine 
Kerbrat-Orrecchioni remarks: “Every one of us can give in to it one day. As 
semioticians, we are ready to allow the right, and even to claim it, to more 
than one reading of the same text; to repeat endlessly (because this truth 
is still a long way from being recognized by most people in the world of 
criticism, or among those who teach literature) that we must recognize 
the existence, at the heart of interpretive activity, of a principle of both 
uncertainty and diversity. But as soon as we take off our semiotician’s hats 
and become ordinary consumers of literary or other texts, we fall right into 
the interpretive dogmatism we were excoriating a few moments earlier, 
stubbornly extolling the virtues of common sense and setting off on a 
crusade against misinterpretation: “I know very well, but all the same….”23
In Le film sous influence, un procédé d’analyse, Jean-Daniel Lafond reasons 
rigorously in the opposite direction, but ends up arriving at the same conclu-
sion: he attributes to the viewer the idea of the individual reading – the idea 
that there are as many f ilms as there are viewers – and to the semiologist 
the role of the one who restores the immanent truth of the text: “the analyst 
is going to…focus their work on reviewing the stimulus – in this case, on 
the f ilm as an organised information system. The study of this structure 
is precisely what is involved in analysing a f ilm. This approach therefore 
turns its back on the sense of ‘the unique’ that the viewer usually has of 
how they perceive the f ilm, and that justif ies the prejudice that says there 
are as many f ilms as viewers.”24
Whether it is the ordinary reader or the theorist who does or does not 
believe in the variability of the text, one thing is certain: the double move-
ment is within us. On the one hand, it is impossible for us not to presuppose 
the existence of the text, namely immanence: without this belief, social life 
would be really very diff icult. On the other hand, it is equally impossible 
for us not to recognize that, depending on the context in which it is carried 
out, the construction of the text may be different (the pragmatic approach).
It seems to me that the logical conclusion to draw from this f inding is 
that these two paradigms must intervene in the analysis of communication 
and therefore in the theoretical framework that aims to take account of 
it. Nor can we fail to recognize that the text varies in accordance with the 
23 Catherine Kerbrat-Orechioni, L’implicite (Paris: A. Colin, 1986), p. 310.
24 Jean-Daniel Lafond, Le film sous influence, un procédé d’analyse (Paris: Édilig, 1982) p. 70.
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context, or overlook the fact that the receiver believes in the existence 
of a text that has been sent to them with a meaning that has been set in 
stone, and that they would simply have to decode. Whether it is or is not 
an illusion does not alter the fact that it is this text that, ultimately, is the 
result of the communication process. What is needed, then, is a theory 
capable of articulating these two contradictory movements at the heart of 
the communication process – a theory that connects the two paradigms.
Even its name tells us that the semio-pragmatic approach aims to articulate 
these two paradigms. This approach does not make obsolete the immanentist 
approach of classic semiology, whose key contributions it recognizes: the 
attention paid to the text, the production of analytical tools (the typology of 
signs, certain conceptual pairings – denotation vs connotation, paradigmatic 
vs syntagmatic relations, and so forth), the structural analysis of the narrative 
and of the description, procedures for analysing the enunciative structure, 
acts of language, etc. – and even salutary warnings against the deviations 
that an uncontrolled pragmatic approach can lead to. Its goal is to put this 
immanentist approach into a contextualized pragmatic perspective. Once 
the contextual constraints governing the construction of the text have been 
recognized, the immanentist analysis can be put into action.
The Semio-Pragmatic Model
It now makes sense to create and construct a model of communication 
that will be adapted.
One caveat, however, about this term “model” is in order: I use it for 
convenience, and my constructions do not have the logical rigour that this 
notion normally implies. The quotes are there to indicate this reserve. Since 
putting them around every occurrence of the term would weigh the text 
down too much, I will ask the reader to include them in their mind every time 
they see the term. What I call a model is only a working tool that mediates 
between theory and observation – a theoretical device, a “machine,”25 a 
kind of optical instrument, a telescope, or rather a microscope, that aims 
to help the reader to see better and ask themselves questions.
I am looking for a model that can account for the two contradictory 
movements that have been highlighted: on the one hand, there is the fact that 
we believe we are looking at a text that someone wanted to communicate 
to us and that we believe we can understand. On the other, there is the fact 
25 Metz, Essais sémiotiques, p. 185.
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that different texts are produced depending on the reading context we are 
in. These two movements do not have the same relationship to the pragmatic 
paradigm: whereas the second is recorded directly, the f irst derives from the 
immanentist illusion – though it must be possible to explain this illusion 
starting from the pragmatic position.
It is clear that patterns of transmission of the encoding-decoding type 
(Shannon and Weaver, Jakobson) or so-called models in “Y” that are content 
to add a pragmatic component to the codic components (for example, the 
deictic component in Benveniste) would not suit this approach. Interactive 
models developed by Bateson, Goffman, Watzlawick and others are closer to 
what I am after. For these models, the “context,” sometimes referred to as the 
“framework,” or the “culture,” is the determinant, an “element” in the sense 
in which we speak of air and water as elements, an enveloping element in 
which the actors of communication are bathed. The metaphor that has been 
developed is that of the “orchestra”: “the members of a culture participate 
in communication just as musicians participate in an orchestra. But the 
communication orchestra has no boss, and the musicians are not playing 
from the same score. They come to more or less harmonious agreements 
because they will guide each other as they play.”26 Thus “each individual 
participates in communication rather than being its origin or its outcome.”27 
However, the concept of communication has a specif ic meaning here. These 
models are, in fact, made for social communication: what happens for the 
individual and between individuals in the hic et nunc, with a focus that is 
often (though not always) therapeutic. In their current form, these models 
seem to me barely serviceable if one wishes, as I do, to study both mediated 
and deferred communication, bringing into play a f ilm, a television show, 
a book, a journal article, and so on, as well as viewers or readers.
The model I suggest building posits a radical separation between the 
space of the sender (S) and that of the receiver (R): when, in the space of the 
sender (S), the sender gives birth to a text (T) in the space of reception, this 
text is reduced to a set of visual and/or sound vibrations (V) from which the 
receiver (R) will produce a text (T’) that cannot, a priori, be identical to (T). 
We thus have a model of non-communication.
Note: This position does not contradict the statement by Paul Watzlawick 
(1972) that “one cannot not communicate.” What the theorist from the 
26 Yves Winkin, Anthropologie de la communication. De la théorie au terrain (Bruxelles: De 
Boeck/ Paris: Seuil, 2001).
27 Yves Winkin, La nouvelle communication (Paris: Seuil, 1981), p. 25.
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Palo Alto school means is that we cannot not produce signals. This does 
not mean at all that these signals are interpreted correctly by those who 
perceive them.
Here is a f irst snippet of how the model is built:
Schema 1: Two spaces 
Space S Space r
S ▬▬ ▬ V ▬▬ ▬▬ ►t V t’◄
▬▬ ▬▬▬ ▬▬ r 
│______________________ ▲
In the space of the sender (S), (V) is located between (S) and (T): the work S does 
actually involves giving shape to vibrations in order to produce a text. When 
we enter the space of the receiver (R), this text is again reduced to vibrations 
(V), and it is these vibrations that (R) will in turn transform into text (T’).
The status that I am assigning to this model is worth noting. The key point 
is that it in no way claims to describe how communication works: rather, it 
aims to make it possible to ask about how communication processes do or 
do not work. The semio-pragmatic model is heuristic: one does not try to 
determine whether a heuristic hypothesis is true or false. Rather, one adopts 
it only provisionally as a guiding idea as one looks for the facts. That is the 
status that is given to the hypotheses which (in)form semio-pragmatics.
The value of putting a model of non-communication at the starting point of 
our reflections is clear: because of its radical character, this model forces me 
to consider communication as a problem and not as something that exists. 
More precisely, the value of such a model is that it forces me to try to explain 
what can lead (S) and (R) to “communicate,” i.e., to ask how the processes 
by which meaning is produced in both spaces can get so close to each other 
that (R) has the impression that (T) was transported from one space to the 
other. This constitutes an immanentist position: (R) “thinks” they have in 
front of them a text that (S) has communicated to them: f irst movement.
The model also allows us to ask about the second movement, namely the 
fact that different texts (T’) can be built from the same (V). Indeed, if (R) is 
responsible for the construction of the text (T’) in the space of reading, we 
can imagine that a receiver (R2) will lead to the construction of a text (T’’), 
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that (R3) will lead to (T’’’), and so on, and that there are as many texts that 
have been constructed as there are receivers.
But what is meant by receivers and, more generally, what is the status of 
the actors in communication?
I will consider (S) and (R) not as individuals, but as actants. Accepting 
the risks that come with abstraction and a deterministic vision – a purely 
theoretical determinism – I will def ine (S) and (R) as the intersection of a 
set of constraints that passes through and constructs them.
The same person can thus appear in the form of different (Rs) – (R1), 
(R2)…(Rn) – following the sets that cross them and produce different texts 
from the same (V): (T1), (T2)…(Tn).
Conversely, different people will be able to appear in the form of one 
and the same (R) and therefore produce the same (T) if they are traversed 
by the same set of constraints.
Finally, if we ask ourselves about the way in which the constraints are 
involved in each of the two spaces, we can then compare how (S) and (R) 
produce meaning based on the set of constraints that constitutes them. The 
more similar the set of constraints that weigh on (S) and (R), the more (S) and 
(R) will be constructed in a similar way, and the greater the chances that they 
will produce meaning in the same way and that what they produce will be 
similar to one another: (T’) becomes more like (T). In the end, communica-
tion can take place because the actants who are producers of meaning, (S) 
and (R), are not free. Specif ically, it is these constraints, and they alone, that 
allow us to get the impression that the process of communication works.
Here we find the question of the “context,” seen not as what the referential 
process refers to (as, for example, in Jakobson’s model), but as all of the 
constraints that govern the production of meaning (cf. Schema 2 at the end 
of the Introduction).
In the same way that some theorists have proposed classifying narrative 
models into models of the f inished story (Greimas) and models that follow 
the movement of the construction of the narrative by the reader (Bremond, 
Eco), communication patterns can be classif ied into:
– models that analyse communication that has f inished, or models 
oriented around results, such as Jakobson’s model, which is focused on 
the message (these models derive from the immanentist paradigm)
– models that analyse communication as it unfolds, or models oriented 
around progressions28
28 Cf. Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publisher, 1995).
52 SpACeS of CommuniCAtion
The semio-pragmatic model falls under neither of these categories. It is 
concerned with the constraints that govern how the actants in communica-
tion are constructed, and with the way in which they are led to produce 
meaning: I propose to talk about a production model.
A production model describes the context as a construction that precedes 
communication, in order to set the terms on which it takes place: for instance, 
if I were to take the set of all theatres, I could construct the context as a space 
in which the actant (R) is positioned as a “viewer,” as opposed to the academic 
context, where (R) is positioned as a “learner,” or to the family context, in 
which they are positioned as a “member of the family.” In progression models, 
by contrast, the context is constructed in the course of communication and 
works as a “variable”: “A central problem for pragmatic theory is to describe 
how, for any given utterance, the hearer f inds a context which enables him 
to understand it adequately.”29
Here we are, then, facing two different conceptions of the notion of 
context – or, more exactly, two different notions of context. Sperber and 
Wilson offer a robust critique of the models that regard the context as a 
prior condition, but if we look carefully at their criticisms, we notice that 
what they see as falling under the notion of prior context has nothing to 
do with the conception of the context as it is found in semio-pragmatics: 
the prior context as they envisage it consists essentially of encyclopaedic 
content and of information stored in memory (they also speak of “common 
knowledge”); for the semio-pragmatic model, the context is constituted by 
the constraints. I think these two models complement one another: the 
production model sets the overall framework within which the progression 
model will operate.
Moreover, Sperber and Wilson acknowledge the existence of this frame-
work, but only for very special cases such as the institution of the law, where 
“there really is a serious attempt to establish mutual knowledge among all 
the parties concerned: all laws and precedents are made public, all legitimate 
evidence is recorded, and only legitimate evidence can be considered, so 
that there is indeed a restricted domain of mutual knowledge on which 
all parties may call, and within which they must remain.” But they go on: 
“There is no evidence of any such concern in normal conversation, however 
serious or formal it is.”30 We can see that Sperber and Wilson are right, of 
course, if we regard the prior context as content. But it is quite a different 
matter if we look at the constraints that govern the production of meaning. 
29 Ibid., p. 16.
30 Ibid., p. 19.
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Communication takes place most frequently within institutional frameworks 
that are obviously just so many systems of constraints (family, school, 
university, the factory, and so on). Going to the theatre and the cinema, 
watching TV, going to a football or rugby game in a stadium, going into a 
supermarket, opening a newspaper, also involve entering into a system of 
constraints. Even spontaneous dialogues come into such frameworks, as 
has been shown by specialists in verbal interactions and conversational 
analysis. In addition, systems of constraints can readily be transported and 
internalized: when I ask my friend Pierre, whom I have just bumped into 
on a street corner, for news of his family, I am caught up in the constraints 
both of the family as an institution and of politeness. And as for romantic 
relationships….
In the semio-pragmatic model, analysis starts decidedly from the context 
– that is, from constraints. These constraints lead the actant (R) to produce 
hypotheses of reading that they will test out on (V): for example, if I am in a 
context that invites me to resort to f ictionalization, I will try to construct 
the space as a “world,” but it may be that the system of vibrations to which 
I apply this process does not allow this.
Chapter 1 examines the status of natural, narrative language and other 
constraints, and suggests constructing the notion of a space of communica-
tion to escape the aporias in the notion of context. Chapter 2 postulates 
that, inside a discursive space (in this case, “Western” space), the actors 
put a shared communicative competence into action. This skill is designed 
as a reservoir of modes of production of meanings and affects, which can 
themselves be analysed as a combination of processes. By way of example, 
several modes are constructed. Chapter 3 offers a detailed analysis of two 
modes, the artistic and the aesthetic, and inquires into the relationship 
between modes and spaces of communication. Starting from the example of 
the communication of memory within the family as an institution, Chapter 4 
shows how the notion of a space of communication can allow contextual 
analysis. Chapter 5 mobilizes the notion of a space of communication to 
allow an understanding of what a production becomes when it moves outside 
its original space. Finally, Chapter 6 examines the difference between 
traditional (immanentist) textual analysis and textual analysis within the 
semio-pragmatic perspective.
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Schema 2: Context as a Set of Constraints
Space S Space r
S ▬▬ ▬ V ▬▬ ▬▬ ►t V t’◄
▬▬ ▬▬▬ ▬▬ r 
│______________________▲
Context S
Constraints a, b, c….n
Context r
Constraints b, c, d, g,… n
1. Context, Constraints and the Space of 
Communication
Abstract
Chapter 1 examines the status of universally shared constraints, narrative 
constraints and the language as a set of constraints.
Keywords: universal constraints, narrative, language
If the context is def ined as a set of constraints, and if the total weight of 
the operation (or non-operation) of communication rests on these, it is 
essential that we give ourselves the means to analyse them. And this is where 
the trouble begins, because there are countless constraints. A number of 
theorists have emphasized, moreover, that this was where pragmatics ran 
aground. François Latraverse sees a “problem that is both theoretically and 
philosophically interesting, even if also something of a cause for despair.”1
At the end of this chapter, I will go out on a limb by suggesting a tool 
for tackling this problem, but before I do that, I will look at two questions 
that have given rise to countless debates, and that it seems essential to ask, 
even if I cannot really answer them. The f irst can be formulated as follows: 
are there any constraints that are shared universally – that is, that would 
weigh on (S) and (R) regardless of the communication context in which 
these actants are located? The second concerns the role of language in the 
system of constraints.
Universally Shared Constraints
It has essentially been cognitivists who have highlighted these constraints. 
They insist on everything that makes a person a person – on the fact that 
1 François Latraverse, La pragmatique: Histoire et critique (Bruxelles: Mardaga, 1987), p. 18.
Odin, R., Spaces of Communication: Elements of Semio-Pragmatics. With an Introduction by 
Vinzenz Hediger. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022
doi 10.5117/9789462987142_ch01
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our perceptual and neural apparatus has remained largely unchanged for 
thousands of years, and that it is this same apparatus that is shared today 
by every human being. We will thus speak of natural constraints.
Natural Constraints2
Here is an example to get us pondering. We know the thesis that Umberto 
Eco has set out in various articles and in Chapter II of his book, The Absent 
Structure: “Iconic signs are conventional. That is, they do not have the 
property of the thing represented, but they transcribe certain conditions 
of experience, according to a code.”3 Faced with this position, which is 
characteristic of the age of semiology, the cognitivists try to persuade us 
that the recognition of objects in images takes place through processes that 
are largely the same as those we use in the world.
There are, f irst of all, pure and simple phenomena of identity: a triangle 
that has been drawn is a triangle. Similarly, some facial features are directly 
present in an image: the more-or-less round or oval shape of the face, the 
geometric configuration of the eyes and the mouth, as well as their relative 
positions. On the other hand, Torben Grodal4 tells us that Eco is wrong 
when he holds that what distinguishes a drawing of a horse clearly from 
the view of a horse in reality, is the lines in the drawing. Since the work of 
David Marr, we know, in fact, that seeing an object entails producing lines 
that delimit “virtual borders,” that is, drawing the apparent outline of the 
objects (cf. the concepts of “zero crossing” and “primal sketch”). There is 
no need to master a code in order to recognize a horse in a drawing: it is 
enough to know what a horse is. Laurent Jullier has come up with a rule for 
this: if an object that is known to a given extent by someone is recognized 
in a given image, “it will be universally recognised by anyone who knows 
that object to the same extent.”5
A number of processes come from automatic cognitive functions that in 
their workings not only have no relation to culture but do not even arise 
from a process of inference: “Who has ever had the impression of seeing a 
2 The following section owes much to Laurent Jullier, Cinéma et cognition (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2002).
3 Umberto Eco, La structure absente. Introduction à la recherche sémiotique (Paris: Mercure 
de France, 1972), p. 191.
4 Torben Kragh Grodal, Moving Pictures: A New Theory of Film Genres, Feelings, and Cognition 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 75–77.
5 Jullier, Cinéma et cognition, p. 100.
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flat movie? And who can even manage to do so by some effort of the will?”6 
Experiments show that the same goes for spotting apparent movement, 
for determining relative sizes, and for sensing three-dimensional relief. 
This type of process even concerns effects that have nothing to do with 
the production of meaning, such as the effects of dizziness, or of a change 
in pressure and speed that one can experience in some simulators or in an 
IMAX theatre: a sense that is impossible to escape. To characterize these 
phenomena, the cognitivists talk about short circuits, “pre-wiring” (meaning 
neuronal connections that are there from birth, and even before that), a 
“sub-symbolic connectionist” level, and encapsulated modules: modules not 
consciously controlled by the subject and that thus cannot be disconnected.
We must insist on one point: that, in order to be valid, such an approach 
must deploy a highly controlled experimental process. Now, very often, 
those who work on communication in that respect do it second hand: they 
do not experiment themselves, and thus rely on experiments carried out by 
researchers from other disciplines, which are highly technical and advanced 
(neuro-anatomy, neurophysiology, neurobiology, artif icial intelligence, 
cognitive psychology, and so on). Since these specialists do not agree among 
themselves, and since there are various currents (such as computationism, 
as opposed to connectionism) and thus propositions that often contradict 
each other, it is diff icult for those doing research in communication to get 
their bearings and particularly to choose among these propositions, because 
they do not have the professional competence to evaluate them.
Conversely, scientists who do experiments are often too trusting when it 
comes to the traps that the f ield of communication sets for them. The most 
serious risk, from this standpoint, is that, because of how they conduct their 
experiments, these researchers allow themselves to be trapped by their 
own way of communicating and of understanding the world (this is what 
is known as the naturalist illusion). Thus, some theorists felt able to say that 
tonal music was based on the natural principles of human cognition and 
that they could deduce from this the existence of a natural and implicit 
grammar of hearing that would explain, for instance, the diff iculties that 
serial music faced in its reception by the public: the idea was that we are 
simply not programmed to hear series in the f irst place. The compositional 
grammar that composers of this type of music use would thus, on this view, 
come into conflict with the natural grammar of reception.7 However, 
6 Ibid., p. 98.
7 Fred Lerdahl and Ray S. Jackendorff, A Generative: Theory of Tonal Music (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1983).
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we have as many diff iculties identifying the play between subject and 
countersubject in Bach’s fugues as there are series in serial music. Also, 
how can we explain, if we accept this theory, that Pygmy polyphonies 
work with no problem for the Pygmies themselves, while we are unable to 
correctly identify their rhythms?8 Does this not also show the existence 
of musical grammars (of production and listening) different from our own, 
and does it not amount to a rejection of the idea that tonal grammar is the 
result of natural constraints? These observations do not mean that there 
are no musical universals: the very fact of music (as opposed to words or 
noise) appears to be a universal phenomenon, as do certain principles of 
construction (tension vs release; repetition vs non-repetition), but we must 
be rather careful in identifying them.
We must add, following Jullier, that the farther we move from the level of 
automatic constraints and towards processes of a symbolic kind, the farther 
we move from processes that may lead to indisputable experiments and the 
more hypothetical the models become. If those doing research on memory 
still base themselves on more-or-less verif iable models, the validity of 
everything to do with the modelling of the human mind (sometimes referred 
to as the theory of mind) as a systematic way, inspired by the computer, of 
treating information (which is itself also an information-processing system) 
depends on the answer to the question: are the two systems of the same 
nature? This debate is wide open. The problem is even more acute when it 
comes to the evolutionary approach. How do I prove that, if I manage to 
convey to my girlfriend my enthusiasm for this landscape, this is because 
it would have been appreciated by our ancestors in the Pleistocene era?9
The Narrative Constraint
There is, however, a universal constraint that seems all but indisputable: the 
narrative constraint. Theorists hailing from a range of disciplines agree: it is 
as if an inner force were driving us towards narrative structures. Ethnologists 
recognize it: the recourse to stories can be found in all societies. Psycho-
analysts talk about “a desire inherent in the structuring of the psyche,”10 
8 Michel Gribenski, “Musique et sciences cognitives,” Labyrinthe, vol. 20 (2005), pp. 99–116.
9 Cf. the Savanna hypothesis, Gordon H. Orians and Judith H. Heerwagen, “Evolved Responses 
to Landscapes,” in Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (ed.), The Adapted Mind 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 555–579.
10 Jean-Louis Baudry, “Le dispositif,” Communications, vol. 23 (1975), pp. 56–72.
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a desire that flows directly from the Oedipal constraint: “isn’t storytelling 
always a search for origins, an account of one’s entanglements with the 
Law, an entry into the dialectic of tenderness and hate?”11 Psychologists, for 
their part, have shown that “plot development” structures our experience 
of early childhood. The use of the term, coined by Ricoeur, is no accident: 
what is at stake here is the issue of “narrative identity.” The child psychiatrist 
Daniel Stern (1995) thus describes what he calls the temporary feeling shape 
in babies as a combination of affects structured in time in tension-crisis-
resolution mode, which produces the line of basic narrative tension: it is 
this shape that binds the schema of affect to the narrative schema. As the 
clinical psychologist Denis Mellier puts it: “Stern promotes narrativity 
as a true experience of precocious, infra-verbal symbolization.12 Mellier 
also points out that this idea already underlay Freud’s description of the 
fort-da game. In more-recent texts, Stern talks about “affective narration” 
and even about a “narrative model,” a construction that would play the 
role, as the toddler approached its third birthday, of an “operating model 
that one recounts to oneself or to another.”13 The neurobiologist Antonio 
Damasio goes even farther: he talks about the “narrative function of the 
brain”: “Storytelling, in the sense of recording what happens in the form of 
brain maps, is probably an obsession of the brain that probably begins early, 
in terms both of development and of the complexity of neuronal structures 
that are needed to create stories. Storytelling precedes language, since it is, 
in fact, a precondition for language….”14
The consequences of this internalization of narrative constraint for 
communication are extremely important. No branch of communication 
escapes narration. Narration runs through literature, comics, theatre, ballet, 
press articles, recipes, songs, weather forecasts, the news (radio and televi-
sion), and just about all TV shows (even reality TV is scripted). In cinema, 
non-narrative f ilms are extremely rare, even in experimental cinema. As for 
documentaries, they most often have a narrative form. The development of 
“storytelling” in the press, and in business and political communications, 
11 Barthes, cited by Raymond Bellour, The Analysis of Film (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2000), p. 77.
12 Dennis Mellier, “L’intégration psyché-soma et le temps de l’intrigue, ce que nous apprennent 
les bébés,” Cairn, vol. 30 (2003), p. 2.
13 Daniel N. Stern, “Engagements subjectifs: le point de vue de l’enfant,” in André Carel, Jacques 
Hochmann and Henri Vermorel (eds.), Le Nourisson et sa famille (Lyon: Cesura Lyon Éditions, 
1990), pp. 30–45, here, pp. 30– 35.
14 Damsio quoted by Raymond Bellour, Le corps au cinéma. Hypnoses, émotions, animalités 
(Paris: P.O.L., 2009), pp. 182–183.
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is without doubt the most obvious recent manifestation of the appeal of 
the narrative model. Narratives also turn up in daily life: the conversations 
that we have are most often merely a succession of mini-tales: the games 
that children make up, but also those that grab and hold their attention on 
gaming devices, are obviously narrational. In fact, it is through narrative 
structures that we perceive the world and organize what we do. It is these 
structures that a grammar of narrative such as Claude Bremond’s (1973) aims 
to construct. It describes the narrative as interrelations of roles during the 
course of the action, and its ultimate goal is to establish a universal theory 
of human action.
The f lip side of the coin is that forms other than narrative seem not 
to work so well. The discursive form exists autonomously, but everyone 
knows that a discourse works better when it gets the story going, either 
by increasing the number of mini-narratives inside the discourse itself, 
or by turning itself purely and simply into a narrative. That gives rise to 
fable, parable, narrative propaganda, the moralistic novel, the educational 
novel, and a great number of f ilms (especially f ictional American ones). 
On French television, Alain Decaux brought history to life for the public 
with his talents as a storyteller. The poetic form reaches only a very limited 
number of readers. As for description, it is decidedly the least favourite 
among readers: who can honestly say they have never skipped descriptions?
Just the one structure does a little better out of the game: the list. Lists 
with scientif ic aims, lists for practical purposes (inventories of all kinds, 
lists of committees, or of things to do, and so on), and “poetic” lists. In The 
Infinity of Lists (2009), Eco shows that there are writers who are in love 
with lists: Homer, Rabelais, Cervantes, Calvino, Prévert, Borges, Perec, 
among others, including Eco himself. However, anthropologist Jack Goody 
notes two important limitations: even if there is a particular pleasure to 
be had from reciting lists (from playing on the sounds, from the rhythm, a 
more-or-less obsessive pleasure from the act of enumerating items), still, 
apart from the listing of ancestors’ names, the recitation of genealogical 
lineages, lists of saints, religious litanies and some situations in games, “the 
occasions that would give rise to verbal lists are few and far between.”15 On 
the other hand, the list is a structure that works better in writing than orally. 
More fundamentally, the list does not have the same structuring power as 
narration: as a structure, it opens onto the inf inite (one can always add an 
item), whereas all narrative is, by contrast, built starting from the ending. 
15 Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), p. 108.
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Besides, even if the list gives off a certain appearance of coherence, it is only 
because the items on it are next to one other, while narrative works based 
on a causal chain. Mnemonics specialists also recommend turning lists into 
stories to memorize them more easily (according to some anthropological 
cognitivists, the human memory is better at storing bits of information 
that are connected by causal sequences). The list is far from having the 
signif icant status that the narrative form has.
The pressure of the narrative form is so strong that non-narrative 
structures can be read in a narrative fashion. In a series of experiments in 
cinema, Paul S. Cowen was surprised to discover this: “It seemed reasonable 
to expect f ilms with a non-narrative structure, and especially those whose 
structure is decidedly dysnarrative, to free the viewer from the ideological 
prison in which narrative f ilms insidiously help lock them….” But he was 
soon disillusioned: “viewers did not show any wish to abandon their narrative 
schema, despite the inconsistency of certain scenes or of the whole movie.” “I 
wasn’t expecting,” he admits, “that the tendency to use a narrative structure 
to make a series of visual experiences coherent would be so strong.”16
I can now conclude on this point. If one accepts the existence of universal 
constraints (and it seems rather diff icult not to), one must recognize that, 
at a certain level, the production of meaning and affects is always carried 
out in the same way in the spaces of the sender and of the receiver, and that 
this weakens the separation between those two spaces without, however, 
making it disappear: there are a lot of levels that are not affected by these 
mandatory processes. From a theoretical standpoint, the value of separating 
the model into two spaces is precisely that it forces the theorist to provide 
evidence of the existence of these shared constraints: that way, they avoid 
presupposing the universality of this or that procedure simply because it 
is the one they are themselves used to using.
We could also suppose that the existence of such processes calls into 
question one of the starting points of the semio-pragmatics model, namely 
that what is transmitted to us are simple vibrations (V). And it is true that, 
because of the mandatory processes, we do not generally have the sense 
that we are perceiving vibrations: “Even with the idiocy of television, the 
visual system does not learn that the screen is a pane with points of light.”17 
But, then again, the fact of putting this transmission of vibrations into 
the model serves as an invitation to explain at what level, and how, the 
16 Paul S. Cowen, “L’importance des processus cognitifs et de la recherche empirique en études 
cinématographiques,” CiNéMAS, vol. 12, no. 2 (2002), pp. 39–60, here pp. 46–48.
17 Pinker, cited by Jullier, Cinéma et cognitiom, p. 103.
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mandatory processes that transform vibrations into meaning or affects 
come into play.
Finally, highlighting universal constraints presents at least the value 
of “putting limits on discourses from other f ields”: there is no point in 
getting tired looking for constraints elsewhere (in culture, society, and 
so on), if we are facing constraints that have been programmed to work 
universally. There is no point in wondering about choices if there is no 
choice.18
The Case of Languages
There would seem to be nothing universal about the use of languages. Quite 
the contrary: one cannot fail to notice their plurality. However, there are 
theorists – and not unimportant ones, either – who support the existence 
of a universal grammar or at least the existence of linguistic universals 
beyond the diversity of languages. We know that this was the position of 
the Port-Royal Grammar (Arnauld and Lancelot 1660). More recently, Noam 
Chomsky (1957 and 1966) hypothesized the existence of structures common 
to all languages and inherent in the human mind. For him, only the existence 
of a universal syntax within us could explain the speed of language learning 
by a child, a speed that precludes the hypothesis of learning by trial and error. 
It seems that we are predisposed to learn grammar, as if this knowledge was 
already part and parcel of the structure of our language faculty. Universal 
grammar would therefore be a positive constraint (Chomsky described 
his universal grammar as an “unconscious constraint”). This hypothesis 
is, however, disputed today by some cognitivists.19
We can also consider language itself as a constraint, or a set of constraints. 
We do not choose our native language: it is because we are born into a 
community that we f ind ourselves having a native language attributed 
to us (“[language] exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the 
members of a community”20). Languages are even a prior constraint on all 
18 Jullier, Cinéma et cognition, p. 198.
19 Cf., for instance, Luc Steeles, Synthesising the Origins of Language and Meaning Using 
Co-Evolution, Self-Organization and Level Formation (Brussels: AI Lab, Vrije Universiteit, 1996); 
Terrence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997); Philip 
Lieberman, Eve Spoke: Human Language and Human Evolution (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1998).
20 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Lingustics (New York: The Philosophical Society, 
1959), p. 14.
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the constraints linked to the body: we are born into a language that was 
here before us and that our body becomes an integral part of.
The fact that linguistic communication is constrained by our relationship 
to a language is an obvious fact that we experience whenever we are talking 
to someone who has a different native language. What is more interesting 
to look at is the role that a language may or may not play outside the space 
of linguistic communication.
Language and Perception
The famous “Sapir-Whorf” hypothesis, as it is known,21 posits that language 
governs the most fundamental categories of our thought, as well as the way 
we divide the world up into objects. For instance, the categories time, space, 
subject, and object would not be the same in English, for example, as in the 
language of the Hopi. The example that is always cited is that of the Eskimos 
and the snow. The fact that their language includes ten words to describe 
snow is said to lead them to consider that there are ten different objects, 
whereas a French person sees only a single object, snow, to which they might 
tack on adjectives: crystallized, melting, frozen, powdered, and so on.22 
Another example comes from research on the performance of arithmetic 
operations in various languages in the Amazon region: it seems clear that 
there is a link between lexical richness around numbers in a language and 
the ability of enunciators of that language to perform certain arithmetic 
operations. On that view, then, one’s language would thus have an effect 
on one’s cognitive capacities.23
The fact remains, though, that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has been 
strongly criticized by many ethnologists, who have faulted the experimental 
conditions, and especially by cognitivists, who hold that we represent the 
world to ourselves through an internal universal language, the language 
of thought, which Jerry Fodor (1975) dubbed “mentalese,” and that the way 
one or another language divides up the world is only a surface effect that 
does not affect our perception of it.
21 Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, 1956).
22 Adam Schaff, “Language and Reality,” Diogenes, vol. 13, no. 51 (1965), pp. 147–167.
23 Pierre Pica, Cathy Lemer, Véronique Izard and Stanislas Dehaene, “Exact and Approximate 
Arithmetic in an Amazonian Indigene Group,” Science, vol. 306, no. 5695, (2004) pp. 499–503; 
Peter Gordon, “Numerical Cognition Without Words: Evidence from Amazonia,” Science, vol. 306, 
no. 5695 (2004), pp. 496–499.
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The only thing we can say in response to these discussions is that the 
jury is still out.
The Influence of a Language on How We Read Images
At one level, the question of the influence of a language on how we read 
images is related to the foregoing problem: if we divide up objects in the 
world as one or another language seems to dictate, the same constraint will 
apply to how we divide up objects in an image.
But we should also recall Michel Colin’s hypothesis, which aims to show 
the existence of a constraint, no longer at the semantic level but at the 
level of the vectorization of a language. In Langue, film, discours (1985), 
Colin suggests that, in Western civilization, we vectorize our reading 
of images (and therefore also their production) in accordance with the 
vectorization of written speech – that is, from left to right. The work of 
certain anthropologists seems to support this hypothesis. In The Domestica-
tion of the Savage Mind, Jack Goody (1977) shows how tables and lists are 
instrumental in the construction of some forms of thought, and holds, more 
broadly, that we think the same way when there is a written language. 
Goody incidentally evokes the question of the linearity of the written text 
and its orientation (horizontal, or up and down), pointing out that “the 
consequences are radical, on the nature of output but more particularly on 
the nature of the input, as well as on the receiver himself.”24 For Goody, the 
key point is that, with writing, you can escape the constraints of temporal 
succession: it allows you to go back, to jump from one passage to another, 
and so on, but he says nothing about the vectorization that Colin talks 
about (that of the signif ier), because he is talking about the opposition 
between the written and the oral, and not about the structuring of one 
or another language. That said, if some graphical f igures are capable, as 
Goody has it, of occasioning changes “the psyche in here,”25 why would 
the vectorization of the linguistic signif ier not influence the reading and 
production of images?
If we start to look at them in this light, we f ind that a number of still or 
moving images seem in fact to have been constructed as though one had 
taken this vectorization into account, whether deliberately or not (because 
that can happen within an implicit grammar).
24 Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, p. 124.
25 Ibid., p. 108.
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As far as audiovisual language is concerned, Colin refers in particular to 
the direction in which panning is done: for a viewer in whose native language 
the vectorization is from left to right, panning from left to right is unmarked, 
whereas panning from right to left is marked and has a striking effect. There is 
an effect at the level of presentation: “And here come those we were expecting,” 
says the left-to-right panning that opens Une Partie de campagne (Jean Renoir 
1936–1946) and that shows us the family Dufour arriving at the edge of the river 
in a carriage.26 And there is a destabilizing effect: at the beginning of State of 
Siege (1973), Costa Gavras uses numerous right-to-left pans on the long lines 
of cars caused by the police checkpoints that have been set up to search for 
terrorists. (This is a f irst-rate foreshadowing of what is to follow in the f ilm.)
Colin also notes the predilection in cinema for introducing new elements 
to the sequence shot through panning or the use of left-to-right travelling 
shots. Jullier criticizes this analysis,27 pointing out that the famous uninter-
rupted long tracking shot that opens Orson Welles’s 1958 Touch of Evil is 
characterized by its right-to-left movement; a bit of bad luck, then, that this 
tracking shot can be read as an excellent counter-example to support left-
to-right vectorization: it uses a right-to-left camera movement to destabilize 
the viewer and prepare them emotionally for the car-bomb explosion at 
the end of the sequence. It is not enough to note that there are a lot of long 
right-to-left tracking shots in classic narrative cinema. That proves nothing, 
because it is possible that these shots are done right to left in order to produce 
a particular effect on viewers. We thus have to carry out analyses, and I must 
say that those I have done tend to support Colin’s hypothesis.
Colin has done a good job of explaining the upshot of his hypothesis for 
communication. “If the assumption about the direction in which we read 
images in f ilm, and f igurative images more generally, were confirmed, it 
would follow that f iguration processes, and more particularly the produc-
tion of speech in f ilm, could not be regarded as escaping a given linguistic 
tradition – the Western tradition.” And he adds: “It is…not impossible that 
this orientation from left right can be found in cinemas whose linguistic 
tradition does not have this orientation in writing (in Arab cinema, for 
example). This would thus tend to support the idea that Western cinema, 
to the extent that it is dominant, imposes not only its semantic models but 
its syntactic structures.”28 In countries whose languages are not based on 
26 I analyse this f ilm in detail in Roger Odin, De la fiction (Brussels: De Boeck, 2000b).
27 Jullier, Cinéma et cognition, p. 80.
28 Michel Colin, Langue, film, discours. Prolégomènes à une sémiologie générative du film (Paris: 
Klincksieck, 1985), p. 104.
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a left-to-right vectorization, one could thus say that directors and viewers 
alike “talk” cinema as a second language. Moreover, directors in these 
countries have often learned cinema in the West or from Western teachers. 
And as for viewers, if they want to understand movies, they are forced to 
learn the vectorization that governs the f ilmic language of the movie they 
are watching – and this happens implicitly. If one were to go along with 
this last remark of Colin’s, one would say that there is a form of cultural 
colonialism within the language of f ilm itself.
“Non-Natural” Constraints and the Notion of the “Space of 
Communication”
I don’t know whether Colin’s hypothesis is on the mark, but one thing is 
certain: it invites us to foresee the constraints related to the language in the 
model, if only so that we do not forget to ask ourselves the question (in my 
view, the cognitivists underestimate the influence of languages). This is a 
question that also requires us to take into account another set of constraints, 
of an economic and political nature, because if Western cinematic language 
can be said to be dominant, that is because the West has had the power to 
impose its cinematographic language on other parts of the world.
It was those working in the f ield of cultural studies who have been 
especially interested in non-natural constraints on communication. Their 
approach is diametrically opposed to that of the cognitivists. Instead of 
turning towards what is universal in humankind, researchers in this f ield 
stress differences, otherness, idiosyncrasies, the diversity of communities, 
and the pluralization of identities. The relationship between the two camps 
is rocky, but I do not see why cultural studies and, more broadly, taking 
other cultures and social customs into account, should put a damper on the 
cognitivist approach, or vice versa. A few cognitivists who are more open 
than others, such as Jullier, share this point of view.
The problem with this type of approach is that when you start to list 
the contextual constraints that are likely to govern communication, there 
is no reason not to keep going. Wanting to show that the f ilmic text could 
not resist the power of the viewers, who are themselves determined by the 
context in which they evolve (“Free readers do not exist”29), Janet Staiger 
29 Janet Staiger, Perverse Spectators: The Practices of Film Reception, (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000), p. 162.
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(2000) explains, by setting out an entire list of constraints – age, “race,” 
“ethnic” group, sex, sexual preference, national identity, and profession 
– how to respond to a movie. She observes, about the f ilm Ferris Bueller’s 
Day Off (John Hughes 1986), that the reactions to the f ilm differ according 
to whether the viewer is an “Anglo, middle-/upper-class” heterosexual 
male, a lesbian teenager, a male homosexual, someone of Hispanic origin, 
a working-class youth, or someone who accepts or rejects the capitalist 
ideology of consumption and male domination. Other constraints appear 
in the course of the book:
– constraints related to education (the respectful silence in cinemas is 
related to the development of the bourgeois public sphere)30
– constraints related to professional habitus: academic analysts valorize 
the cognitive over the emotional, and above all presuppose a cooperative, 
coherent viewer who is eager to understand the purpose of the f ilm and 
is not out simply to be entertained31
– intertextual constraints: reflecting on the reasons that may have brought 
her to laughter when she saw The Texas Chainsaw Massacre (Marcus 
Nispel 2003), Staiger says she believes they may have been related to her 
juxtaposing the f ilm to Psycho (1960) and Hitchcock’s “morbid sense of 
humour”32
– psychoanalytic constraints: Staiger says these constraints also played 
a part in her reaction to The Texas Chainsaw Massacre: “As Freud notes 
about jokes, the economies of expenditure of energy are related to 
inhibition”33
It would not be hard to add other constraints to Staiger’s list.
Faced with this proliferation of constraints, we can easily lose hope. 
Staiger, moreover, is quite aware of this problem: “Studying the responses 
of empirical subjects is a very complex process, full of historiographical 
and theoretical problems.” And she specif ies that it is “a diff icult task” to 
determine “what identities in the interaction with a specific text are at stake 
for the individual.”34 To put it in my own words, it is diff icult to define how 
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To avoid these aporias, I suggest moving away from the notion of “context” 
to that of space of communication. The latter is an attempt to “model” the 
context.
Here is a def inition: a space of communication is a space within which 
the set of constraints pushes the actants (S) and (R) to produce meaning 
on the same axis of relevance.
This idea is not new: communications professionals (communicators) 
understood that if they wanted to have any chance of being heard, they had 
to narrow the difference between the space of production and the space of 
reception by building up these spaces for those they were trying to reach: 
the modelling serves, here, to model the context. I will mention two main 
ways to do this, though there are no doubt others.
The first is to build a system of external constraints so that the addressees 
communicate as intended. When it comes to mass communication, this is the 
role played by genres that are used to regulate these addressees’ expectations 
by setting the axis of relevance that will be used during playback. Raphaëlle 
Moine talks about “generic rails.”35 This is also the role that television listings 
play. Most large institutions (schools, the Church, and so on) also make use 
of these kinds of construction.
The second part places constraints within the message itself, in the hope 
that receivers identify the axis of relevance that the sender wants to see 
adopted: this is the method of the segmented audience, which consists in 
targeting a specific audience (French teenagers, the “50-year-old housewife,” 
young gay couples, and so on).
In the semio-pragmatic perspective, the notion of the space of com-
munication differs from that of “context” in much the same way as langue 
differs from langage in Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory. Confronted with 
“context,” a vague notion that covers a heterogeneous, or even heteroclitic, 
set of constraints that cannot be tamed by analytic discourse, a space of 
communication is a construction that theorists have come up with. Thus, 
whatever the word “space” might mean, there is nothing concrete about a 
space of communication. It is already less far from the notion of “mental 
space” that Gilles Fauconnier36 constructed, but aside from the fact that 
its workings cover units much broader than sentences, it does not have the 
cognitive status that this author ascribes to it. Here, it is the theorist who 
chooses the axis of relevance that in turn ensures the consistency of the 
35 Raphaëlle Moine, Cinema Genres (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2008), p. 89.
36 Gilles Fauconnier, Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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space of communication on which they will work or that they will use as 
a tool of analysis.
Those who know my previous work will have noticed that I am using here 
the concept of a space of communication and no longer that of an institution: 
in fact, I realized that the notion of an institution ran too great a risk of 
creating the idea that it is a structure existing in the real world. In addition, 
a space of communication can be anything other than an institution in 
the common understanding of the term. The fact remains, however, that 
the definitions of the institution I gave at that time focused on a point that 
still seems to me just as essential, namely the notion of a sanction. I quoted 
Cornelius Castoriadis, for instance: “The institution is a socially sanctioned, 
symbolic network.”37 I also cited Alain Berrendonner, who wrote that 
the institution is “a normative power that subjects individuals to certain 
practices under penalty of sanction.”38 For the actants in communication, 
not respecting the constraints imposed within a space of communication 
in which they f ind themselves means they will pay the price one way or 
another. It is therefore worth asking about the type of sanctions involved in 
any particular area of communication: for television, it could be the boredom 
I feel when some soppy f ilm comes on, when I was expecting a thriller; at 
school, a bad grade given by the teacher in the mark book; in interpersonal 
communication, a conflict among the members of a family, and so on.
The construction of a space of communication is governed by the following 
principles:
(a) The theorist has the right to attribute to the space of communication 
they want to work on the degree (and precise kind) of generality or 
particularity (scope) they want in terms of object, space and time. For 
example, they may decide to work on the space of pedagogical commu-
nication (the object) in general (not taking into account the parameters 
of time and space), or on the space of pedagogical communication in 
education in the Third Republic (time) in France (space), or then again 
on the space of pedagogical communication in history classes (object) 
today (time) in France (space), and so on.
(b) The theorist has the right (even the obligation) to reduce this space to 
a limited number of manageable parameters. This is the principle of 
relevance: the space of communication is the result of the selection of the 
37 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, Trans. by Kathleen Blamey, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 132.
38 Alain Berrendonner, Éléments de pragmatique linguistique (Paris: éd. de Minuit, 1981), p. 95.
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constraints that govern the production of meaning, depending on what 
axis of relevance the theorist chooses for their analysis. For example, if 
I decide to work on the space of pedagogical communication in general, 
I will single out only the constraints that set it apart from the space of 
everyday interpersonal communication, or of playful communication, 
informative communication, and so on. I will not focus on the historical, 
cultural, or ideological differences among the different approaches to 
pedagogy.
(c) The key thing is to show these limitations. This is one of the lessons I 
have learned from Christian Metz: “It is enough to say it” was one of 
his favourite pieces of advice.39
Schema 3: Levels of constraints 
Space S Space r
S ▬▬ ▬ V ▬▬ ▬▬ ►t V t’◄
▬▬ ▬▬▬ ▬▬ r 
│______________________▲
universal constraints
Constraints related to a language
Constraints related to a “space of communication”
39 Christian Metz, Langage et cinéma (Paris: Larousse, 1971), p. 49.
2. The Discursive Space : Communicative 
Competence and Modes of Production 
of Meaning
Abstract
Chapter 2 postulates that, inside a discursive space (in this case, “Western” 
space), the actors put a shared communicative competence into action. 
This skill is designed as a reservoir of modes of production of meanings and 
affects, which can themselves be analysed as a combination of processes. 
By way of example, several modes are constructed.
Keywords: modes, processes, operations, f iction, spectacle, documentary, 
energy
I assume that at some point in history it will be possible to construct a very 
broad communication space within which actors will deploy homologous 
processes by which meaning is produced.
I refer to all of these processes taken together as discursive-communicative 
competence. This competence is a reservoir that the communicating actors 
(sender and receiver) draw on so that, by deploying one or another process, 
they can produce meaning.
The notion of competences I use here should not be confused with 
the notion of competence that Noam Chomsky1 developed in linguistics: 
Chomsky argued that language ability is innate – hard-wired into our genetic 
make-up – and thus independent of any contextually given influence. He 
also argued that it is limited to syntax – that is, to the ability to generate 
sentences. The competence I have in mind here is something different: it is 
1 Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton, 1957); Noam Chomsky, Aspects 
of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1965); Noam Chomsky, Cartesian 
Linguistics (New York: Harper & Row; 1966).
Odin, R., Spaces of Communication: Elements of Semio-Pragmatics. With an Introduction by 
Vinzenz Hediger. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022
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related to a space of communication and has a much broader aim than just 
the production of sentences: it is a discursive-communicative competence. 
In using this concept, I am working more in the tradition of Dell Hymes2 
and many researchers, such as Sophie Moiran and Patrick Charaudeau, who 
have carried on his thought in their own way, than in that of Habermas.
Discursive-communicative competence is just one of the components 
of communicative competence. The number and status of the components 
of communicative competence vary by researcher, but aside from the fact 
that everyone (taking into account terminological differences) agrees on the 
existence of a discursive component, it seems to me that if we come up with 
certain groupings, we can capture three other competences: semio-linguistic, 
sociocultural and referential.
Semio-linguistic competence has to do with the mastery of languages: 
natural languages (written and oral), sign language, the language of images, 
the language of cinematography, and so on. In the semio-pragmatic model, it 
is on this semio-linguistic competence that the implementation of processes 
is based, according to the language used.
Socio-cultural competence has to do with the interactive and social dimen-
sions of communication. In the semio-pragmatic model, this competence 
intervenes in the relationship between the space of communication and 
the actors in this space, as well as in the relationships among those actors.
As for referential competence, which regulates the relationship to areas 
of experience and to objects in the world, and thus directly to the meaning 
that is produced, the semio-pragmatic model must assign it a place, but it 
cannot say anything about it, because the meaning that is produced is always 
socio-historical, and it is only empirical analyses in spaces of communica-
tion that are precisely situated – whether in historical, geographical, or 
sociological terms – that make it possible to grasp it. The semio-pragmatic 
model itself has to do with process, not content. Content is reintegrated 
during case studies.
A note on terminology: because of its specif icity, and especially in view of 
the broader terrain it covers, from here on in I will use the term discursive 
space to designate that space that regulates discursive-communicative 
competence. I will limit the use of space of communication to spaces con-
structed at a lower level (spaces of pedagogical, scientif ic, artistic, and 
family communication, and so on) – that is, to spaces that have been 
constructed within the discursive space: these spaces select the processes 
2 Dell Hymes, Foundations in Sociolinguistics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1974).
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of discursive-communicative competence that will be deployed by the 
actants in a given communication.
The question of the f ield of reference covered by this discursive space 
cannot not be asked. Despite the vague, elusive, or even equivocal character 
of the term “Western” – it conveys, as Claude Prudhomme puts it so nicely in 
his article “Occident” in the Dictionnaire des concepts nomades en sciences 
humaines, “a cumbersome ideology for the present age”3 – I will take the view 
that the discursive space in this book emerges from within Western space. 
The use I make here of the adjective “Western” is contrary to its ideological, 
and even more so to its polemical, use. As I see it, talking about a Western 
space shows, f irst, a recognition of the need for prudence, and indicates that, 
if they work, the processes that are described do so within a limited space. 
Specif ically, the adjective “Western” tries to take into account that these 
processes are built from my own experience as an actor in communication, 
and that I believe this experience is shared by a wide range of actors. In 
fact, I use the term “Western” for lack of a better alternative – Prudhomme 
notes there is no “alternative”4 – because it is the term that comes to mind 
immediately when I wonder about this set of actors that I have a sense 
of belonging to, but he does not prejudge in any way the geographical or 
historical situatedness of these actors. It is likely that at least some of these 
processes work in actors who are not “from the West” within the meaning 
often given to this term (Europe, North America). I do not think, either, that 
an extended def inition of this space is possible. I share the view held by 
Alexandre Zinoviev – who, to avoid the misunderstandings created by the 
word “West,” coined the term Occidentalism (1995)5 – that it is necessary to 
pass to a higher level of abstraction: the “Western” space I mean here is simply 
a theoretical fiction. Moreover, we must also insist that this construction 
has to do neither with values (the West is often defined in terms of values: 
freedom, Christianity, humanism, scientif ic thought, and so on), nor with 
content (geographical, historical, cultural, civilizational, and so on), but 
with processes and, more generally, with phenomena that come from within 
social anthropology (or socio-anthropology).
This chapter and the next will look primarily at these combinatories of 
processes that I call modes.
3 Claude Prudhomme, “Occident,” in Olivier Christin (ed.), Dictionnaire des concepts nomades 
en sciences humaines (Paris: Métailié, 2010), pp. 343–362, here p. 356.
4 Ibid., p. 343
5 Alexandre Zinoviev, L’Occidentisme, essai sur le triomphe d’une idéologie (Paris: Plon, 1995).
74 SpACeS of CommuniCAtion
Modes are theoretical constructs that aim to structure the processes of 
the production of meaning into functional sets. The construction of these 
modes answers three major questions:
1. What discursive form or forms does this mode implement: narration, 
description, “discourse” (in the narrow sense of an argumentative 
construction), poetic structure, and so on?
2. What affective relationships does it produce?
3. What enunciative relationship, and what enunciator(s), does it invite 
us to construct?
It may be useful at time to introduce a subquestion to question 1:
1a. What type of space does this mode construct: a world, a set of signs, a 
symbolic or “discursive” space, an abstract space, a plastic space, and 
so on?
All of these questions point to a further question that summarizes them all:
– What type of communication experience does this mode lead to?
The major importance of this series of questions lies in its analytical value: 
by making it work systematically (but not necessarily in the order indicated: 
depending on the modes, it can be more effective to start with this or that 
question) and by playing on systems of opposition, we get to the construction 
of a series of modes. My goal here is not to offer a list of these modes, but 
to show, based on a few examples, the problems that constructing them 
poses for the theorist.
In order to make the construction of modes more meaningful, I will 
discuss it on the basis of productions that exemplify the operation of any 
particular mode (productions that are made to be read in this mode), but 
let there be no mistake: these productions are exemplary only because 
I assume that both actants in a communication process agree to play 
the space-of-communication game for which they were designed. These 
productions could be read in an utterly different way in another space of 
communication. Conversely, any mode can be deployed outside its own 
space of communication. I will offer a few examples below.
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Fictionalizing Mode (First Approach)
If there is one experience that is commonly shared, it is indeed that of f iction. 
As a consequence, it does not seem absurd to start constructing modes in 
an attempt to construct one that can give an account of this experience: the 
f ictionalizing mode. One might think that the extremely strong presence 
of this mode would make it easier to construct, and that it would thus be 
easily identif iable, but that is not the case.
The f irst diff iculty the theorist encounters in this operation is the word 
“fiction” itself. There has been a tendency to use this word to refer to anything 
and everything. Even theorists feel this temptation. Thus Metz asserts that 
“all f ilm is f iction”6 while Eric Clemens has it that “All literature…is …fiction-
al, even realist literature, and even memoirs and autobiography.”7 Of course, 
this position may have its relevance within the theoretical frameworks these 
authors use, but for an analysis of communication (especially one centred 
on various communicative experiences), it can only be counterproductive. If 
everything is f iction…. Assimilating f iction and narrative, as other theorists 
do, is just as problematic: believing, as does Laurent Gervereau,8 that “a report 
that is f ilmed is still f iction” because “it involves the creation of a narrative 
by one or more particular characters” does not allow us to account for the 
difference in the communication experience between seeing or reading a 
piece of reporting and seeing or reading a piece of f iction. In addition, if 
deploying a narrative construction thus means creating f iction, then here 
again, everything or almost everything becomes f iction: as we have seen, 
we use narration in almost all communication situations. It is crucial that 
we be more restrictive in how we characterize this mode.9
I will characterize f ictionalizing mode through the following series of 
processes:
(a) at the level of the space: constructing a world – that is, a space that is 
at least potentially habitable, even if only by the receiver (diegetization)
I am reading Le ventre de Paris (The Belly of Paris) by Émile Zola (1873): “In 
the midst of this great silence, in the deserted space of the avenue, the 
6 Christian Metz, “Le f ilm de f iction et son spectateur,” Communications, vol. 23 (1975b), 
pp. 108–135.
7 Éric Clemens, La fiction et l’apparaître (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993), p. 276, note 20.
8 Laurent Gervereau, Les images mentent. Histoire du visuel au xxe siècle (Paris: Seuil, 2000), 
p. 399.
9 Roger Odin, De la fiction (Brussels: De Boeck, 2000b).
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carts of the market gardeners were heading to Paris, their wheels bumping 
along in rhythm, the clatter echoing off the façades of the houses that 
slumbered along both sides of the avenue, behind the disorderly rows of elm 
trees.” From the f irst lines, having forgotten these black spots on the page, 
these words, as well as the syntax of the sentence (that is the advantage of 
arbitrary constructions: as soon as we know the rules, we have access to 
the meaning), I myself am on the avenue amongst the carts and the market 
gardeners. Fictionalizing involves, f irst and foremost, entering into a world.
(b) at the discursive level: the construction of a narrative (storytelling).
“Florent, taking in the immense glow that Paris was giving off, thought 
of this story he was hiding. Having escaped from Cayenne….” Just a few 
words are enough to get my imagination as a reader going, to get me 
wondering about Florent as a character, and about his history – in a word, 
to draw me into a narrative construction: I am just dying to see what is 
going to happen next….
(c) at the level of the affective relationship: the construction of the text 
such that the events narrated resonate fully with me. This is the process 
of mise en phase.
Here is an example: Zola interrupts Mademoiselle Saget’s revelations 
about Florent (“He’s coming from the jailhouse….”) with four pages f illed 
with descriptions of cheeses, thus raising both our own expectations 
and those of the women who are waiting for the story that the gossip is 
taking mischievous pleasure in dragging out. The process of mise en phase 
aligns the affective positioning of the receiver (in this case, the reader) 
regarding the relationships that appear in the diegesis.
(d) at the enunciative level: the construction of an enunciator I am forbid-
den to ask questions of, in terms of identity, ways of acting, and truth: this 
is what I call the process of the fictivization of enunciation.
As soon as I start to ask about the identity of the enunciator (who wrote this 
text? who was Zola?), about how the text was constructed (for instance, if 
I start admiring Zola’s powers of description, or his way of playing with 
metaphors, such as that of the sea, which is spun throughout this passage, 
or about the truth of what is stated (does the rue Pont-Neuf actually stretch 
from the Seine to the rue Montmartre and rue Montorgueil?) – as soon as 
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I start doing that, I stop engaging in f ictionalizing reading. Fictionalizing 
means being willing to “believe” in the existence of a world without asking 
how it came to be. On the other hand, questions are possible at the level 
of the events taking place in this world: Why was Florent sent to prison? 
How did he escape? What did he come to Paris for?
I will talk about a real enunciator when an enunciator is constructed who 
can be questioned in terms of identity, ways of acting, values and truth, and 
of a fictitious enunciator when the enunciator is constructed such that they 
cannot be questioned, as is the case with the f ictionalizing mode.
This way of constructing the enunciator radically distinguishes f iction-
alization from the lie, the hypothesis or the error, which assume, rather, a 
real enunciator who is questioned in terms of truth.
Finally – and this is doubtless the most important phenomenon from the 
point of view of communication – the f ictivization of the enunciator leads 
to the fictivization of the receiver: by agreeing not to ask questions about the 
enunciator, I somehow place myself outside the real world.
Definition of the fictionalizing mode (preliminary approach)
– At the level of the space: construction of a world (a diegesis)
– At the discursive level: the construction of a narrative
– At the affective level: relationship between mise en phase and narrated 
events
– At the enunciative level: construction of a f ictitious enunciator.
Spectacularizing and Energetic Modes
Compared to the normal usual use of the notion of f iction, the way I have 
constructed the f ictionalizing mode is highly reductive, with the result that 
a number of productions that have generally been designated as “f ictions” 
are excluded from the realm of f ictionalization: they do not produce the 
experience of f iction that I have just described. Explaining the communica-
tive functioning of these productions involves the assumption that one is 
going to construct other modes.
In writing on cinema, musicals are categorized as fictional f ilms. However, 
the experience of the musical works only partially in f ictionalizing mode. 
When dances or songs are being performed, two changes take place for the 
viewer with regard to f ictionalization: the transformation of the “world” into 
a “spectacular space,” and the shift from a f ictitious to a real enunciator.
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I am watching Singing in the Rain (Gene Kelly and Stanley Donner 1952). 
Don Lockwood and his friend Cosmo Brown are walking along, chatting 
away, in the bustling Monumental Pictures studio. Don Lockwood is sad, 
because he is still thinking about the girl he loves. As they come up to a 
piano, Cosmo Brown launches into a stunning number that combines song, 
dance and acrobatics, to give his friend back some joie de vivre. Initially, we 
see his wisecracks through the eyes of Don Lockwood, to whom they are 
addressed in the diegesis and who has ensconced himself in an armchair in 
the foreground to look at his friend. Then, as the sequence continues, Cosmo 
Brown’s song gradually becomes more autonomous. The sound, which up to 
this point has been diegetic (Cosmo Brown has been playing the piano), is 
replaced by a soundtrack that Cosmo Brown begins to dance to. Soon, Don 
Lockwood disappears entirely from the scene. We do not even see him at 
the end of the sequence, as we might have expected to: the sequence ends 
with a fade that segues directly from the show Cosmo Brown has put on to 
the next scene. We thus end up completely forgetting that Don Lockwood 
was even there, and getting absorbed in Cosmo Brown’s showstopper 
performance: he rolls on the f loor, climbs the walls, moves through a set 
while singing and dancing to the rhythm of the music, and so on. Even if 
on the face of it the space has not changed (we are still in the studios, and 
stagehands keep coming onto the set, even prompting the odd gag with 
Cosmo Brown), my relationship to what is being shown is undergoing a 
profound change: whereas at the beginning of the sequence I was invited 
to enter the world of the story being told, and to take a look around the 
studio along with two friends, I am now being sent back to my position as 
“viewer”: between the space where Cosmo Brown performs his song and the 
space I am in, an invisible barrier of sorts is established. The world of the 
story gives way to a spectacular space. At the same time, I can only admire 
the performance put in by the actor who plays Cosmo Brown, as pianist, 
singer, dancer and acrobat. That is to say that I am no longer constructing 
a f ictitious enunciator – the character fades into the background – but, on 
the contrary, a real enunciator: Donald O’Connor – that is, an enunciator 
I can question in terms of identity and ways of acting – all questions that 
are forbidden by the enunciative construction of f ictionalizing reading.
At moments such as these, I switch from f ictionalization to the spec-
tacularizing mode.
Definition of the spectacularizing mode
– At the level of the space: the creation of a spectacular space – that is, 
a space separated from the viewer by a barrier that is either visible 
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(the orchestra pit, the stage curtain, or the cinema screen) or invisible 
(the barrier is in our heads)
– At the discursive level: even it has a fairly clear penchant for 
storytelling, spectacularizing mode can deploy any discursive 
process
– At the affective level: the affective relationship takes place not with 
the characters as it does with f ictionalization, but with these real 
people: the singers, dancers, actors, and so on
– At the enunciative level: the construction of a real enunciator who 
can be asked questions in terms of identity and ways of acting
This mode is the one that I turn to in dealing with any performance that is 
broadcast live, or recorded and shown later, on television: a piece of theatre, 
a concert, a ballet, a variety show, a circus show, a boxing match, a soccer 
or rugby match, and so on. Wildlife f ilms and f ilms about nature very often 
work in this mode (we hear, moreover, of “spectacles of the world”). But 
sometimes I also use this mode in daily life – for instance, when I look at 
holidaymakers on a beach or attend a speech by a politician at a meeting, 
and so on.
Another set of productions generally regarded as falling within f iction, 
but that still stand in the way of f ictionalization: those that function in the 
energetic mode.
The f irst break with f ictionalization takes place at the discursive level: at 
certain moments in Natural Born Killers (Oliver Stone, 1994), really fast-paced 
editing completely unstructures the narrative. In the case of James Cameron 
(Terminator, 1984; Aliens, 1986), this effect is produced by dazzling flashes 
and strobes. In these sequences, the story becomes less important than 
the work the rhythm does. Even in f ilms that are undeniably narrational, 
it can happen that the viewer is taken along in a visual and sound stream 
that allows them to take off and rise above the narrative (for example, in 
some parts of Lucas’s Star Wars, [1977 to …]).
The second break – which is linked, moreover, to the f irst – has to do 
with the affective relationship. At moments such as these, it is not so much a 
matter anymore of allowing myself to move to the rhythm of the events being 
narrated (mise en phase) as it is of allowing myself to vibrate to the rhythm of 
the images and sounds. Affects make way for effects. To characterize these 
productions, Richard Corliss created the category of Dyna-Movies10 – f ilms 
that are more dynamic than they are dramatic. For his part, Laurent Jullier 
10 Time, 2 July 1990, p. 46.
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(1997) speaks of a “f ilm orchestra” and of a cinema of “f ireworks,” the idea 
here being that these f ilms instantly short-circuit the viewer’s intellect and 
strike their sensory system directly.
This is, indeed, one of the unique characteristics of this mode. Meaning 
is still produced, of course – though it fades into the background somehow: 
what is important plays out in the relationship to the body. It is less about 
sharing ideas with me or telling me a story than about getting me to feel 
certain effects physically. “My f ilms,” wrote George Lucas, “are closer to an 
amusement park ride than to a play or novel.”11 The “natural constraints” 
whose place in the semio-pragmatic model was mentioned in the previous 
chapter play an essential role here.
Definition of the energetic mode
– At the level of space: construction of an image-sound space (as op-
posed to a world or a spectacular space)
– At the discursive level: a (partial) blocking of discursive production in 
favour of a construction based on rhythmic variations and variations 
in intensity
– At the affective level: relationships based more on effects than on 
affects
– At the enunciative level: the construction of a f ictitious enunciator
It is certainly in the music video that this mode is expressed most purely: 
some clips do not tell a story, but lead me – in a complex sequence of images 
that deploy all the resources of f ilm language, all the special effects – to 
stick as closely as possible to the pace and atmosphere of the song and/
or the music. On the radio, it often happens that music is received in this 
mode by listeners with no training in listening to music (a kind of listening 
that requires that acute attention be paid to the work done on the sounds). 
Similarly, it is this mode that is imposed on me when, tired of an evening, 
I look with a superf icial eye at the television, without paying attention to 
what is being said or to how the story being told is unfolding, allowing myself 
to be lulled by the torrent of sounds and images the TV f loods me with 
(speaking of “media flux,” then, is actually getting at something). Finally, 
it can happen that I watch the world in this mode (the passing of clouds, 
water f lowing in stream, a f ire in a f ireplace, an unending procession of 
cars on the motorway).
11 Time 15 June 1981, quoted by Laurent Jullier, L’écran post-moderne. Un cinéma de l’allusion 
et du feu d’artifice (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997), p. 37.
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Documentarizing Mode, Moralizing Mode
As opposed to the mode of experiencing f iction, everything encourages 
the theorist to build another grand mode: that of the experience of the 
real. In previous publications, I proposed to refer to such a mode as the 
documentarizing mode. Today, to account for this experience of the real, 
it seems to me that we need to construct not one but two modes. I will 
continue to use documentarizing mode for that mode that is aimed at 
communicating information on the real (if only by showing it), and I will 
talk about a moralizing mode for the mode for transmitting and discussing 
values (which are also elements of the real). Even though in the process 
of communication these two modes are often linked, in fact two types of 
experience are concerned here: knowing the world, and wondering about 
values. These two modes have been institutionalized in a different way 
in the world: on the one hand, there is science; on the other, philosophy 
and morality. It would seem to be a good idea, then, to separate these 
two modes.
I open up the 13 August 2009 edition of Le Monde. With the exception of a 
small section devoted to games (crosswords and Sudoku), which calls for 
the deployment of the ludic mode (a mode that should be analysed in and 
of itself), it is clear that the primary space of communication established 
by this newspaper demands recourse to the documentarizing mode. The 
majority of the articles have a “discursive” structure more or less mixed 
with narrative elements or mini-stories. Some articles fall squarely within 
the category of the narrative, including biographies, obituaries (Thierry 
Jonquet, Francisque Collomb, François Luchaire) or otherwise: four-time 
Olympic champion Greg Louganis. On the last page, I can even read a 
travelogue, whose title is an explicit reference to Jules Verne – “Around 
the world in 80 days on a bike” – and which deploys three of the four 
processes of f ictionalization: diegesis, narration, and mise en phase. The 
only difference from f ictionalization is that I am asked to construct a real 
enunciator, Guillaume Prébois, the cyclist and the author of the article. It 
is this enunciative construction which puts me into the documentarizing 
rather than f ictionalizing mode. Several articles belong to one and another 
series. One case in point is the article on Greg Louganis (part of the “Sum-
mer Portraits” series); another is an article on “Clarksdale and the Curse 
of Cotton” (part of the series “On Route 61”). But there are also maps (for 
example, to locate Clarksdale on Route 61 or to check the weather), schedules 
(radio and television programmes airing that day, and more weather), a 
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copy of the f irst page of the 4 May 1989 edition of Le Monde, informative 
photos and a page put together in list mode (“Notebook”: births, deaths, 
and so on). But Le Monde also invites me to use the moralizing mode. For 
instance, the editorial is in the form of an argument that tries to show that 
the values of peace can prevail in today’s Middle East. Plantu’s cartoon, on 
the bottom right of the front page, also calls for such a reading: it shows a 
space littered with graves and corpses. It is clear we are seeing individuals 
who have recently been murdered: they are still bleeding. A banner across 
the top reads: “Human-Rights Cemetery in Russia.” In the foreground, a 
well-dressed man wearing Western attire and holding a suitcase in the 
colours of the European Union flag (a yellow circle of stars against a blue 
background) is looking inside a huge pipe that wends its way towards us 
from the horizon and that a sign identif ies as a Russian pipeline. We read 
in a thought bubble what the well-dressed European thinks: “I’d come 
out against it, but I can see the light at the end of the tunnel.” It is a moral 
“discourse” by means of a picture.
If we compare this to f ictionalization, we cannot fail to be struck by the 
variety of structures and forms that are accepted by the documentarizing 
and moralizing modes. The originality of these modes derives, in fact, from 
their imposing just a few constraints:
– at the discursive level, all discursive forms are accepted: the most com-
mon are the narrative and the “discourse”
– at the level of the construction of space, only the construction of a 
plastic (abstract) space is forbidden, because it blocks the discursive 
process; otherwise, we have a choice between different modalities of 
constructing a “discursive” area (a chart, a series of symbols, diagrams, 
and humorous cartoons) or the construction of a world
– at the level of affective relationships: we also see both the deployment 
of the narrative arrangement of material and an utter lack of concern 
at this level, at the risk of boring the receiver (as happens in the case of 
certain education f ilms)
In addition to the production of information or values, the only real con-
straint on these two modes is at the enunciative level:
– construction of a real enunciator who can be asked questions in terms 
of identity, ways of acting, and truth for the documentarizing mode
– the construction of a real enunciator who can be asked questions in terms 
of identity, ways of acting, and values for the moralizing mode
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Example for the documentarizing mode: who are you to be telling me about 
this or that topic? What competence do you possess in this area, and how 
did you manage to get this information? Is your story true? Are you sure 
you’re not trying to hide something from me?
Example for the moralizing mode: Do you have the authority to say 
what you’re claiming? Who are you to be giving me lessons, or urging me 
to embrace this or that value?
The fact that the enunciator can be asked questions does not mean that 
they will be asked any. It is common for a real enunciator to be constructed 
without there being a felt need to go farther and engage in a process of 
questioning – but the key point is that this is possible. At any time, these 
questions can crop up and put the enunciator in a spot of bother. It is this 
possibility that establishes the real enunciator.
This enunciative constraint itself opens up several possibilities: indeed, 
several real enunciators can be constructed for a single production. As I 
watch Howard Hawks’s The Big Sky (1952), I can construct Hawks himself 
(what does the f ilm tell me about Hawks as a person?), the era in which the 
f ilm was shot (historian Marc Ferro has done much to promote this type of 
reading of f iction films), the language of f ilm, cinema in the 1950s, and so on, 
as actual documentarizing enunciators, and Hawks again, the production 
house, Hollywood, American society and his values, and so forth, as real 
moralizing enunciators.
This considerable freedom to engage in construction may explain the 
difficulty that productions involving these modes have in being well received 
in the social space: as a reader of f iction, I know very precisely what cognitive 
and affective work I am going to have to do. But this is not the case with these 
productions. These two modes do not create a strong system of anticipation, 
and that is not very comfortable for the receiver.
Proof a contrario: documentarizing and moralizing productions that are 
most fully accepted by the public are those whose form is closest to that of 
f iction, or those that compensate for the weakness of the set of expectations 
by creating a strong contextualization that calls up one or both of these 
modes. This is what happens when I buy a newspaper such as Le Monde. It 
is the role played by the TV schedule. As for documentaries, they work so 
much better when they are seen in a dedicated space such as at festivals, 
as part of regular broadcasts, or in the context of sessions that have been 
announced in spaces that are themselves involved in documentarizing and 
moralizing (for example, schools). In general, we see that these productions 
are received all the better by the public if they are part of debates that are in 
tune with the times – that is, in existing spaces of communication in social 
84 SpACeS of CommuniCAtion
space, as spaces involved in documentarizing and moralizing: debates on 
sexuality, ecology, globalization, and so on.
Finally, the consequence of the construction of a real enunciator is 
that I am myself involved in communication as an actual person. This 
implies a positive result: that I can make clear my disagreement with 
the enunciator, challenge the information they have, and reject their 
values – all of which is much more diff icult to do in the case of f iction. 
But there is a catch: I myself can be directly implicated, and summoned 
to explain or justify myself. If in general this does not pose too many 
problems in the space of scientif ic or moral communication, where one 
has to do with actors (scholars and philosophers) who have accepted 
this risk by entering into in this space, we can see in this enunciative 
construction one of the reasons why documentarizing and moralistic 
productions are less popular with the public than f ictionalizing ones. 
While f iction reassures me (as an actual person, I am not being targeted), 
these productions speak to me personally.
Definition of the documentarizing mode
– At the level of discourse: the production of information (with no 
constraint on the form)
– At the affective level: undetermined
– At the enunciative level: the construction of a real enunciator who 
can be asked questions in terms of identity, ways of acting, and truth
Definition of the moralizing mode
– At the level of discourse: the production of values (with no constraint 
on the form)
– At the affective level: undetermined
– At the enunciative level: the construction of a real enunciator who 
can be asked questions in terms of identity, ways of acting, and values
Fictionalizing Mode (Second Approach); Fabulating Mode
The way in which I have presented modes up to this point suggests that 
there is a system of oppositions of the type:
documentarizing mode and mode moralizing = relationship to reality
vs.
f ictionalizing mode = no relationship to reality
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Now, although this system of oppositions is quite frequently attested to 
in analyses devoted to f iction or documentaries, it is not at all in keeping 
with the experience of f iction. Because the experience of f iction is also an 
experience of the real, on the one hand as knowledge of the world (how many 
African children have discovered snow or, in an earlier period, supermarkets, 
through f ictional f ilms?), and on the other hand as a site where values are 
made manifest. If we take the analysis of the fictionalizing mode to its logical 
conclusion, we f ind that it always results in the construction of a “discourse” 
and a morality that it aims to communicate to us. That is because of the 
very nature of narrative, which conveys values with which f iction, thanks 
to the mise en phase, links us up and invites us to identify.
The question that then arises is this: if it is true that all f iction is both 
documentarizing and moralizing, what is the point of keeping f ictionaliza-
tion as a separate mode? Should we not, rather, regard it as a set of processes 
that can be deployed by the documentarizing or the moralizing mode – that 
is, as a modality of these modes?
This way of thinking could be quite useful. If we consider that f iction 
blends in with documentarizing and moralizing modes, this shows indeed 
that f iction is not some innocent game: on the one hand, it informs (so it 
can be used educationally, for teaching); on the other hand, it also conveys 
values, and here we should be vigilant. The weakness of this analysis is that 
that is not how f iction is experienced: that experience is neither that of the 
documentarizing nor that of the moral “discourse.”
Second proposal: establish an obligatory relationship between the f ic-
tionalizing mode on the one hand, and documentarizing and moralizing 
modes on the other – and bear in mind that any use of the f ictionalizing 
mode leads to these two modes. Again, this way of presenting things is not 
satisfactory, because if f iction conveys information and values, it does not 
do this by using the same processes as are used by the documentarizing 
or moralizing modes. In the case of f iction, the relationship with reality 
is made under cover of the construction of the f ictitious enunciator in 
the narrative. As a result, the real enunciator of information and values is 
masked here – hidden – to the point where the addressee of the f iction may 
believe that they do not exist. This is the specif icity and also the strength 
of f iction: this information and these values are transmitted implicitly, as it 
were: the receiver includes them unintentionally and without even knowing 
it, simply by taking an interest in the story. This has prompted Louis Marin 
to say, “the narrative is a trap.”12
12 Louis Marin, Le récit est un piège (Paris: ed. de Minuit, 1978).
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Third proposal: take another look at how I have constructed the f ictional-
izing mode, and integrate processes regarding the relationship to reality 
into its construction. It is the only solution that, for me, seems pertinent. It 
is the basis for this new characterization of the f ictionalizing mode.
Definition of the fictionalizing mode (new proposition):
– At the level of space: construction of a world (diegetization)
– At discursive level 1: the construction of a narrative (storytelling)
– At discursive level 2: the construction, from the narrative, of a 
“discourse” that conveys information and values
– At the affective level: mise en phase with the story and thus with the 
values it conveys
– At enunciative level 1: construction of a f ictitious enunciator of the 
story and of characters (what I have been calling fictivizing)
– At enunciative level 2: construction of a real enunciator of information 
and values, who is hidden – masked beneath the f ictivization contract
The splitting of the discursive and the enunciative levels is what allows us 
to understand how f iction intervenes in the real world.
But things are just a bit more complicated than that again. There are, in 
fact, texts that explicitly proclaim the f iction they offer as an illustration of a 
moral “discourse.” In such a structure, at the logical level, it is the “discourse” 
and the values that it conveys that come f irst: even if the moral of the tale 
is given at the end, everyone understands that the point of the story they 
have just been told is to exemplify it. However, the f iction does not lose its 
power: it pulls the reader in, and makes them want to read to the end. We 
are thus faced with a balance between f iction and a “discourse” that is both 
particular and somewhat precarious. When moral “speech” asserts itself too 
strongly, communication heads straight into moralizing mode. When the 
world and the story do so, we head straight into f ictionalizing mode. When 
the balance is respected, experience is confused neither with f iction (the 
world that is constructed is less dense and less present to us), nor with the 
moralizing mode: the moral is deduced from the story we have just been 
told, and it is this story that the addressee was interested in in the f irst place.
We could regard such productions as a subcategorization of the moralizing 
mode (where f ictionalization is used as a “discursive” process for moralizing) 
or of the f ictionalizing mode, which, as we saw above, still results in an 
implicit morality, which is explained here. Both of these ways of proceeding, 
however, suffer a disadvantage: they do not take account of the fact that this 
configuration gives rise to a specif ic experience. But the key fact, which is 
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also a bit surprising, is that this construction – based as it is on a structure 
that is, however, and as we have just seen, fairly unstable – has become 
institutionalized over the course of history to the point where it has been 
given a name: “fable” or “parable.” What we have here, then, is an experience 
that has a long tradition, in both oral and written literature, but also in the 
theatre, in painting and even in sculpture (the cornices on Romanesque 
churches often operate in this mode). Some f ilms also work based on this 
model: Neighbours (Norman McLaren, 1952), The Boy with Green Hair (Joseph 
Losey, 1948), and so on. In these circumstances, my theoretical choice is to 
construct a specif ic mode: the fabulating mode.
Definition of the fabulating mode
– At discursive level 1: construction of a “discourse” that posits a system 
of values (those that the story will convey)
– At enunciative level 1: the construction of a real enunciator of the 
“discourse”
– At the level of the space: the construction of a world (but of a density 
that is often lower than in f iction)
– At discursive level 2: the construction of a narrative
– At the affective level: the process, through the narrative, of mise en 
phase
– At enunciative level 2: the construction of a f ictional enunciator of 
the tale
Described in this way, that fabulating mode appears to be made up of the 
same processes as the f ictionalizing mode. However, the hierarchization 
of processes is not the same in each case. Whereas with the f ictionalizing 
mode it is the construction of a narrative by a f ictitious enunciator that 
governs everything, here it is the construction of a “discourse” delivered 
by a real enunciator.
The methodological consequence of this is that the modes differ from 
each other in virtue not only of their processes, but also of their structure.
It would certainly have been possible to go farther with the specif ica-
tion of certain descriptions (the next chapter contains a more detailed 
characterization of two modes: the artistic and the aesthetic) – but it was 
important to f irst explain how to construct the modes. For each mode, a 
systematic description has been given in the form of a structure of processes. 
While one may disagree with my definitions, at least everyone can respond 
with all the givens at their disposal. Another advantage of these systematic 
descriptions is that they make it possible to make comparisons among the 
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modes and thus to point up more effectively, through mutual differentiation, 
what type of communicative experience each one refers to. I hope in the 
end that I have been able to show that the work of constructing the modes 
is interesting in itself, in view of the theoretical questions that it prompts 
us to ask.
Schema 4: The Levels of Semio-Pragmatic Analysis
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universal constraints
Constraints related to a language
the discursive space
Communicative competence as a repository or processes
the modes
Spaces of communication
Selection of processes, and of one or more modes to use
3. Aesthetic Mode, Artistic Mode: 
Relationship between Modes and 
Spaces
Abstract
Chapter 3 offers a detailed analysis of two modes, the artistic and the 
aesthetic, and inquires into the relationship between modes and spaces 
of communication. Starting from the example of the communication of 
memory within the family as an institution.
Keywords: aesthetic, artistic
The modes constructed in the preceding chapter are characterized by 
what might be called their vertical structure: they are made up of a series of 
processes that take place at the same time – thus, of a block. Even though 
these processes can be hierarchized, and individually deployed over the 
long term, the system they comprise is not staggered: they are all mobilized 
together, as an indissoluble whole. By contrast, the artistic and aesthetic 
modes demand to be built in accordance with a horizontal structure: their 
processes are staggered – in succession. Even though I cannot engage 
partially in f ictionalizing or documentarizing (I f ictionalize, I document, 
or I deploy another mode), I can embark on aesthetic or artistic modes 
without being able to f inish them.
While a number of theorists recognize the autonomy of the aesthetic 
mode (you can look at a natural object in the aesthetic, but not the artistic, 
mode), the aesthetic mode is most often related to the artistic, and to such 
an extent that it def ines it. “If aesthetic experience constitutes an intrinsic 
end and value, then there may be good reasons to define art in its terms….”1 
1 Richard Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art (New York: 
Rowman & Littlef ield Publishers, 2000), p. 47.
Odin, R., Spaces of Communication: Elements of Semio-Pragmatics. With an Introduction by 
Vinzenz Hediger. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022
doi 10.5117/9789462987142_ch03
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Similarly, in The Aesthetic Experience (1986), anthropologist Jacques Maquet 
notes that, since the Renaissance, in Europe, an object whose function 
is merely to create aesthetic delight is regarded as emanating from art. 
(He opposes this delight to the aestheticizing of the functional.) For his 
part, Rainer Rochlitz has it that “any work [of art] is at f irst only a claim to 
aesthetic recognition”2 and seeks to determine the “aesthetic criteria” for 
the artistic (Chapter VI). Gérard Genette, for his part, def ines all artistic 
production as “an artifact (or human product) with an aesthetic function,” 
even though he thinks it is impossible to determine these criteria3 and has it 
that the existence of an aesthetic intent (and even of an “epsilon of aesthetic 
intent”) is enough to make any object into a work of art.4
In the face of these positions, it seems to me necessary, rather, to construct 
the two modes as utterly independent. Unlike Jean-Marie Schaeffer5 this 
position is not, for me, a philosophical option. It seems to me, simply, that 
by positing this independence one is better equipped to take account of the 
experience of artistic and/or aesthetic communication.
From the Aesthetic Mode to Aesthetic Spaces
Contrary to what I have written earlier, I no longer believe that the aesthetic 
mode is characterized by the fact that it does not involve the construction 
of an enunciator.6 What had led me to this unfortunate idea is that I could 
not f ind which one could be the enunciator of natural objects when these 
are read in the aesthetic mode (for instance, stones, such as in the beautiful 
book that Roger Caillois dedicated to them: The Writing of Stones, 1985); 
however, not only could there be no text without an enunciator, but I became 
aware that I am the one who operates as an enunciator when I look at the 
stones or at any natural object in the aesthetic mode. What had misled me 
at the time was what Gérard Genette refers to as the “objectif ication of the 
2 Rainer Rochlitz, Subversion et subvention. Art contemporain et argumentation esthétique 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 36.
3 Gérard Genette, The Work of Art, Trans. by G.M. Goshgarian, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994), p. 4.
4 Gérard Genette, La relation esthétique (Paris: Seuil, 1997), p. 271.
5 Jean-Marie Schaeffer, L’art de l’âge moderne. L’esthétique et la philosophie de l’art du XVIII° 
siècle à nos jours (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), pp. 28–31.
6 Roger Odin, “Art et esthétique dans le champ du cinéma et de la télévision,” in Dominique 
Groux and Henri Holec (eds.), Une identité plurielle. Mélanges offerts à Louis Porcher (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2003a), pp. 219–232.
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subjective”:7 the object of aesthetic reading is seen as if it itself has aesthetic 
values, while in reality I am the one who attributed them to it while I was 
looking at it. The illusion that there is no enunciator came about because I 
was not aware of this attribution. I am thus indeed the one who constructs 
the aesthetic text: it is a matter of constructing a real enunciator who can 
be asked questions in term of identity – and it is indeed this enunciative 
structure that constitutes one of the major characteristics of the aesthetic 
mode.
I use the term aesthetic mode for the process by which a subject takes 
part in this adventure that is a quest for aesthetic values.
To account for this quest, I hypothesize that, as a subject of the aesthetic 
mode, I act as the subject of a narrative journey whose goal is to investigate 
aesthetic values. Yet we must indeed clarify the status of this narrative 
journey: above all, we must not conflate it with the narrative constructions 
that can be found at the discursive level of the aesthetic mode itself. It is, 
rather, a matter of my using the narrative model as a meta-level tool to 
describe the dynamics of the mode itself.
The f irst phase is the moment of my encounter with the object, what 
we can call (using the terminology of Greimas’s narrative semiotics8 – 
terminology that I will use throughout this analysis) the moment of the 
contract, which commits me to the aesthetic mode. This contract can take 
various forms: sometimes, it is the object that directly arouses my desire 
to set off in search of values: “Oh that’s beautiful!” (it is love at f irst sight). 
Sometimes it is someone else who draws my attention to the object (“Look 
how beautiful it is!”), or a critical text, or a reading. Sometimes it is a complex 
process that can be described only on a case-by-case basis. One thing is 
certain: without affective relationships with the object, there is no chance 
of my committing to the aesthetic mode. Affective relationships are indeed 
the addresser (destinateur) of the aesthetic mode, and it is this that launches 
the quest and gives rise to my desire to go farther in the study of values.
The second phase – the “qualifying sequence” – corresponds to the al-
location of resources (adjuvants) that will allow me to carry out this study. 
Indeed, the aesthetic mode works only under certain conditions (being 
able to disconnect from the stress of daily life, being free to look around, 
and so on), and requires, on the part of the subject, certain qualities, even 
if nobody really agrees on what these are (sensitivity, the ability to think in 
7 Genette, La relation esthétique, p. 117.
8 Algirdas Julien Greimas, Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Method (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1984).
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symbolic terms, to imagine, and so on). What is going on here is the entire 
question of aesthetic education, which is very different from that of artistic 
education, with which it is so often confused.
The f inal phase (“the main sequence”) is the production (or not) of 
aesthetic values, it being understood that this production is supposed to 
have conquered various opponents: anything that can distract me from 
my aesthetic quest. I can also be my own opponent and take an interest in 
plenty of other things than the study of the object’s aesthetic values, such 
as the information conveyed, the story being told, and the author.
Aesthetic values should not be confused with the message of the work 
(these are not the values conveyed by the story being told, or by the “speech” 
being engaged in). Aesthetic values are constructed in my encounter with the 
object, an encounter that takes place in a double movement from the feelings 
that are experienced to the cognitive work they prompt, and/or from the 
cognitive work done to the emotions it gives rise to. While I agree, in the case 
of the f irst movement, with Nelson Goodman, who holds that “in aesthetic 
experience, the emotions function cognitively,”9 the second movement flips his 
formulation around and states that, in aesthetic experience, cognitive outputs 
operate at the level of emotions. The two movements seem to me inseparable, 
even if the one can take precedence over the other under certain conditions.
In any case, it is at the affective and enunciative level that most of the work 
of the aesthetic mode takes place. Production at the discursive level often 
remains internal to the subject, and shows up only in the form of an “interior 
speech.” When it is expressed and gives rise to the production of statements, 
it can take various forms. Thus, in an amateur travel f ilm, we see a woman 
in the middle of a beautiful landscape. She is on her own (as is often the 
case, it is the husband who is f ilming) and she is making big gestures with 
both arms, both to tell her husband what to shoot (the waterfalls around 
her) and to say to whoever watches the f ilm later: “Look how beautiful it 
is!” Not a word is spoken (the f ilm is silent), but the gestures amount to 
discourse.10 Discursive production can range from a simple exclamation 
of admiration (“Oh!”) all the way to an aesthetic treatise spanning several 
volumes, via a poem celebrating the object of my aesthetic experience, or 
a story of my encounter with the object, or the production of drawings, 
paintings, photographs, f ilms and even music (Pictures at an Exhibition by 
Mussorgsky is intended to convey the artist’s aesthetic experience as he 
9 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), p. 248.
10 Karl Siereck, “C’est beau, ici. Se regarder voir dans le f ilm de famille,” in Roger Odin (ed.), 
Le film de famille. Usage privé, usage public (Paris: Méridiens Klincksieck 1995), pp. 63–78.
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looks at Victor Hartmann’s paintings). The only thing that matters is that the 
discursive structure has to do with the communication of aesthetic values.
We must be careful not to take this term as having exclusively “discursive 
value.” The values do indeed always have “discursive” content, but the bulk of 
that is often elsewhere, in sensitive relationships through which values are 
communicated. With the aesthetic mode, it is a matter not just of construct-
ing a text, but, to use a formulation of Jacques Rancière’s, of “distribution of 
the sensible.”11 While I have indicated in the foregoing analysis what place I 
believe the emotional level occupies, still, we must go farther: the aesthetic 
mode invites us to admit that a certain domination by, or even a certain 
autonomy of, the sensitive in relation to textual construction is possible. 
Herman Parret speaks of an aestheticization of pragmatics.12
In any event, values are put at the centre of the aesthetic mode, and pro-
vide it with its ultimate justif ication. These values fall under the collective; 
they are imposed on the individual. The space of aesthetic communication 
regulates the aesthetic relationship of its members to works and to the 
world. The content of aesthetic values (which, as the axis of relevance, 
imparts consistency to every space of aesthetic communication) varies 
from one space to the next: beauty, ugliness, the sublime, well done, new, 
authenticity, “power of resistance,” the ability to change people’s lives, the 
development of sensitivity, the enrichment of the self and of society, and 
so on. Not only do these values change in the course of history (there is a 
history of aesthetic spaces), but at some point in history there are several 
aesthetic spaces. In Distinction (1984), Pierre Bourdieu differentiates among 
these spaces in taking as a criterion the dispositions that consumers owe 
to their relative position in the economic f ield. There is thus a diachrony 
and a synchrony of spaces when it comes to aesthetic communication, 
but at this level, semio-pragmatics does not have much to say. While it 
provides the framework for analysis, as soon as we move to content, it is up 
to the historian and the sociologist to do the work: to study the semantic 
investment of the values that def ine these spaces.
Definition of the aesthetic mode
Phase 1: contract
– At the emotional level: linking up of the subject with an object
11 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (London: Con-
tinuum, 2006).
12 Herman Parret, The Aesthetics of Communcation: Pragmatics and Beyond (Berlin: Springer 
Science+ Business Media Dordrecht, 1993).
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– At the enunciative level: I construct myself as a subject heading off 
in search of the aesthetic values of the object
Phase 2: qualifying sequence
– At the emotional level: the emotional experience of the object
– At the enunciative level: the quest for adjuvants that can help me 
eliminate opponents
Phase 3: f inal sequence
– At the emotional level: indeterminate form, and the production of 
aesthetic values
– At the discursive level: indeterminate form, and the production of 
aesthetic values
From the Artistic Mode (in Reduced Form) to Inscription in the 
Space of Art
In the course of the year 1908 (not long before the appearance of Ricciotto 
Canudo’s famous piece on the seventh art, “Trionfo del Cinematografo,” 
which appeared on 25 November 1908 in Nuovo Giornale in Florence), 
a lawyer, Émile Maugras (who was also the Omnia Pathé’s Managing 
Director and Chairman of the Board of Pathé Cinema) and Maurice 
Guégan, a doctor of law (and also a Managing Director of Pathé National 
Cinema), undertook to have cinema enter into the space of art to promote 
the productions of the f irm they were working for – that is, to meet the 
economic objectives that are part and parcel of industrial competitive-
ness. They set out their thesis in The Cinematograph before the Law [Le 
Cinématographe devant le droit] (1908).13 The entire position that both 
authors took was based on a single line of argument, which aimed to show 
that f ilm falls under the Act of 1793 on Artistic Property, according to 
which “The authors of writings of every kind, music composers, painters 
and designers who create paintings or drawings, will, as long as they 
live, have the exclusive right to sell their work, and to have it sold and 
to distribute it.”14
13 The passage that follows is based on a study conducted in collaboration with André Gau-
dreault. It was Gaudreault, moreover, who introduced me to the text by Maugras and Guégan 
(André Gaudreault and Roger Odin, “Le Cinématographe, un “enfant prodige,” ou l’enfance de 
l’art cinématographique,” in Leonardo Quaresima and Laura Vichi (eds.), La decima musa. Il 
cinema e le altre parti (Udine/Gemona del Friuli: Forum, 2001), pp. 67–81).
14 Émile Maugras and Maurice Guégan, Le Cinématographe devant le droit (Paris: V. Giard & 
E. Brière éditeurs, 1908), pp. 2–3.
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The argument is, f irst of all, that cinema is nothing other than drawing: 
“Drawing, according to one generally accepted def inition, is the repre-
sentation of one or more f igures in a landscape, of some object, drawn in 
pencil or pen, painted with a brush, or created in any other way (Trousset). 
Cinematography is nothing other than the representation of landscapes 
or characters by a mechanical and chemical process.”15 Although there 
is an entire tradition that locates drawing within the “mechanical arts,” 
and although the use of some processes such as grids, optical tools, the 
application of the rules of perspective and of geometric rules, and so on has 
sometimes limited human involvement, the definition proposed overlooks 
what is generally seen as the major feature of drawing, its “character of 
gestuality”: the fact that it is produced by “instruments that have historically 
been the natural extension of the human hand” (Larousse). Maugras and 
Guégan seem to be aware of the problem, because they take the precau-
tion of anchoring their def inition in what I will call a double enunciative 
delegation: on the one hand, they present the def inition as “generally 
accepted” – that is, as having been accepted by anyone and everyone (the 
doxa is appointed as an enunciator); on the other, they ascribe it to an 
authority, Jules Trousset, who in 1877 published the Nouveau Dictionnaire 
Encyclopédique (f ive volumes, La Librairie Illustrée, Paris). In reality, the 
conflation of cinema with drawing is for all intents and purposes based on 
the last element in the definition: representation “by any means” (emphasis 
given in the book itself).
The second part of the argument conflates cinema with engraving: “en-
graving is the art of producing f igures on a flat surface, either with incisions, 
usually shallow, or with mordants – in the end, through the processes of 
chiselling and sculpture. Cinematography also reproduces images on a 
f lat surface (f ilm) with mordants in developing baths. For let there be no 
mistake, f ilm that has been exposed to light contains the image in the 
making; the developing bath simply contains the corrosive chemicals that, 
by destroying certain salts, reveal the drawing. Cinematography is thus 
engraving….”16 Here, the reasoning is particularly modern: it is in keeping 
with the def inition of photography as an index, which we f ind in Peirce 
and, more recently, in Jean-Marie Schaeffer, who speaks of a “luminous 
footprint.”17 However, the def inition of photography as an index, far from 
being what establishes it as art, is, on the contrary, what makes it an imprint 
15 Ibid., p. 3.
16 Ibid., p. 4.
17 Jean-Marie Schaeffer, L’image précaire (Paris: Seuil, 1987), p. 59.
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of the real. It is precisely because of this indexical status that Jean-Marie 
Schaeffer sees photography as a “precarious art”: “How can we distinguish 
between what counts as the image in its own right and what counts as 
the real, when we are looking at an image that is not an image as such in 
its specif icity except when it is understood as recording the real?”18 The 
assimilation of cinema with engraving is thus a paradoxical argument, to 
say the least, for integrating cinema into the space of art. The argument is, 
then, not without its weaknesses. But what matters for our two authors is to 
show that, because cinema is of a part with drawing and engraving, it falls 
de facto under the 1793 Act, and it must thus be recognized as belonging 
to the space of art: “cinematography is a drawing or an engraving, and it is 
certain, regardless of the value of the work in question, that we must see it 
as belonging to the f ine arts.”19 This declaration calls for two remarks. The 
f irst is that cinematography’s entry into the space of art is taking place at a 
price – its negation as a specif ic medium: “cinematography is a drawing or 
an engraving.” The second concerns the passage I have given my emphasis; 
it says, in the clearest way, that the process of inscribing an object in the 
space of art (in this case, cinema) has nothing to do with the aesthetic value 
of the object: “regardless of the value of the work in question.” On the other 
hand, Canudo closely linked the entry of cinema into the space of art to an 
aesthetic production.
In The Cinematograph before the Law [Le Cinématographe devant le 
droit], what allows the registration of cinema in the space of art is noth-
ing more than the status of the enunciator (we are in the paradigm of the 
“institutional” def inition of art20). All f ilm thus falls within the space of 
art, because the enunciator that produces it, cinema, belongs to this space. 
Any object can thus be regarded as belonging to the space of art if it is 
recognized that the enunciator belongs to the space of art: it is the logic of 
the ready-made. This logic works whether the enunciator is an individual 
(Duchamp or Mozart, for instance), an institution (The Pompidou Centre), 
a group (the Impressionists), a form (literature), and even, as we have just 
seen, a means of expression (drawing, engraving) or a medium (cinema). 
At this level, implementing the artistic mode means constructing a real 
enunciator belonging to the space of art.
18 Ibid., p. 158.
19 Maugras and Guégan, Le Cinématographe devant le droit, p. 5 [my emphasis].
20 Morris Weitz, “Le rôle de la théorie en esthétique” in Danielle Lories (éd.), Philosophie 
analytique et esthétique (Paris: Klincksieck 1988), pp. 27–40; George Dickie, Evaluating Art 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).
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It can happen that the artistic mode is limited to this process. Insofar 
as this process remains outside the object itself (which it is happy enough 
just to label), I will talk about artistic labelling.
Definition of the artistic mode (in reduced form)
– At the enunciative level: the construction of an enunciator belonging 
to the space of art (artistic labelling).
Even if we take the view that the artistic mode as I have just described it 
is not sustainable, we would be wrong to underestimate its importance. 
On the one hand, this approach is far from being exceptional: it happens 
really often that I f ind myself having to recognize the artistic status of an 
object (“This is art”) without pursuing any further the quest for values, in 
analysing or contemplating this object, either because this object does not 
affect me (while I know that Poussin is a recognized artist, his paintings 
do not speak to me at all) – or, to put it more simply, because I do not even 
ask myself: it is art, I know, but I just leave it at that. On the other hand, 
because, for a production, being labelled as belonging to the space of art 
has major consequences: it gains “distinctiveness,” “auratic value,” it will 
certainly sell better, and can give rights to its author. It can even happen 
that this labelling makes us want to approach it more carefully, and f inally 
that it leads to the artistic mode in its full-f ledged form, or even to the 
aesthetic mode.
From the Artistic Mode (Full-Fledged Form) to the Spaces of Art
The objective of the artistic mode in its full-f ledged form is to establish a 
relationship, which is required, between the characteristics of the object 
and an enunciator with a proper name: it’s a Renoir; this is by Mozart; that’s 
a Le Corbusier building.
From the outset, there is a twofold difference from the preceding 
process: on the one hand, there is a requirement that the enunciator be 
individualized. For example, I cannot just say that the enunciator is cinema. 
Rather, the enunciators will be of the type: Abel Gance, Jean Renoir or 
Alain Resnais. On the other hand, we are interested in the object and its 
characteristics.
The movement that connects an object and a proper name can go in both 
directions: from proper name to object, or the other way round. In both 
cases, it is the proper name that is at the heart of the relationship to the 
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space of art. Ben, a painter from Nice well known for his black-and-white 
paintings written in the form of aphorisms, says that “art is a matter of the 
proper name.”
Seen in this way, the work of the artistic mode consists entirely in f illing 
in the proper name. In itself, the proper name is empty. Searle describes 
it as a nail on which we hang descriptions.21 The processes of the artistic 
mode are designed to endow the proper name with content, whether this 
is done before or after the enunciation of the proper name:
– biographical studies
– studies on the context in which the work was produced (historical 
studies)
– thematic and stylistic analyses whose aim is to make what links produc-
tions by the same author (productions done under the same name).
Finally, the artistic mode can develop further through the construction 
of series and through comparisons with the productions by other proper 
names, either synchronically or diachronically (the history of art is a history 
of proper names).
The artistic mode thus appears to be based on an enunciative process 
(labelling or the enunciation of a proper name) and on discursive processes. If 
the aesthetic mode is a quest, the artistic mode, in its full version, is a search. 
It seems that no affective production is required, even if there is nothing to 
stop it. I can analyse a work very precisely, and dissect its structure systemati-
cally, without being in the least bit moved or touched, and without heading 
off in search of aesthetic values. Pierre Sorlin thus distinguishes “stylistic” 
and “systemic” analysis from the aesthetic approach.22 Several works in 
the f ield of art history, numerous university productions, high-quality texts 
that are very well documented and that even pay close attentive to textual 
work, show no signs of any search for aesthetic values. Besides, that is not 
what the institution is asking for….
Thus, even when the mode in its full-fledged form is involved, the artistic 
mode often remains separated from the aesthetic mode.
As we conclude this analysis, one thing seems certain: in our cultural 
space, only the enunciation of the proper name guarantees full-f ledged 
membership in the space of art.
21 John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1965).
22 Pierre Sorlin, Esthétique de l’audiovisuel (Paris: Nathan, 1992), p. 210–212.
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Work being done to remove African productions – and the same goes 
for Oceanian and Inuit productions, for instance – from the ethnographic 
space and locate them within the space of art demonstrate this clearly. It 
all starts with the analysis of objects to establish identif iable sets based 
on relevant features spotted through categorical differentiation (masks, 
sculptures, seats, and so on), differentiation based on the materials used 
(wood, stone, metal, and so forth) and stylistic features. These sets lead to 
the construction of a series of collective enunciators generally related to 
the places of origin of these objects (thus people speak of Dogon masks, 
Nigerian masks, Ivorian masks, and so on) and to a certain point in time 
(determining a given period). These sets are in turn divided into subsets 
by “tribe.” But the big moment, one that all art historians are waiting for, is 
the identif ication of the individual creator who can be recognized by their 
“personal vision”23 and accorded a proper name. “For quite some time,” 
note Martine Degli and Marie Mauzé, “we have specif ically not referred to 
creators from non-Western societies as artists, whether they are sculptors, 
poets or musicians. That is because artistic expression is considered as 
a kind of specif ic offshoot of a society’s creative capacity…. It was only 
starting in the 1960s that a number of studies started drawing attention 
to the individual dimension of creation, beyond the respect for stylistic or 
more broadly cultural constraints: a number of home-grown artists emerged 
from anonymity in this way.”24 Similarly, Frank Willett, after having noted 
that a stylistic designation “is nevertheless a signif icant turning point in the 
history of African art,” feels he must add: “even the sculptor’s name was not 
recorded.” And we feel relieved to be able to specify that “at the moment, 
hundreds of names of artists are mentioned in various publications” and 
to be able to give a few examples of works that have been written about 
sculptors who have been named: those by Fischer on Tame, Si, Tompieme et 
Son, from Northeast Liberia, those by Father Kevin Carroll on the sculptor 
Yoroubas Arowogun and his son Bandele, and so on.25 If we cannot say the 
proper name, there is still something missing. That explains the jubila-
tion one can feel in the text of the presentation by Philippe Dagen for the 
exhibition entitled Abomey at the Musée du quai Branly: “Finally, African 
artists are no longer anonymous. Abomey, an exhibition at the Musée du 
quai Branly, aff ixes names to the works.” Finally, “with African sculptures 
23 Frank Willett, African Art: An Introduction (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 153.
24 Degli, Marine and Marie Mauzé, Arts premiers. Le temps de la reconnaissance (Paris: 
Découvertes Gallimard 2000), p. 112.
25 Willett, African Art: An Introduction, pp. 226–237.
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we can do what we do with European art: make stylistic comparisons, study 
an individual’s details, a signature look.”26
A contrario proof of the importance of the proper name in our space of art: 
the process, popular among collectors of primitive art, of “distinguishing” a 
work of art by promoting the absence of a proper name associated with it. 
Sally Price tells us that, for these collectors, “the anonymity of the creator 
adds even more value to a work of art….” She quoted a Parisian collector: 
“I’m utterly enchanted by the artist’s anonymity. Not knowing who the artist 
is gives me enormous pleasure! “Once we know who created an object, it’s 
not primitive art any more.”27
We might think that, if it is so hard to f ind artist’s proper names in Africa, 
that is because in Africa there is another conception of art as we know it, or 
even that the notion of art does not exist there. Goody reports that, when 
the discussion was about “African art,” “Meyer Fortes, an anthropologist, 
said that the Tallensi of Northern Ghana did not have any,” but he adds: “one 
may question the use” that Fortes “makes of the word ‘art.’” Goody notes 
that for Fortes, art is limited to representational forms – sculpture, theatre, 
myth – but that the Tallensi know music and the verbal arts, and produce 
objects of an artistic character.28 It seems to me that there is no reason to think 
that Africa does not have any art. And there is no reason to see Africa as a 
seamless whole. This means that if one wanted to account for the functioning 
of African productions from the African point of view, not only would one have 
to construct the artistic mode otherwise than I have done – one would have 
to construct several artistic modes and thus several spaces of art depending 
on the region, the “ethnicity” and the “tribe” being considered.
I think that only African researchers could come up with these construc-
tions. Perhaps, after all, these researchers will show that there are no real 
differences with our space of art – for example, that the conception of art in 
Africa also calls for the use of the proper name (why would African societies 
be societies without authors?) and that it is only because there is a lack of 
information that there is this feeling of anonymity or because, in oral civiliza-
tions, there is a tendency, related to the nature of oral communication, towards 
the gradual erasure of the individual signature (as Goody suggests in The 
Domestication of the Savage Mind29). However, we cannot assume that a priori.
26 Le Monde, Sunday/Monday, 29/30 November 2009.
27 Sally Price, Espaces de l’art. Arts primitifs; regards civilisés, (Paris: énsb-a, 1995), p. 155.
28 Jack Goody, La peur des représentations. L’ambivalence à l’égard des images, du théâtre, de 
la fiction, des reliques et de la sexualité (Paris: éd. La Découverte, 2003), pp. 14–37.
29 Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind.
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Definition of the artistic mode (in its full-fledged form)
– From the proper name to the object:
• At the enunciative level: attribution of a proper name
• At the discursive level: f illing in the proper name (biographical 
studies, thematic and stylistic analyses, comparison with other 
artists, the history of art)
• At the affective level: undetermined
– From the object to the proper name:
• At the discursive level: thematic and stylistic studies, comparisons 
with other productions, the construction of sets and subsets, bio-
graphical studies
• At the enunciative level: research into and the allocation of a proper 
noun
• At the affective level: undetermined
Relationship among Modes and among Spaces
As we have just seen, separating the artistic mode from the aesthetic mode 
makes it possible to account for a number of behaviours that would otherwise 
remain unexplained. Another advantage of this separation is that we can 
ask about the relationship between these two modes as well as about the 
relationship to the spaces they belong to. There are four questions we can 
ask here.
Can belonging to the space of art and having recourse to the artistic mode 
lead to the aesthetic mode?
The mere fact of putting a question mark over this relationship shows the 
break that has been created in relation to the doxa that holds that “aesthetic 
experience is both an intrinsic end to art and a suff icient justif ication,” 
following Richard Shusterman’s formulation, which we cited above. However, 
just because the relationship is not required, that does not mean that it 
cannot come into being. This is what happened to me in the case of Stéphane 
Mallarmé, who has always bored me, even though I know perfectly well 
that Mallarmé is a great poet who belongs without question to the space 
of art (artistic labelling). Now, it happened that Mallarmé was included in 
the programme at CAPES30 and that I had to study his work in detail to 
30 Certif icat d’aptitude au professorat de l’enseignement du second degré (secondary-education 
teaching certif ication).
102 SpACeS of CommuniCAtion
present to my students. From reading and rereading his writings, and by 
dint of carrying out stylistic analyses of his poems (= the deployment of 
the full-fledged artistic mode), I have come to discover in them a hitherto 
unsuspected wealth, and have gone in search of values and shifted to reading 
in the aesthetic mode, a process that is itself determined by my belonging 
to a certain aesthetic space (which corresponds to my place in the social 
structure).
Can the aesthetic mode lead to the artistic mode and the space of art?
Even if any entry into the space of art does not originate in an aesthetic 
approach – economic interests are often a more powerful driver, as we have 
seen in the case of the cinema – it is still a possibility: because this piece 
had an effect on me, and because it drew me into a rewarding aesthetic 
experience, I want to bring it into the space of art to give it some social 
and institutional recognition that it would not otherwise get. My job, then, 
is to f ind institutional support, critics, dealers, museum off icials, and art 
historians who, by deploying the artistic mode, will legitimize the entry of 
this production into the space of art.
Jean Dubuffet’s initiative promoting productions by insane and marginal-
ized people is an example of this approach. Dubuffet is interested in “works 
done by people unscathed by artistic culture, in which mimicry, unlike 
what is happening among intellectuals, plays little or no part, so that these 
authors are drawing everything – in terms of subject, choice of materials, 
means of transposition, rhythms, ways of writing, and so on – from their 
own creative capital, and not the clichés of classical art or the art that is in 
fashion.”31 Even though he uses the term “art” in his writings, what captivates 
Jean Dubuffet are the values at stake in these productions (we are indeed 
in the aesthetic mode): “We are witnessing the workings of art – utterly 
pure, raw, reinvented in all its phases by its author, based only on their own 
impulses – thus of art in which only the workings of invention appear, and 
not the workings of the chameleon and the monkey, which are constants 
in cultured art.”32 To defend these values, Dubuffet set about legitimizing 
these productions through recourse to the artistic mode – that is, by doing 
everything to bring out the proper names of their authors: seeing to the 
promotion of artists (Wolf i, Aloïse, Müller, et al.), the creation of notes on 
their work and of their biographies, analyses of their works, the creation of 
a specialized journal (L’Art brut, the f irst issue of which came out in 1964) 
31 Michel Thévoz, L’art brut, (Geneva: Skira, 1995), p. 11.
32 Quoted by ibid.
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and even the setting up of a museum (unable have it set up in France, in 
1976 Dubuffet eventually established it in Lausanne).33 The end result was 
nothing less than the production of a new artistic space: l’art brut. And one 
could also regard Dubuffet as the “inventor of l’art brut” Dubuffet34 – an 
artistic space different from the space “of the cultural arts.”
This analysis conf irms the hypothesis I advanced earlier, about the 
situation of art in Africa, namely that there can exist at a given moment 
in history (in synchrony), and in the same cultural space, several spaces 
of art. Interestingly, the processes of the artistic mode that we f ind in the 
two spaces of art that have been spotted (the space of art cultural vs the 
space of l’art brut) are the same. What changes when we go from the space 
of cultural art to the space of l’art brut is nothing more or less than the 
values conveyed by the aesthetic mode, which has led to the mobilization 
of the artistic mode.
Can belonging to the space of art block the deployment of the aesthetic mode?
It can happen that a recognition of belonging to the space of art blocks the 
aesthetic mode. It has thus been possible to see the declaration that theatre 
is Art (with a capital A) as constituting a block to the ability of the working 
class to make an aesthetic approach to theatre, as opposed to f ilm. There is 
a similar problem with the space of the Museum as this high place of Art. 
What is at issue here is that what we might call the “arrogance of Art”35 
gets in the ways of the deployment of the aesthetic mode: I am crushed by 
the weight of the label, a label that, what is more, can be read as a marker 
of class position (Bourdieu). The result is that I have no wish to go farther, 
and that I confine myself by acknowledging the label.
Can the aesthetic mode block entry into the space of art?
The aesthetic mode, for its part, can block entry into the space of art: there 
are many poets, painters and f ilmmakers who have found themselves, for a 
time at least, denied access to the space of art because the values that were 
the object of their aesthetic quests were not recognized by their time or their 
country, and therefore by the space of art that was dominant at that moment 
in history. From the Impressionists (“That’s not painting!”) to musique 
33 Lucienne Peiry, Art Brut: The Origins of Outsider Art, (New York: Random House Incorporated, 
2001).
34 Thévoz, L’art brut, p. 11.
35 Masahiro Hamashita, “La quête de la beauté contre l’arrogance de l’art,” Museum Interna-
tional, vol. 61, no. 4 (2009), pp. 9–15.
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concrète (“That’s not music – it’s just a load of noise!”) via experimental 
f ilm (“This is not cinema!”), there are countless examples of productions 
that people have tried to kick out of the space of art, refusing to recognize 
their authors (to take into account their proper names). This was also the 
case for productions of l’art brut before Dubuffet’s initiative.
The choice to separate the two modes turns out to be productive – but 
then again it is the questions that the analysis brings up that are the most 
interesting: the question of the relationship between textual production and 
sensitive relationships, of the relationship of the modes among themselves, 
and of the relationship between modes and communication spaces.
A priori, the implementation of modes in a given space of communication 
is really flexible: pretty much any mode can occur in any space. However, in 
practice, if the actant who is the receiver wants the communication to work 
(which is not a requirement), they will make the effort to inscribe within 
the space of communication that the sender has set aside for them (they 
still must be able to access this information), and will give priority to the 
mode(s) of production of meaning that this space calls for. This does not, 
however, block the use of other methods – although these will take place 
in second position, often in an ad hoc and unpredictable way (the analyst 
generally does not have the means to take them into account). Things get 
complicated when a production migrates into a space of communication 
that does not belong to it, because this space is going to try imposing its 
own way; in this case, it will be a good idea to wonder about the relationship 
between the mode of origin and the mode called for by the new space of 
communication. I will revisit these questions in the following chapters.
4. Contextual Analysis and the Space 
of Communication : The Space of 
Communication of Family Memory
Abstract
Chapter 4 shows how the notion of a space of communication can allow 
contextual analysis.
Keywords: home movie, memory, family
In this chapter, I will show how the notion of a space of communication can 
be used to understand what is happening, from a communication point of 
view, in a given contextual framework.
I will take as an example communication within the family institution, 
as it exists in western space. But studying the family from a communication 
point of view can mean many things. The f irst decision I have to make in-
volves choosing the axis of relevance that I will hold onto in order to build the 
communication space I will work on. I am spoiled for choice: interpersonal 
relationships? relationships as a couple? parent-child communication? 
the relationship to the media? the influence of the spatial arrangement of 
the house or apartment on family communication? and so on. I decided 
to analyse the space of communication of family memories, an important 
axis: by creating links between the present and the past, memory is what 
ensures the internal permanence of the family. Even if everything that does 
not relate to this axis is not studied, that does not mean that everything 
that does concern it will be studied (important issues on this axis that will 
not be addressed include genealogical research, which fascinates many 
families): here again, the goal is more to show a method than to analyse in 
detail any particular space of communication.
Odin, R., Spaces of Communication: Elements of Semio-Pragmatics. With an Introduction by 
Vinzenz Hediger. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022
doi 10.5117/9789462987142_ch04
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The Space of Communication for Memory in the “Traditional” 
Family
When I say “traditional” family, I mean the bourgeois patriarchal family 
that predominated from 1945 to 1975, the great period of familialism. This 
structure can be described as a set of constraints governing the construction 
of the actants in this space.
The Constraints and the Construction of the Actants
“Every group assigns spaces.” In his thoughts on Maurice Halbwachs, Paul 
Ricœur1 remarks that “these are retained or formed in memory.” According 
to Halbwachs,2 this system of places is particularly strong and stable 
within the framework of the family: “Men may change their occupations or 
nationality, they may rise or fall on the leader of social positions: subjects 
may become masters, and masters may become subjects – a layman may 
become a priest, and a priest can return to the laity. But a son does not 
become a father unless he builds another family: and even then he will 
always remain the son of his father. There is in this case an irreversible 
relationship there. In a similar manner, brother cannot stop being brothers, 
for this is a kind of indissoluble union. Nowhere else does the place of the 
individual seem more predetermined, without taking into account what the 
individual desires or indeed is.”3 We have also known, since Freud, that 
these determinations have to do not only with biological relations, but with 
the symbolic places that manifest themselves in the Oedipal relationship.
In this structure, the father has a special status. Not surprisingly, then, 
it is he who pioneers the construction of family memories (he is the one 
who has the tomb built, who orders the portrait paintings, who takes the 
photos, who does the f ilming, and so on.), but he does involve the entire 
family in all of this. Concerned about generational continuity, he organizes 
grand rituals of remembrance: when there is a birth in the family, rites of 
passage (f irst communion, wedding, retirement), physiological changes (the 
f irst tooth, the f irst words, the f irst steps), material changes (a new house, 
a new car), he arranges for visits to the cemetery, sends out invitations to 
big meals, shows home movies of the family, and so on. He is the one who 
1 Paul Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p.121.
2 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago, London: Chicago University Press, 
1992).
3 Ibid., pp. 69–70.
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oversees the construction, or reconstruction by the members of the family of 
the family history – a more or less mythical story that serves, for outsiders, 
as the off icial history, and for family members, as a consensus builder, or at 
least as a generator of an apparent consensus. At this level, it is the Family 
(the family as a structure) that is the real enunciator of the work of memory: 
concerned about its preservation, the institution ensures that nothing can 
disturb its harmony. Paternal censorship is coupled with self-censorship: 
there are certain things we simply do not talk about.
But the family is not only a structure. It is also a group of individuals, and 
we cannot conceive of the relationship to family memory without taking 
account of this dual status. Even Halbwachs, who, as we know, defends 
the thesis that individual memories are always based on social and thus 
collective relationships – makes this distinction: “In short, any event or 
f igure remembered by the family partakes of these two characteristics: 
on the one hand it recreates a singularly rich picture, which is deeply 
penetrating since it allows us to retrieve realities we have come to know 
personally through intimate experience; on the other hand it obliges us 
to view the person from the experience of our group, that is, to recall the 
kinship relationship that explain why this person is important for all of 
us.”4 There is thus another family memory, deeply personal, and more 
secret, too. This memory is no freer than the last one, but the constraints 
that govern it concern, not the group, but the individual themselves. This 
hidden memory that works in everyone’s inner self gives rise to a textual 
production very different from the preceding one – a production with an 
often-dysphoric tone: that is where the old resentments show up, the old 
conflicts between members of the family – all the unspoken things that 
make up its shadowy side.
Which Mode(s) to Construct? Private Mode, Intimate Mode
The existence of these two memories means that I cannot stick to the con-
struction of a single mode, as visual anthropologist Richard Chalfen does 
with what he calls the Home Mode (1987). Two modes must be constructed, 
corresponding to the two types of memory that have been identif ied: the 
private and the intimate modes.
By private mode, I mean that by which a group (here, the family) makes 
a return to its past. With the private mode, we are in what Edward S. Casey 
4 Ibid., p. 71.
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called Reminiscing:5 reliving the past, evoking it as a group, for example 
by talking about it, but also, perhaps, by sharing photos or videos. Here, 
communication is exteriorized (whether by speech, sound, or image) and 
is therefore directly subject to the constraints (censorship) of the family 
structure. As a result, productions made in this mode are highly standard-
ized (there is nothing that looks so much like a home movie as another 
home movie) and they most often have a euphoric tone to them. Another 
consequence is that what is being said (the textual production) is in this 
case often less important than the fact that it is said in the f irst place: the 
key is in the exchange between the actants who are taking part in the 
communication.
By intimate mode, I mean the mode by which I go back over my life and 
the family’s past. The intimate mode takes the form of inner speech: com-
munication is not externalized. There is no point in dwelling on the strength 
of the emotions that animate this internal production and on its role in 
building the identity of the individual – a construction done by opposing 
the Self to the Other.
Like the aesthetic and artistic modes, the intimate and private modes 
operate horizontally and can be described with a narrative structure. This 
structure can give rise to various scenarios, depending on the answer to 
the questions: what prompts the movement of remembrance? What kind of 
movement is involved? Who are the opponents? Here are a few examples.
Stories of sudden emergence: I encounter an object and it triggers a memory. 
Ricœur tells us that memory “arises in the manner of an affection.”6 This 
is the famous madeleine scene from Proust. Here we are in intimate mode. 
There is no intention at work in this sudden emergence of the memory, 
neither on my part or on the part of the object, which certainly was not 
made to put the memory in motion. Here, the object is not so much a vehicle 
for memory as it is a stimulator of it.
Stories of quests: These occur at two levels. At the personal level, the 
scenario is the other way around from the one we have seen: I set off in search 
of family memories. This is the strategy of the reminder that Ricœur defines 
as “an active search.”7 Here, the intention is mine (I am the subject who 
goes on a quest) and the memory is the Object of my quest. It may happen 
that this quest comes up against that opponent, oblivion. I will then have 
5 Edward S. Casey, Remembering: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1987).
6 Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, p. 17.
7 Ibid.
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to resort to adjuvants to reach my goals: question other members of the 
family, consult the archives, look at photographs, reread letters, and so on. 
In private, the quest takes on a collective dimension: the re-united family 
goes in search of memories (family meals, meeting around the family grave, 
the screening of family movies, and so on).
Stories of transformation: X intentionally gives an object the status of 
curator of family memories that, in the future, it reminds him of the moment 
he is living (intimate mode). In La Photo sur la cheminée (1993), Bertrand Mary 
describes how newlyweds decided to lovingly keep, under a glass globe, a 
large silver coin that had been blessed by the priest along with the rings, 
the garland of orange blossom the bride was carrying, and the white ribbon 
she was wearing in her hair (private mode). We have to do here with the 
logic of the “talisman,” or what Krzysztof Pomian (1990) calls the domain of 
semiophores (how objects are accepted into museums): it is a matter here 
of accepting the object into my personal museum.
Stories of donation: It is no longer I, but someone who intentionally gives 
me an object on which they confer the status of curator of memory (private 
mode): the bride who snips off a lock of her hair to give it to her f iancé, the 
father who gives his son a watch so that he’ll remember him. Here again, 
memorial labelling is aimed at the future.
Stories of transmission: my father tells me what his life was like when 
he was a child, or I get a letter in which my daughter tells me all about her 
holiday by the sea. The account he gives and the letter she sends (but it could 
also be a series of photos, audio recordings, videos, and so on) are vehicles for 
remembrance: they transmit the content of memories in the battle against 
forgetting. The two modes, intimate and private, can then take hold.
The use of one mode does not mean the other cannot be used at the same 
time: one can participate in collective memory research (private mode), while 
individually going back to one’s past (intimate mode) and vice versa. Three 
major types of relationship can then be established between the two modes.
The construction of parallel stories: while we are watching a home movie 
that recounts the last trip to Greece, and while the re-united family evokes 
memories (a collective construction: private mode), I start thinking about 
my grandpa who died a year ago and whom I miss (intimate mode). The 
private and intimate modes work separately here.
The construction of a single story through the articulation of the two 
modes: the private and the intimate modes reinforce one another; I go in 
greater depth into what is said collectively without, however, wanting to give 
utterance to these thoughts. The intimate mode enriches the relationship 
of remembrance.
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The construction of divergent stories: the constraints on the space of com-
munication for family memory imply that what is enunciated by the private 
mode contributes to family cohesion, or at least does not jeopardize it. In these 
circumstances, it is common that my inner speech (intimate mode) is not in 
agreement with what I say in my oral communication with other members 
of the family (private mode). In the end, both modes involve the construction 
of a real enunciator who can be asked questions in terms of identity:
– the enunciator “I” for the intimate mode: individual memory is a 
stakeholder in the construction of my personal identity;
– the enunciator “The Group” for the private mode (here, the Family): 
the collective approach helps construct and assert the identity of the 
Family as a collectivity with regard to its members, to other families, 
and to other community groups with which members of the family may 
be involved (at work, school, the sports club, and so on). Of course, the 
collective approach is also involved in the construction of my personal 
identity.
Definition of the intimate mode
– At the discursive level: inner speech
– At the emotional level: extremely powerful
– At the enunciative level: the construction of a real enunciator: I
– At the relational level: the construction of identity
Description of the private mode
– At the discursive level: indeterminate in form, but highly standardized 
in a given context
– At the emotional level: feelings of euphoria, and a sense of community 
belonging
– At the enunciative level: the construction of an actual collective 
enunciator
– At the relational level: interactions within a group
It should be noted that, in order to describe these two modes, I had to add a 
level to the ones I had used previously for the other modes: the relational level.
Communication Operators
A communication operator is anything that, in a given space, on the axis of 
relevance that is selected, is used by the actants to enable communication.
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In this case, the communication operators are operators of memory. At 
the level of textual production, they work as vehicles for, and stimulators of, 
memory. On the one hand, they give me information that feeds my memory 
directly: I did not remember that my aunt was so beautiful – but this portrait 
reminds me. On the other hand, they lead, through a chain reaction, to a 
textual production, which can sometimes move away completely from 
the text produced by the operator: seeing a picture of my grandparents, I 
start thinking about Pierre, one of my childhood friends whom I have not 
seen for more than twenty years, and then about all the anxieties I felt 
when I was coming back from my f irst day of classes in primary school…
the mystery of associations…. At the relational level, they are involved in 
the relations among the members of the family, in the relationship the 
family has to other groups and the relationships all the members of the 
group have individually to themselves (all three cases have to do with the 
construction of identity).
A brief typology allows us to distinguish between unintentional 
operators (Proust’s madeleine), operators that are born of the intention 
of the receiver (I decide to go and see once again the village where my 
grandparents lived, Châtel-de-Neuvre, thus setting it up as a memory 
operator) and operators conceived as such when they were being produced: 
the tomb (around which the family gathers every year for All Saints’ Day), 
the oral histories that my grandfather would tell me of his adventures 
during the First World War, the portrait paintings, postcards, photographs, 
f ilms, and so on.
But we cannot simply identify and classify operators; we must still wonder 
about their nature. It is then that we f ind out that an operator is not neces-
sarily what we tend to imagine it to be.
When it comes to the communication of family memories, portraits are 
not really interpreted as paintings. Even though the artistic mode can show 
up as an element of evaluation (“It’s a Paulin!” said Mrs. X with some pride 
as she showed her portrait to her guests – Paulin being an obscure painter 
from the Lyon region), the relationship to the person painted (the indexical 
relationship) is what prevails: “It’s the spitting image of her!” In fact, these 
portraits are seen as photographs, and even before photography exists: they 
ask for a reading, and also, in the space of the sender, for a production in 
the mode of the imprint (with the particularity that the print is performed 
here by human hands, mediated by the look and the work of the painter). I 
will refer to this memory operator as photographic painting.
We could then be tempted by an approach in terms of remediation – “Every 
new medium is justif ied because it f ills a void or f ixes a fault made by its 
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predecessors”8 – and we may imagine that photography will substitute, 
as an operator, for the painted portrait, because it works directly on the 
indexical mode. (“The production of a print is a stand-alone process that is 
not necessarily mediated by a human gaze.”9) Yet things are not actually 
that simple, because the photograph often appears to be too exact, too 
precise and, if truth be told, too true. It can be, then, that the model does 
not feel suff iciently valued. Painting is thus making a comeback with the 
touch-up job: reduce the size of a nose that is a bit on the big side, add a 
missing tooth, redraw an ear that is sticking out, and so on. We can then 
talk about the painted photograph as an operator.
What is suitable as an operator for the space of communication of family 
memory is thus a new medium that is neither painting nor photography, but 
a mixture of both: this is not convergence,10 but hybridization.
The same phenomenon of hybridization takes place in the case of the home 
movie. Contrary to what its designation seems to assume, the home movie 
is not, or more precisely should not be, a “movie,” at least not if what we call a 
“movie” is a production that is structured for communication purposes, with 
a beginning and an end. When the home movie is constructed as a “movie,” it 
shows the family history from the point of view of the one who made the movie 
(generally, the father), a point of view that may not be accepted by the other 
members of the family, who will have trouble finding their own experiences in 
it. For a home movie to work well, it must be composed as a series of unordered 
shots that show only snippets of the lives of the family in such a way so that 
each member can reconstruct their family history: in a word, it must be less 
of a vehicle for and more of a stimulator of memory. To put it another way: the 
home movie works well when it is “badly done.”11 It would thus be a mistake 
to imagine that amateur makers of home movies are bad at what they do: 
they are simply respecting the constraints of the space of communication in 
which they are operating. This constraint can be formulated as follows: when 
you make a home movie, do not act like a f ilmmaker.
The a contrario proof is that, if one makes home movies as a “f ilmmaker,” 
this becomes a source of conflict with the members of the family (conflict 
is the sanction that f lags the fact that the constraints on the space of 
8 Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT, 1999).
9 Schaeffer, L’image précaire, p. 22.
10 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York: New York 
University Press, 2006).
11 Roger Odin (ed.), Le film de famille. Usage privé, usage public (Paris: Méridiens Klincksieck, 
1995), Roger Odin (ed.), “Le cinéma en amateur,” Communications, vol. 68 (1999).
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communication have been transgressed). The f ilm The Amateur, by Krystof 
Kieslowki (1979), thus tells the story of a maker of home movies, Filip Mosz, 
who, little by little, is seized by the desire (the demon) “to make films” (he puts 
his family in front of the camera) and who, because of this role change, loses 
his wife and his child. Although his story is far less dramatic, Steven Spielberg 
shows, for his part, the conflicts generated by his position as a f ilmmaker 
when he films his family: “What my father was filming was awfully boring. A 
lot of baloney. So I decided to take matters in hand. I got out of the car to run 
ahead and add some interest to our arrival. Like in a gangster movie. Over 
time I began to serve as director on our vacations. My sisters were irritated 
because they had to unpack the luggage several times in a row…. They are very 
tough. They know exactly what I’ve cut out. And they want me to reinsert it. But 
I’m the one who has artistic control. And I’m not going to give in.”12
And here is another exhibit, this time in terms of reception: if we regard 
a home movie as a “f ilm,” we will get bored in a hurry. Unlike f ilms made 
for the cinema, the home movie is made, not to tell a story to an audience, 
but only to get family memory going.
But if making a home movie is not f ilmmaking, what is it? The answer 
seems to be this: the home movie is an animated photo album. Here are 
three arguments that can support this answer. Arguments at the aesthetic 
level and at the level of content: the home movie shows the same family 
events and uses the same stylistic f igures as are used in family photography 
(pauses, frontality, looking directly at the camera, the group photo, and so 
on), but animated. Ethno-methodological: the person making the home 
movie regards themselves, not as a “f ilmmaker,” but rather as a photographer. 
Hervé Guibert quotes a remark his father made after a screening of home 
movies: “‘You’ll be disappointed,’ he said, ‘they’re only home movies.’”13 
With the home movie, we have to do with the photographic strip and not 
the f ilm strip (strip: “an ongoing activity…as seen from the perspective of 
those subjectively involved in sustaining an interest in them”14). Here there 
is a structural argument: the home movie shows a sequence of snippets 
from life, separated by holes in time of various sizes (from a few minutes 
to several days, or even several months). There is often no link between 
these moments other than that they all belong to the family history. Here 
we are talking about chronological order, not narration. This is precisely 
the structure of the family photo album.
12 “Interview with S. Spielberg,” Die Zeit, 26 August 2004, no. 36.
13 Hervé Guibert, Ghost Image (Los Angeles: Green Integer, 1998), p. 49.
14 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), p. 10.
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What these two examples – the portrait and the home movie – show is 
that, in order to analyse the operators involved in a space of communication, 
it is not enough to stick to the mediums as they are. What is needed is to 
analyse how each space of communication constructs its operators. This 
construction is intended to adapt the operator to its function in the space 
of communication in question. For instance, the value of structuring the 
home movie as an “album of family photos” (that is, as a construction 
with “holes” in it) is two-fold: not only does this construction allow each 
member of the family to have a one-to-one relationship with the family 
history (everyone can f ind their experiences in it, since there is no story 
being imposed on them), but it encourages the collective reconstruction of 
this history by all of the members of the family, because the holes have to 
be f illed in; and it is true that there is a lot of chatter while a home movie 
is being shown, even to the point that people stop watching it. The home 
movie (like the photo album) thus functions more as a relational than as 
a textual operator.
To summarize, then: the constraints that are at work in the family govern 
the construction of the operators, the actants and the modes in such a way 
that the communication of memory between members of the family takes 
place “in the best way” and is carried out for the benef it of the family as 
an institution. In particular, the system of censorship or self-censorship 
involved in communication between family members and the separation 
between two modes of speech – one of them external, standardized and 
euphoric (private mode), the other internal (intimate mode), which returns 
the expression of problems to the realm of the unspoken while allowing 
them to be formulated by the individual – these are two major factors of 
this proper functioning. If intimate speech comes to be externalized, if 
censorship is not respected, and if operators are not constructed as they 
“should” be, these transgressions will be punished, and that will create 
conflicts within the family. Analysed in this way, the communication of 
memory in the family seems to have a primarily ideological function: to 
strengthen family cohesion in order in turn to promote familialism and 
perpetuate the family as an institution in its traditional form.
The Space of Communication for Memory in the New Family 
Structure
Halbwachs notes that some families, “more sensitive to present conditions 
than to the prestige of the past,” “have organised their lives on a new basis…. 
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Such families indicate the traits of a society in which the barriers erected by 
particular traditions between domestic groups have been lowered, familial 
life no longer completely absorbs the individual, and where the family circle 
is enlarged and is partly merged through other forms of association. Their 
ideas and beliefs represent the budding traditions of these more extended 
groups, into which the old families will be absorbed.”15 This description by 
Halbwachs takes pretty good account of how the actants are constructed in 
the new family structure: as hierarchical constraints diminish, individuals 
take precedence over the institution, and personal relationships outweigh 
kinship (in what is sometimes called “the family of choice”).
On the other hand, and in parallel with the evolution of the family, 
an unprecedented technological evolution has directly affected memory 
operators in the family space, both at the level of production and at that of 
dissemination: the development of TV, which has turned out to be a very 
good teacher of audiovisual language – everyone now “knows” how to f ilm 
and even how to edit: codes have been integrated. Then there are the shift 
from f ilm strip to video and then to digital, the ability to record sound 
directly, the appearance of miniature audiovisual recording equipment, the 
spread of the mobile phone and the computer, and the rise of the Internet. 
Even as we make sure not to succumb to technological determinism, it is 
certain that these developments change the constraints. And as we shall 
also see, they provide tools that are adapted to the new family structure.
This change in the institutional and technological context implies a 
change in the characterization of the space of communication of family 
memory as we have just presented it. The f irst idea that comes to mind is to 
take account of this development as a transformation of the preceding space. 
However, it is not this solution that I will latch onto: it seems to me more 
useful from a descriptive standpoint to build a new space of communication, 
a space different from the preceding one at the level both of operators and 
of modes of the production of meaning and textual production. On the 
one hand, this is because with regard to the experience in this new space, 
things are changing quite dramatically; on the other hand, because this 
new space does not make the one that preceded it disappear. To varying 
degrees, these days, the family is a mixed structure, hovering between the 
two spaces: there is thus an intersection between the two spaces. In the 
analyses that follow, I will try primarily to characterize the new space, 
but also point up a few characteristics that attest to the persistence of the 
preceding space.
15 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p. 185.
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“Freed-Up” Communication
The loosening of the institutional constraints at the heart of the family has 
meant that the new productions of memories immediately bring up aspects 
of family life that until that point had remained unspoken.
Breaking with the euphoric view of family pictures, we see family “as is,” 
with its happy moments, to be sure, but also with all its minor instances of 
pettiness and all the moments of rivalry and conflict that always arise within 
any group. The introduction of direct sound encourages this movement: 
because sound is harder to control than images, particularly everything that 
is said off-camera, things are said in new productions that would previously 
have been unthinkable: words that we would prefer to forget, unpleasant 
remarks, denials that cause more hurt than any assertion could, poisonous 
innuendos, and so on.
But it is especially the relationship to intimacy that has changed. The change 
in institutional constraints, along with technological evolution, means that 
nothing is missed when the camera is rolling. In Family Viewing (Atom Egoyan, 
1987), a son discovers that his father is erasing home movies so that he can 
film himself having sex with his new girlfriend. The selfie f ilm is on the rise. 
In an advertisement for a camcorder, a woman lying on her back holds her 
camera at arm’s length and films herself as the slogan tells us: “My film – my 
life.” As far as I know, no advertisement for an amateur f ilm camera offers 
the possibility of the selfie f ilm as a selling point. With small cameras, and 
especially with mobile phones, one more milestone has been passed. These 
devices establish a relationship of intimacy with their owner (we always have 
them in our pockets or in the palm of our hand). The selfie film is getting banal: 
we tell our mobile phones the secrets we used to tell our favourite teddy bear.
Testimony Mode: Another Mode of Production of Meaning
Today, it is no long only the father, but all members of family, who take 
family photos and make home movies. This is made possible by making 
easy-to-use equipment available to everyone. We then see a proliferation of 
productions made from different points of view: that of the father, of the wife, 
but also of the children, who have their own devices (often mobile phones). 
An individual enunciative structure replaces the enunciative collective 
structure (the Family). In the new family structure, the photo album and 
the home movie (in both of which the Family is the enunciator) make way 
for a plethora of photos and movies about the family.
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A new mode of production of meaning takes place – a mode that comple-
ments, and does not substitute for, the private and the intimate modes: 
that of testimony.
By testimony mode, I mean a subject, an I who, through the production 
of a text (written, oral, image and/or sound) offers their views on what they 
see or have seen – in this case, family life.
This construction of an enunciator, I, differs from that which takes place 
in intimate mode, in that the enunciator no longer expresses themselves 
through inner speech, but through explicit utterances addressed to the other 
family members. This mode has both a personal and a collective dimension. 
Another point of difference with the intimate mode is that, while we can 
reprise for this mode what Kate Hamburger said of the lyric I – in intimate 
mode, “we no longer can, no longer may, ascertain whether the statement’s 
content is true or false, objectively real or unreal – we are dealing only with 
subjective truth and reality, with the experience-field of the stating I itself.”16 
Testimony mode calls, on the contrary, for an assessment in terms of identity 
(who are you to be giving an account of this event?), of ways of acting (where 
were you when it happened?) and of the truth, for which the one giving the 
testimony is held responsible. We are a long way off from arriving at the 
consensus we saw in the preceding family structure. The role of constraints 
has been overturned, and the “normal” status of family communication 
has changed: newly produced memories beget debate, discussion, and even 
conflict between members of the family and the enunciative subject. The 
family is now an area of tensions that are manifested explicitly. However, it 
is not certain that this leads to a dissolution of the family space. What can 
be seen here, rather, is a process of clarif ication in relations and a change 
in the structure of the institution.
Definition of the mode of the first-hand account
– At the discursive level: the predominance of narrative structures
– At the emotional level: an extremely strong personal investment
– At the enunciative level: the construction of an I-enunciator who can 
be asked questions in terms of identity, ways of acting, and truth
Other Memory Operators
Whereas in the preceding space it was the constraints within the family 
structure that governed the status of the operators, it is now language 
16 Käte Hamburger, The Logic of Literature (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 277.
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constraints from television that are imposed. Films are now made in accor-
dance with the conventions used by television programmes: interviews with 
family members, zoom shots pointing up this or that detail (the “zoom” is a 
strong enunciation mark), interruptions straight from the camera operator, 
who comments on this or that situation, and so on. These f ilms are often 
edited: they play with transitions that the software offers as possibilities: of 
creating overlays, mixing f ilms and still photos, and so on. The home movie 
turns into a journalistic report on the family: a production performed by 
a subject.17
Moreover, this subject is no longer aimed only at family audiences, but 
also at boyfriends and girlfriends, buddies, relatives, and even all of those 
friends one does not know on sites such as Facebook. Some of these videos 
have in fact been uploaded to the Internet, to a personal blog or some sharing 
platform, and in this way they contribute to the confused relationship 
between public and private spaces characteristic of society today. Patrice 
Flichy, using a notion proposed by the psychologist Serge Tisseron, speaks 
in this context of an “extimate space.”18 Tisseron refers to a “desire for 
extimacy” as “the force that is driving everyone to put part of their life out 
there.”19 These videos, indeed, count as self-expression at least as much as 
home movies do. However, if in some ways they escape family constraints, 
they still fall under the yoke of other ones: editorial and economic models 
that govern these shared platforms – constraints that the makers of these 
videos are not always aware of.
Changes also take place at the level of reception operators. These days, 
home movies and photos are watched on a TV, a computer, or a mobile. In 
general, the switch to small screens is seen as promoting reading in isola-
tion – but this is only partly true. Not only are f ilms and photos watched on 
small screens with other family members immediately after being recorded 
or snapped, but the camera or the mobile phone is passed from hand to 
hand (“pass me the f ilm” thus means “pass me the mobile”20). Unlike the 
traditional photo album, the mobile phone can even expand the family 
17 James M. Moran, There’s No Place Like Home Video (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2002).
18 Serge Tisseron, L’intimité surexposée (Paris: Hachette, 2001), p. 45.
19 Ibid., p. 52.
20 In an interview for the Pocket Films Festival (July 2006), “Videos taken with phones as 
shifters,” Jean-Louis Boissier says: “Because we did not have the equipment to screen these f ilms 
on the big screen, I told the audience, ‘I’ll pass you the f ilm.’ No sooner were these words out of 
my mouth than I thought: ‘pass a f ilm’ – that could be it. The phone is handed by one audience 
member to another.”
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circle to include, with a simple click, those who are absent. More than 
the individualization of reading, the essential change lies, I think, in the 
fact that on these screens I can watch a lot of things other than just home 
movies: football, the news, variety shows, video games, my e-mails, my bank 
account and even my tax forms. As a result, not only do these operators lose 
their “sacred” dimension – they also become trivial. And the more of them 
there are, the more banal this process becomes. Previously, we had to do to 
with images in relatively small numbers that became real “loci of memory.” 
Nowadays, there are so many of them that they have to be archived, and 
that in turn begets an obsession to classify, organize, and prioritize them 
with the help of one and another app. It is a radical change in logic: we are 
in the functional logic of databases.
This deficit of the sacred is sometimes diff icult to live through – and that 
is a sign that the traditional family structure has not lost all of its influence. 
This is clear from the revival that one of the oldest memory operators is 
enjoying these days: portrait paintings done in oil. We upload a photograph to 
a website and get a painted portrait of it. We can interpret these productions 
as a return to photographic painting, but with the difference that the focus 
is now on the fact that it is a painting. Advertisements that promote this on 
the Internet emphasize that the portrait is produced “by human hand” (if not 
by an artist) and signed (a marker of subjectivization). The other argument 
is that the painted portrait “resists time and light without a problem” and 
that “its colours will still be just as vivid in f ifty years,” whereas there is 
nothing more perishable than digital photographic productions.
This uncertainty about the durability of the new memory operators seems 
to be one of the major reasons for the proliferation of “family websites,” 
which constitute a resurgence of sorts, in the Internet space, of the “home 
movie” under the previous structure. By contrast with Home Videos, fam-
ily sites have the Family as an enunciator. They lie at the intersection of 
the editorial constraints on the home page and of those on the family 
structure. The posting of family images serves here as a guarantee that 
family memories will be preserved. On the one hand, this is because we 
believe that a website is more reliable as a storage space than individual 
solutions – a belief that is, for the most part, unfounded. On the other – and 
this is the key point – it is because there is the more or less unconscious 
notion that, if these images are seen by others (and on the Internet that 
can mean thousands of others), they will be around for all eternity. In 
this case, we cannot speak of blurring the boundary between public and 
private spaces: we are still in private space, but the public space becomes 
the ultimate operator for family memories.
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A few general remarks in conclusion. As the reader will have observed, 
during this effort to characterize the space of family memories, both in 
its traditional and current versions, communication has taken on a new 
dimension: the production of relationships (the creation of a family history 
is used to achieve consensus, the work of memory contributes to collec-
tive and/or individual identity, the new modalities according to which 
memories are produced may generate conflicts, and so on) has been added 
to the production of meanings and emotions. It is not surprising that 
this dimension appears at the moment when I start using the notion of 
a space of communication, which is, at bottom, a space of relations. This 
relational dimension may even be more important than that of textual 
production. In addition, the communication process appears to be oriented 
towards the production of different effects. Here, it produces identitarian 
and ideological effects, for instance. The analysis in terms of the space 
of communication enriches the semio-pragmatic model that has been 
proposed so far: communicating means producing meaning, emotions, 
relationships and effects in the larger sense of the word (cf. Schema 5 at the 
end of the chapter). The model is constructed in a back and forth between 
theory and analysis.
On the other hand, we can now list what questions to ask as we contem-
plate analysing the context in terms of a space of communication:
– Which communication space should be constructed? What axis of 
relevance should be chosen to carry out this work?
– What determinations are at work in the space that has thus been built?
– How have the actants involved in this space been constructed? What 
are the relations among them?
– How have the communication operators been constructed?
– How are meaning, emotions, relationships and effects produced?
– What is the importance of each of these productions?
Finally, this chapter shows the need to consider the diachronic evolution 
of contexts: the change in constraints within the same context (here, the 
family) can, indeed, make the construction of a new space of communica-
tion necessary, even though we have stayed on the same axis of relevance 
(memory) to carry out the analysis. The communication experience we are 
taking account of is no longer the same: the actants and the operators are 
constructed in a different way, meaning is no longer produced in the same 
mode, text productions have a different status, and relational effects are 
no longer the same.
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Schema 5: Levels of Semio-Pragmatic Analysis: New Version
Space S Space r




Constraints related to a language
discursive space
Communicative competence as a reservoir of modes
Spaces of communication
Choice of an axis of relevance
Highlighting of constraints
Construction of actants and operators




5. The Space of Communication and 
Migration: The Example of the Home 
Movie
Abstract
Chapter 5 puts into action the notion of a space of communication to 
create understanding around what a production becomes when it moves 
outside its original space.
Keywords: home movie, archives, television, history, art, medical context
In the preceding chapter I showed how analysis in terms of a space of com-
munication made it possible to describe how productions belonging to the 
same axis of relevance worked in a given context, and how it could take 
account of the transformation of this context throughout history. The present 
chapter looks at how this same concept can help explain what becomes of 
a production when it migrates outside its original context. To address this 
issue (and in keeping with the previous chapter), I will take the example of 
family audiovisual productions – and more precisely, of the home movie. 
And indeed, the home movie goes through a remarkable phenomenon of 
migration through a whole range of diverse contexts. It is a matter here of 
studying, not these contexts in and of themselves, but only what they do 
to the home movies that come into their midst. There can be no question, 
either, of analysing all the contexts into which these productions migrate. 
I will simply offer a few examples that I have chosen because of the variety 
they represent and the methodological interest they hold for us.
The Home Movie: From Archives to Loci of Memory
The most notable manifestation of the migration of family audiovisual 
productions outside their home institution is most certainly the creation, 
Odin, R., Spaces of Communication: Elements of Semio-Pragmatics. With an Introduction by 
Vinzenz Hediger. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022
doi 10.5117/9789462987142_ch05
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around the world, of archives that either are specialized in these productions 
or that at least have a fund specifically dedicated to them: The Cinémathèque 
of Brittany, the Video Library of the City of Paris, the Library of Saint-Étienne, 
the Andalusian Cinémathèque, the Cinémathèque Basque, the Museum of 
Ethnography of Goms (Switzerland), the North West Film Archive (Man-
chester), the Scottish Film Council (Glasgow), the Small Film Museum (the 
Netherlands), the New Zealand Film Archive, the Austrian Film Museum 
(Vienna), the Bophana Audiovisual Resource Center (Cambodia), the National 
Board of Antiquities for Prints and Photographs (Finland), the Living Picture 
Archive (Viborg, part of the Museum Salling Complex, Denmark), the Human 
Studies Film Archives (Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC), and so on.
It is their value as documents that justif ies the migration of home movies 
to these archives. Read in the documentarizing mode, they do indeed impart 
valuable information on whole sectors of society that are not documented by 
off icial authorities or in professional reports. In particular, they are second 
to none when it comes to documenting what happens when nothing hap-
pens: “the banal, the everyday, the obvious, the common, the ordinary, the 
infra-ordinary, the background noise, the usual.” Georges Perec, from whom 
I have borrowed this listing, notes: “The newspapers talk about everything 
except the everyday.” And he wonders: “What is really happening – what 
we live through, the rest, all the rest: where is it?” He then starts musing 
about an “endotic” (as opposed to an “exotic”) anthropology.1 Makers of 
home movies are, in their own way, involuntary endotic anthropologists. 
Without thinking about making this or that document, they f ilm these 
moments of life that professionals do not f ilm (because they do not come 
from the communication space in which they operate).
But we cannot stop there. Most of the institutions that collect these f ilms 
are regional archives or cinémathèques and are thus subject to specif ic 
constraints: in particular, they are involved in the identity problems of the 
region in question. At more or less ritualized screenings, people meet up 
to share a story and make clear their belonging to the same community. 
The production of meaning and affects is then related to the memory of 
the group. We are no longer in documentarizing but in private mode. The 
relational dimension of communication outweighs, then, the production of 
meaning. The archives are transformed into “loci of memory.”2 The main 
1 Georges Perec, “Approche de quoi,” Le pourrissement des sociétés, Paris: 10/18 (1975), 
pp. 251–255.
2 Pierre Nora, “Entre mémoire et histoire. La problématique des lieux,” Les lieux de mémoire, 
I. The Republic (1984), Paris: Gallimard, pp. xvii – xlii.
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reason that those who deposit f ilms give for doing so is, moreover, that they 
want to be part of the region’s memory.
The choice between the documentarizing and the private modes depends 
for the most part on the status of the actant who is interested in these movies. 
Whereas the inhabitants of a given region enter an archive as members of a 
community (using the private mode), researchers (historians, sociologists, 
ethnologists, anthropologists, and the merely curious) use documentarizing 
mode f irst and foremost: for them it is the truth that is essential. Of course, 
the same individual may straddle both actantial roles.
Different operators are deployed in accordance with whether the produc-
tion of meaning is in accordance with one or the other mode. When the 
private mode predominates, we f ind the same type of operator as in the 
family, but at the level of a larger community such as a city or a region: 
f ilms serve as stimulators of memory and relationships. What is important 
is less what they show or say, and more the work of memory they generate 
and the link that they create (or reinforce) between or among the receivers. 
Conversely, when it is the documentarizing mode that predominates, these 
same f ilms are approached, rather, as vehicles of information, and these 
operators have an utterly different status: they are tools that make it possible 
to reconstruct the past in a (more or less) systematic, reasoned, distanced 
way (which memory does not do). They are analyst-operators.
Here are some examples of analyst-operators.
Surface analysis: here the focus is on things the f ilm shows but that are 
not the subject of the shots: the landscape, the milieu, shopfronts, signs in 
shops, cars passing in the street, what the characters are wearing, activities 
going on in the background (the police off icer on traff ic duty, the street 
sweeper, the person hawking the morning paper), and so on.
Serialization: comparing representations of the same theme (the status 
of women, holidays, marriage) in f ilms from different periods and cul-
tures makes it possible to highlight differences and make interpretation 
productive.
Enunciative analysis: this has to do with the point of view from which 
f ilms show the world: how do settlers f ilm Africa and Africans? Is there a 
male way of f ilming? Does a Protestant make the same home movies as a 
Catholic?
Contextualization: what is represented can remain opaque, or at least 
not deliver all of its meaning, if it is not put into context. You must then 
request information from the author of the images, and set the f ilm in its 
historical and social context. In a word, you must leave the f ilm, all the 
better to come back and understand it more fully.
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The change of “framework”:3 a f ilm can become important because 
the historical framework in which it is interpreted has changed. Thus, 
André Huet, the founder of the INEDITS European Association (“amateur 
f ilms/memory of Europe”) which since 1991 has been bringing together all 
those – archivists, directors, researchers – who are interested in the home 
movie as a document, tells how travel f ilms that had been shot in Yugoslavia 
and that he had stored even though he considered them irrelevant, became 
remarkable documents after the war.
I would add that analyst-operators differ depending on the disciplinary 
framework within which meaning is produced: historians, sociologists, 
ethnologists, and anthropologists use difference theoretical and meth-
odological tools.
In a word: in this context, family audiovisual productions are inscribed 
in two spaces of communication:
– On the one hand, there is the space of communication of the document, 
where meaning is produced through the documentarizing mode, and 
the actants in the communication act as “researchers” to make f ilms 
produce information;
– On the other hand, there is the space of collective memory: the f ilm 
operator serves as a stimulator (private mode) and the actants behave 
as members of a community.
It can certainly happen that these spaces work on their own, but more often 
there is some intersection: the former miner who comes to the multi-media 
library at Saint-Étienne for a screening of home movies from the 1950s will no 
doubt allow himself to be carried away by the dimensions of remembrance 
and community, but at the same time he will be certain to learn a few 
things about his city. Similarly, the historian who works on a corpus of 
home movies to study the life of miners in the Loire Region, will doubtless 
feel the need – in order to flesh out their analysis – to appeal to their own 
memory and that of those who have lived that life.
Note: We can ask whether it would not have been more useful to construct 
just a single space of communication, the space of the archive, and to estab-
lish at its core two poles, in accordance as communication tends to move 
more towards memory or more towards the document. This solution would 
certainly have the advantage that it would signal the unity of the context of 
the archive, but it has two drawbacks. On the one hand, it places memories 
3 Goffman, Frame Analysis.
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and documents on the same axis, thus suggesting that these experiences 
are of the same nature, which is at the very least up for discussion.4 On the 
other hand, by placing these two notions on two poles of the same axis, it 
links them, thus preventing us from envisaging that one of them can work 
without any connection to the other (even an oppositional one). While it 
may be thought that the memory approach is most often combined with 
a good helping of the documentarizing approach, the latter can also work 
independently.
The Home Movie on Television
After archives, probably the most signif icant phenomenon when it comes 
to the migration of family audiovisual productions outside the family 
context is their rather persistent presence on television, on the news, 
in magazines, on talk shows (television can no longer have a writer, a 
painter, an athlete, a politician or a scientist on as a guest without showing 
excerpts from their home movies), not to mention the French home-movie 
show Vidéo gag.
If for the moment we exclude Vidéo gag, which belongs to another space, 
this migration can be described as a movement within the space of the 
document, and thus as an invitation to read these f ilms in documentarizing 
mode. But while it is not incorrect, this way of conceiving things misses 
the point. Besides the fact that the informational content of the fragments 
of f ilm that are broadcast is usually extremely low, this migration can be 
understood only if we relocate it within the perspective of the shift from 
paleo- to neo-television – that is, in the context of a change in structure thus 
in constraints within television itself. In the 1980s, economic and political 
changes did indeed lead television to favour a certain type of relationship to 
the viewer: a relationship of proximity replaced the pedagogical (hierarchi-
cal) relationship that is characteristic of paleo-television.5 The use of home 
movies is a continuation of this movement: they serve as proximity operators. 
For example, by showing me the home movies of the personalities who have 
been invited, television brings me closer to them, because these f ilms are 
like those of my family. Meaning is then produced in intimate mode: I will 
4 Cf.. the entire debate between memory and history: Nora, “Entre mémoire et histoire. La 
problématique des lieux”; Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting.
5 Francesco Casetti and Roger Odin (1990), “De la paléo- à la néo-télévision,” Communications, 
vol. 51 (1990), pp. 9–26.
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look, in my own life, for what I share with these guests. A relationship of 
empathy can then be established.
But even more important than their content is the origin of these images. 
Directors of these programmes also make a point of underscoring this (often 
with a subtitle, “amateur pictures”), undoubtedly to get themselves off the 
hook for the poor quality of the images, but especially because mentioning 
this origin works as an enunciative operator that invites me to see these 
images as shots taken by people “like me,” as opposed to a professional. 
From now on, these images appeal to me in a different way: they have a 
specif ic emotional force, a force that encourages me to accept them as they 
are without questioning their enunciator in terms of truth (their origin is 
the guarantee of their innocence). I use the term authenticity mode for the 
mode that, even as it invites me to construct a real enunciator, forbids me 
from questioning it in terms of the truth.
Definition: authenticity mode
– At the enunciative level: construction of a real enunciator constructed 
as “like me” at the level of identity
– At the discursive level: all textual productions are possible
– At the emotional level: the fact that this enunciator is “like me” 
produces an affective relationship that prohibits all questioning in 
terms of the truth
The authenticity mode is thus opposed to the documentarizing mode.
What is important when it comes to the television programmes I consider 
here, is to encourage the viewer to use the authenticity mode within the 
space of the document, and thus in competition with the documentarizing 
mode. The authenticity mode thus undermines the space of the document 
from within: it has nothing to do with the question of truth. It seems to me 
that what we have here is one of the major functions of the use of family 
audiovisual productions on television, but also in many other contexts: the 
effort to limit the opportunities for a critical mindset to take hold.
One thing that demonstrates the strength of the authenticity mode is 
advertising, which thinks nothing of creating fake home movies (identifiable 
by their topic, but also by blurry, shaky, poorly framed images, the noise 
of the projector, and so on) to deploy it. The idea is to exploit the point of 
intersection between family space and advertising space: the use of “ready-
to-use” family scenes, but refocused around the product to be promoted. This 
involves the use of the f ictional-communication trope: we see a f ictional 
family addressee who comes into contact with the product – this with a view 
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to targeting the actual addressee, the buyer watching at home. One thus 
comes to take the point of view of these f ilms as perfectly objective, “since it 
is ours.”6 The use of this mode also makes a programme such as Vidéo gag 
something other than a show belonging to the space of entertainment – to 
which, however, it does undoubtedly belong. Vidéo gag is probably the most 
famous show when it comes to the migration of home movies to television: it 
has enjoyed continuous success since its launch in France in September 1990. 
It seems that it was the Japanese show Kato-chan Ken-chan Gokigen TV that 
got the idea off the ground in the mid-1980s. And now it, and variants of it, 
can be found the world over: America’s Funniest Home Videos (US), You’ve 
Been Framed (UK), Drôle de vidéo (Canada), and so on.
In a way, the title says it all: it is about drastically reducing home movies 
to gags. The operator is both simple and remarkably effective: fragments of 
home movies are selected for the gags they show. These gags are then grouped 
by theme: falls, blows, weddings, pets, children, and so on. Finally, sound 
effects are added, as is a commentary (often in the form of a dialogue) to 
enhance the comic dimension of the situations involved. The fragments of 
home movies thus transformed are intended to be read in the spectacular-
izing mode: on the face of it, they are there only to make us laugh. Yet this is 
not quite how things work in the space of reception: yes, the spectacularizing 
mode is used to good effect, and yes, we laugh a lot, but what is happening 
goes well beyond this laughter. The show I see on the screen has people 
like me as enunciators (and I am like them): there are those performing 
in the gags, there is the one responsible for f ilming, and then there is the 
one who has decided to send these clips in to the television station. This 
enunciative relationship contradicts the effect of the distance from the 
spectacularizing mode, and encourages me to deploy the authenticity mode 
and acknowledge the indisputable truth of the images I am being shown: 
these series of gags that send me back a picture of myself and others that is 
ridiculous, grotesque, and frankly lamentable, tell the truth. Vidéo gag is 
not some innocent show: not only does it make me a participant in universal 
stupidity – it also invites me to accept it without any argument and, what 
is worse, to take pleasure in a radical exercise of self-contempt.
These analyses all point to the same conclusion: by inciting self-contempt 
(Vidéo gag) and by blocking questions about truth (documentarizing and 
advertising spaces), the migration of the home movie to television plays 
an ideological role: to reduce critical consciousness. In doing so, the home 
6 Marie-Thérèse Journot and Chantai Duchet, “Du privé au publicitaire,” in Roger Odin (ed.), 
Le film de famille. Usage privé, usage public (Paris: Méridiens Klincksieck 1995), pp. 177–190.
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movie meets up with one of its primary functions in the space of the family: 
to prevent problems from being raised, to manufacture consensus, and to 
keep the institution going. Home movies summon up authenticity mode 
with such natural ease that we can speak of a home-movie effect to refer to 
this relationship between f ilm and viewer – a relation in which the entire 
question of the truth is blocked out.
From Home Movie to Micro-Histories
As we saw in the study on archives, the home movie is a really good docu-
mentary source. It is hardly surprising, then, that historians or citizens eager 
to escape their country’s off icial history decide to use it to convey history. 
But how can we escape the home-movie effect when we are using this type 
of document for the purpose of historical reflection?
The series Private Hungary by Peter Forgács seems exemplary in the 
response it offers to this question. This series is made up of no fewer than 
a dozen feature f ilms entirely produced by reassembling home movies (we 
have to do here with the found-footage tradition). The context of creation of 
these f ilms allows us to offer a hypothesis to explain the director’s use of 
this type of treatment: confronted in its history by the question of national 
existence at the heart of an empire, and subjected to multiple occupations 
over many years, Hungary has had its memory shattered. If it is true that, 
as Pierre Nora said, “there are loci of memory because there is no longer 
a community memory,”7 we can understand why Forgács, a Hungarian 
director who wants to investigate the history of his country, would decide 
to turn to home movies, those wonderful loci of memory. In addition, it is 
not absurd to think that the change of scale will allow things to be seen 
differently than they are portrayed in the off icial history. We recognize 
here the micro-history problematic (Revel, 1996).
The f irst f ilm in the series, The Bartos Family (1988), which I will take 
here as an example (it sets out the overall principles), explicitly claims its 
place in this tradition of historical research: The voice-over track tells us, 
“The saga of the Bartos is a Hungarian family novel, and the reflection of 
a private story.”
Forgács’s cinematographic work – the use of subtitles, the decomposi-
tion of movements, the use of freeze frame and slow motion, playing with 
the repetition of sequences, and the use of repetitive music – acts as an 
7 Nora, “Entre mémoire et histoire. La problématique des lieux,” p. xvii.
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enunciative analyst-operator: its role is to explicitly show the director’s 
point of view: “the world as seen by Zoltán Bartos,” as the opening sequence 
of the f ilm says. This programmatic statement is intended to make the 
mediation process the central subject of the f ilm. The usual functioning of 
the cinematographic reference is modified: instead of reality in the present, 
we are shown representations. It is thus impossible to switch to interpreting 
in authenticity mode.
On the one hand, I am invited to read in discursive mode:
Definition of discursive mode
– At the discursive level: the construction of argumentation
– At the emotional level: emotions are used to convince (we have to 
do with rhetoric here)
– At the enunciative level: the construction of a real enunciator who 
can be asked questions about identity, ways of acting, and truth
On the other hand, the discursive mode occurs here at the meta-level: I am 
prompted to wonder what it is that gives the world seen by Zoltán Bartos 
its specif icity.
The f ilm quickly gives two answers: the world according to Zoltán Bartos 
consists f irst and foremost of his family and the family business. The father, 
“the head of the family,” is also the “CEO of the timber business.” We follow 
him as he gives a sort of guided tour of his workshops on the banks of 
the Danube with his board of directors. It is rare in a home movie to f ind 
sequences devoted to work. The fact that Zoltán Bartos has decided to f ilm 
such a visit is certainly indicative of a bourgeois mindset. But what is most 
interesting is how we are shown the relationship to the world of work. 
During the visit, the f ilm takes us into the workshops where workers are 
busy sawing boards. Whereas up to that point the f ilm had merely let us 
hear music, it now reintroduces the noise of the workshops, in particular the 
piercing racket of the saws. A little later, between two shots of Bartos posing 
in front of his shop, the f ilm will show woodworkers carrying huge boards 
to put them in a cart, and here again the soundtrack will be the noise of the 
boards falling into the cart. Because amateur f ilm of the time was silent, 
the viewer knows that these noises are the result of post-production work 
and that the only enunciator there can be is thus Forgács. The only thing 
the viewer can do, then, is look for a deliberate meaning that exceeds their 
simple diegetic anchoring, and all the more so since the way the editing has 
been done encourages the construction of an oppositional system: whereas 
the Bartos family is associated with music, the noise is associated with the 
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work the workers are doing, as though one were suddenly falling back to 
reality, to the concrete world (every noise makes us think of its source). 
Without making it explicit, the f ilm makes the viewer realize that it is the 
very real work of others that allows the bourgeoisie to “live well” (“he [Bartos] 
had a factory and a shop that allowed him to live well”).
On the other hand, a few sentences from the voice-over pointing up the 
historical events of the period, with images showing us members of the 
bourgeoisie dancing, wining and dining (Hitler’s Anschluss of Austria, laws 
on the Jews, and so on) are enough for Peter Forgács to give us a real sense of 
the indifference to history that bourgeois society showed. The f ilm makes 
clear that the bourgeoisie saw nothing coming – neither Nazism nor com-
munism. The conclusion of the f ilm focuses directly on this obliviousness to 
history: while we attend the communist May Day parade, Peter Forgács adds 
a song by Kazal: “When did Napoleon win or lose a great battle? In what year 
was he Emperor? When was he crowned? They can ask me all they like – I 
can’t answer, because there’s never been a date in history I could recall.”
But there is more: while blocking interpretation in authenticity mode, 
Peter Forgács has understood how much he could get out of the emotional 
potential within these images. He uses these fuzzy, whitewashed images of 
the past to free up their f igural dimension, while putting in place a series 
of processes to force us to take some distance. It is a matter of putting this 
emotional potential at the service of reflexive thinking. The music by Tibor 
Szemzo (his favourite composer) acts as a sort of commentary on the images. 
It is the voice of history, a voice that prompts us to question these images 
by projecting us into the future (it is in relation to the impending disasters 
that they produce meaning). The noises, which strike us even in proportion 
to their rarity, also play on this premonitional mode (the train sequences, 
which make us think of the trains for the concentration camps) or check 
off problems in the images – problems that, without the noises, we would 
not have seen: problems around the relationship of the bourgeoisie to the 
real, around class relations, and so on. As for the voice-over comments, 
which are few and far between, and which are offered under the guise of 
very simple structures (often short noun phrases), they are far from neutral. 
These short sentences say both too much and not enough, thus prompting 
us to construct the discourse ourselves. The f ilm presents us with a text 
perforated with holes, fragmentary, incomplete, and sometimes seemingly 
disordered, which we need to complete and organize. Thus all the f ilm work 
Peter Forgács does, he does to make us ask questions about the images it 
shows us. The Bartos Family belongs to the category of stimulating f ilms (to 
borrow a formula used by Alain Resnais about his f ilm Muriel). It seeks to 
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involve us in historical reflection – a reflection that goes far beyond just the 
Bartos case, because it bears on the position of the bourgeoisie in history.
In The Bartos Family, the use of home movies, far from blocking the 
question of truth, puts it at the very heart of the construction, but it took 
important cinematographic work to get to that result. This work consists 
in analysing the home movie as an ideological operator that reveals the 
behaviour of a social class. The passage to a meta-level space of communica-
tion is what makes this analysis possible: the cinematographic work brings 
about the creation of a “discursive” critical space in relation to that of home 
movies. Peter Forgács’s f ilm is a kind of semio-historical analysis, on f ilm, 
of home movies.
The Home Movie in the Space of Art
The f ilm A Song of Air by the Australian Merilee Bennett Air (1987) is 
presented as a letter to her late father. At the beginning of the f ilm, a text, 
handwritten by Merilee herself, tells us that the images in this f ilm come 
from the home movies shot by her father, the reverend Arnold Lucas Bennett, 
who had f ilmed his family with unflagging regularity from 1956 to 1983. 
From the images we are shown, it is clear that Merilee’s father was a “good 
f ilmmaker”: not only are the images sharp and well framed, but the f ilms 
are carefully constructed – we could even say: directed: “On holidays, he 
would gather us together to be in his movie; we staged the departure so he 
could f ilm the farewell and the car pulling away,” runs the voice-over. The 
father even created scenarios, all of which had the same theme: a family 
threatened by outside danger. “We were playing our one life for the sake of 
his movies. The important thing was to be together, and feel the same way 
about the world.” Shots taken automatically show us the father surrounded 
by his wife and children, keeping them under his thumb, embracing them 
with his long arms, moving them around to arrange a family-style portrait, 
and asking them again and again to look at the camera. Doing that means 
looking together in the same direction and thus bearing witness to the 
family’s unity as a group. Here, form closely follows content. Images are 
placed in order, regulated, policed, always being controlled: images of the 
moral and familial order that the father (a dyed-in-the-wool Baptist) imposes 
uncompromisingly within his family.
The result of this upbringing, in which cinema plays an important role 
– “almost every Sunday evening, after tea, we would watch movies; we saw 
ourselves growing up as time went by…” – is presented in the words of the 
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letter that Merilee reads in a voiceover: it is the story of her revolt against 
the family order and against f ilms that both reflect and advance it. In the 
text of this letter, Merilee explains to her father how and why she threw 
herself into a life exactly that is the opposite of the one he had planned for 
her, how she became a topless waitress in a brothel, and how she prostituted 
herself and took drugs.
In the face of a “well-made” home movie that’s “made too well” and that 
coerces its family viewers, another kind of coercion, in the form of violence, 
has to result. The violence here is that of art. Not only does Merilee cut and 
reassemble the images from her father’s f ilms in order to make them fit into 
what she is saying – she also does cinematographic work that plays a game 
that is the opposite of the work done by her father: she de-structures the 
images that were made by her father and that are framed too well, that are 
too sharp and too clean, by reworking them through decomposition and 
recomposition or by tackling the very substance of the images (by adding 
graininess). That creates these moments of considerable formal beauty, 
notably in a sequence in which Merilee is swimming under a waterfall: 
the shot is paused a number of times in succession, so we see the torrent of 
water drops through a succession of frozen images showing the young girl’s 
determination to hold her own against this force that is submerging her.
It is only at the end of this long work – which feels a bit like it is torturing 
the f ilm, the f ilmmaker herself, and the father – that Merilee can say to 
her father, “I love you.”
A Song of Air is a good example of what we can call “f ilms that settle scores 
through the home movie.” There are plenty of f ilms of this kind from pretty 
much all over the world, especially f inal student projects in art schools or 
universities, for which students reassemble home movies. You could almost 
say it has become a genre.
The context in which these f ilms appear is almost always the same. After 
being subjected to an extremely restrictive family order (sociopsychological 
constraints), the child breaks free, trying to f ind their way, and embarks 
on a life that is precisely the opposite of what the family had planned for 
them: we are in the space of personal construction (identity). This move is 
the operator that will allow them to take their distance from the home-movie 
effect (which has often been one of the instruments of an imposed order) and 
to return to these f ilms in the intimate mode, but with a critical point of view. 
Not only is the euphoria that predominates in home movies denounced as 
untrue, but home movies appear, on this reading, as formidable operators of 
oppression: everything that was meant to promote fulfilment and guarantee 
happiness is seen as destructive.
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On the other hand, the search for a life that is the opposite of the one 
planned by the family leads the girl or the young man to turn to the space 
of art: it is there that the encounter with cinema takes place (for instance, 
Merilee Bennett studied photography and cinema at Philip Institute of 
Technology in Melbourne). The space of art is particularly well suited to 
the psychological problems that these young people have to solve: it is a 
space in which they will be able to take on the role of author and thus of the 
subject responsible for production – that is, a space in which they will be 
able to assert their identity. What better way, then, to settle accounts with 
the past than by taking possession of the f ilms of one’s own father and using 
his home movies for one’s own personal creative ends? The operator is the 
work of artistic creation. Signif icantly, A Song of Air begins and ends with 
images of Merilee at the editing table working on her father’s 16-mm films. It 
is not a matter, however, of switching to a meta-level, as in The Bartos Family. 
The work done on home movies is more radical here: it can be described as 
involving the destruction of the father’s home movies, followed by the work 
of reappropriation in order to transform these f ilms into personal work.
Finally, having home movies migrate to the space of art means bringing 
them into a public space (as against the private space of the family), which 
is not only a strong act of emancipation, but also an obvious demand for 
recognition: in this space, the f ilms will be read in artistic mode – that is, 
in relation to their author (A Song of Air is a f ilm by Merilee Bennett). The 
text thus produced has a two-fold status: on the one hand, it is an œuvre 
asking to be seen as belonging to the space of art; on the other, it is a gesture 
of identity aff irmation. We are at the intersection between the space of art 
and that of personal construction.
But there is another way for home movies to migrate into the space of art: 
from the outset, artists conceive of their home movies as part of this space. 
Jonas Mekas and Stan Brakhage are undoubtedly among the initiators of this 
movement, but there are many artists working in this way. The titles clearly 
show the relationship to the home movie: Oh My Mother, Oh My Father, The 
Sons (Kohei Ando), The Family Album (Alan Berliner), Der Fater [sic] (Nol 
Brinckmann), Family Portraits (John Porter), and so on. Sometimes the 
designation is even simpler and more explicit: Home Movie (Vito Acconci, 
Jane Oxenberg, Lee Ann Brown, Taylor Mead, et al.).
We might ask whether it is legitimate to talk here about migration, 
in so far as there is no change of context but immediate integration into 
another: art. It seems to me, however, that we have a case of migration here, 
because the home movie is a genre assigned to a space of communication: 
the family. Getting this type of production into the space of art involves 
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a real shift. Perhaps we could talk about a mental migration, because this 
shift is made f irst and foremost in the director’s mind. The viewer, for their 
part, is encouraged to make a move in the opposite direction: faced with 
a production that claims to belong to the space of art, they are forced to 
recognize that it originated in the family space.
The space of art thus overlaps with that of the family, but this overlap is a 
merger. It is not a fusion, or a meta-relationship with a critical aim (as in The 
Bartos Family). Nor is it a relationship of destruction and re-appropriation (as 
in A Song of Air). We have to do, rather, with a relationship of domination: the 
space of art is imposed on the family space. Even though they are still home 
movies, they are made to be interpreted in artistic mode by an audience 
outside the family: those who direct them claim to be auteurs (artists) and 
demand to be recognized as such.
In these f ilms, as in the home movie, signs showing that they are badly 
made are everywhere to be found, but – and this is the key distinction – in 
this case they are there on purpose. In this context, they become part of the 
auteur’s brand signature (we can spot one of Mekas’s films right away from his 
way of playing with skipped frames) and they will be read in aesthetic mode 
(the viewer enjoys the malleable aspect of these images: blurry, overexposed, 
grainy, with unsteady pans, and so on.). But we must see all the same that, 
in order to work, these tropes require that viewers agree to read them in 
this mode. And that assumes in turn that these viewers belong to the same 
“interpretive community” as the director (Fish, 1980; Allard, 1995) – that is, 
that they are part of the same aesthetic space of communication.
It is thus on the basis of the aesthetic space that this interpretation 
authorizes the entry of these f ilms into the space of art and interpretation 
in artistic mode. If these actants are not part of the same aesthetic space 
of communication, they will simply be rejected.
The Home Movie in the Medical Context
I will f inish with this quick analysis of the migrations of home movies, 
evoking a context that is rather different from all those I have mentioned 
up to now: that of medical research.
The f irst example is within the framework of research on developmental 
psychology. Psychologists8 call on parents of autistic children to lend them 
8 Jean-Louis Adrien and Maria Pilar Gattengo, “Dépistage précoce de l’autisme à l’aide des 
f ilms familiaux: apport de la recherche et d’une démarche rétrospective dans la démarche de 
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their home movies so they can try to spot the clues, the warning signs that 
would make it possible to offer an early diagnosis of autism and thus to 
treat it more effectively. The review covers babies from birth to eighteen 
months. The goal is to identify signs of “relational withdrawal”: children with 
pervasive development disorders have more-signif icant and longer-lasting 
scores on relational withdrawal in the f irst months of their lives than do 
other babies. It is the axis of relevance that governs the interpretation of 
these movies in this context. The interpretation is done here by researcher-
actants – we are in the space of scientific research – that is, of actants who 
deploy a rather specif ic operator: a package of thorough knowledge without 
which we would not even know what to look at on the axis of relevance that 
has been chosen. The mode of production of meaning is the documentarizing 
mode. The home movie becomes a stand-in experimental laboratory. While 
it is impossible for researchers to carry out investigations within families 
themselves in order to study children’s behaviour, the home movie makes 
such research possible: seeing a home movie is a little like living with this 
family in the months when the f ilm was shot. In this operation – in contrast 
to what we saw in The Bartos Family – the home movie as a medium is erased: 
it is regarded as transparent, and gives direct access to the signs documenting 
the issue of autism. The enunciator questioned by the interpretation in 
documentarizing mode is not the f ilm, but the family itself.
Other practitioners use the home movie to help patients who are suf-
fering from severe memory problems. Here we are in the space of therapy. 
Jean-Claude Leners9 tells how, at the Centre gérontologique de Pontalize 
in Luxembourg, “reminiscing sessions” are arranged for patients suffering 
from Korsakoff’s syndrome, during which clips of home movies are projected. 
These clips are not necessarily of the patients’ own home movies: they can 
be of any family. The sessions take place once a week. The communica-
tion operator consists of micro-sequences of one to two minutes, based 
around key moments in life such as a birth, a marriage, school, work, and 
local traditions – moments that each patient will be able to recognize. It 
is here that the use of the home movie is particularly relevant: its heavily 
stereotyped character is a valuable asset, because the images will be all the 
more likely to resonate with patients. These sequences are then projected, 
soins,” in Alain Haddad, Antoine Guedeney and Tim Greacen (eds.), Santé mentale du jeune 
enfant: prévenir et intervenir (Toulouse: éditions Erès, 2004), pp. 85–93.
9 Jean-Claude Leners, “Reminiscence: A Way to Use Amateur Films in Order to Work with 
Patients Suffering from Memory Problems” in Sonja Kmec and Viviane Thill (eds.), Private Eyes 
and the Public Gaze: The Manipulation and Valorisation of Amateur Images (Trier: Kliomedia, 
2009), pp. 97–99.
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either on their own or in series (based around the same theme). For these 
screenings, the sequences are chosen so as to form a relationship with 
the outside environment. For example, if a given screening takes place in 
December, it will focus on activities having to do with Christmas. If it is 
in July, the emphasis will be on summer-holiday pictures, and so on. The 
constraints on the context thus reinforce the power of the images shown, 
or at least resonate with them so as to enhance their galvanizing power. 
Patients look at these sequences in a group in a hospital room. The idea is 
to stimulate the intimate mode of meaning production by using the private 
mode. After each screening, the sequences are discussed in a group, but 
patients are asked to call up their most intimate memories. This process 
of remembrance is helped along by the group discussion and the overall 
context. The long-term objective is to allow people in the group to get into a 
more stable living environment. Finally, all sessions are transcribed, so the 
practitioners can use information from other sessions. The text produced is 
therefore twofold: on the one hand there are the stories the patients tell; on 
the other, the transcripts that will in turn serve as operators. But beyond this 
textual production, the key is in the act that is performed both in relation 
to patients and by them. The role of home movies is explicitly performative 
here: to elicit a response in order then to offer treatment.
These analyses show the great variety of contexts into which a production 
can migrate, and the complexity of the constructions that are needed in 
order to take account of one’s place in these various contexts. However, it 
is possible to summarize the approach. (It would be no different if, instead 
of studying the migration from one type of production, as I did here, I were 
to study that of a single production such as a f ilm, a photograph, a painting, 
a text, or a piece of music.)
By contrast with the previous chapter, which held to a single axis of 
communication that was posited a priori at the start of the analysis, analysing 
the migration of a production into different contexts requires f irst and 
foremost that we ask ourselves about the axes and the spaces of communica-
tion that we must construct in order to take account of the workings of 
this production in these contexts. Which communication space or spaces 
are the more relevant to helping us understand what is happening? How 
many spaces of communication do we have to construct? We have seen, 
for instance, that, while for the archives I have constructed two spaces of 
communication corresponding to the two modes that have been evoked, I 
have thought it more appropriate, in order to account for the use of home 
movies as documents on television, to construct only one mode – and this 
even though, here too, two modes are involved. It is a matter in this case of 
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strategic decisions that the analyst has a duty to take on what seem most 
clearly to them to be the most important points of the communication 
experience being analysed.
Once the space or spaces of communication have been f ixed upon, the 
construction of the actants and the operators of communication proceeds 
as it did in the previous chapter. The next question, once several spaces of 
communication have been constructed, has to do with the relationship 
between and among them: the analyses in this chapter have highlighted 
intersectional relationships, and those involved in the movement to the 
meta level, in superposition, and in domination. The next chapter will show 
that yet other relationships are possible.
We can still ask what is left of the original space in the new context, what 
the role of this reference to the origin is, and what effects this reference 
produces. We can then try to characterize what becomes of the productions 
in the new context. What is their status? When it comes to home movies, that 
status ranges from the document to their reduction to a series of gags or to 
the signs of autism (with the erasure of the medium), via their positioning as 
objects of analysis (The Bartos Family), or to their destruction or reconstruc-
tion (A Song of Air). And what about their role? Here again, analyses show 
the diversity of responses: a role that is informative, relational, ideological, 
based around identity, therapeutic, and so on.
Finally, we must question the why of the migrations themselves, for these 
do not happen for no reason. They are not innocent. Thus the proliferation 
of family-f ilm migrations today draws on the existence of a vast space of 
communication that is shot through by strong identitarian and communitar-
ian temptations, but also by a change in the relationships among intimate, 
private and public. Taken together, these migrations are part, both of the 
effects produced by the constraints that result from this space, and of its 
operators: they help, at the level they operate to strengthen and extend it.

6. Textual Analysis and Semio-
Pragmatics
Abstract
Chapter 6 examines the difference between traditional (immanentist) tex-
tual analysis and textual analysis within the semio-pragmatic perspective.
Keyword: textual analysis
The objective of semio-pragmatics is to put the “immanentist approach into 
a contextualized pragmatic perspective. Once the contextual constraints 
governing the construction of the text have been recognized, the imma-
nentist analysis can be put into action.” That was, as we may recall, the 
def inition of the semio-pragmatics programme I gave in the Introduction. 
The wording used could suggest that the pragmatic perspective taken does 
not change anything about the textual analysis as it was carried out within 
the immanentist paradigm. However, this is not the case. While it is true that 
the tools of immanentist analysis are still very useful, we are witnessing a 
radical transformation of what textual analysis itself is: from now on, as we 
have already seen from the analyses presented in the two previous chapters, 
it is no longer a question of analysing an existing text, but of analysing the 
experience of textual production in context.
I would now like to place myself in the conditions that most resemble 
traditional textual analysis: the analysis of one specif ic production in a 
unique context. I hope that this will highlight the differences even more 
effectively.
The three productions I will analyse have been chosen for the variety of 
f ields they represent: a television show belonging to this mythical moment in 
cycling, the Tour de France; the reproduction of a painting in an art-history 
collection; and joint research work on a f ilm, carried out at a university.
The approach I take is as follows: I begin by describing the context 
in which the reading takes place. I then use the notion of the space of 
Odin, R., Spaces of Communication: Elements of Semio-Pragmatics. With an Introduction by 
Vinzenz Hediger. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022
doi 10.5117/9789462987142_ch06
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communication to try to characterize the communicative workings of 
this reading, and the experience it gives rise to. In the context in question, 
the goal is to unfold this reading, to open it up in all its dimensions (or at 
least in the broadest way possible).
A Stage of the Tour de France on Television
It is really hard to escape the hold exerted by this “total myth” known as 
the Tour de France1 everywhere in the press, and on radio and television, 
it invites us, over a period of three weeks, to “align our lives with that of the 
Tour.”2 Philippe Gaboriau sees it as “a substitute for working-class desire for 
liberation,”3 but more broadly it is all social classes who are caught up in a 
massive wave of reconciliation with the world. Even though I am not a big 
fan of sports broadcasts, I still decided, therefore, to look at the 17th stage, 
a crucial step because there are several passes to cross: the Marie-Blanque, 
the Soulor, and especially the legendary Tourmalet. My knowledge of the 
region from having holidayed there probably contributed to my decision. 
My expectations were as much those of a tourist as of a sports fan.
The café I sat down in had a bit of a party atmosphere: watching the Tour 
de France, everyone is friendly and in a good mood. People call out from 
one table to another, recalling what happened in the last stage. The Tour 
de France is a TV serial: what I see today is determined by what happened 
yesterday, the day before yesterday and the days before. Little by little, the 
entire history of the Tour can be evoked. If there is one show that works 
based on prior knowledge, this is it. I must confess that I am sorely lacking 
on this score, but the atmosphere is contagious and I get caught up in it: 
even though I am quite clueless, I cannot stop myself from getting involved 
in the conversation. The relational dimension of communication sometimes 
makes one do funny things when it comes to the production of meaning…. 
On the other hand, the broadcast of the Tour de France is a debased form of 
what Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz4 described as “ceremonial television”: it 
1 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Paris: Seuil, 1970), p. 118.
2 Alain Arnaud and Michel Chandelier, “La prise en charge du Tour de France par la télévision, 
dans le contexte de la crise du dopage. 1998–99,” in Pierre Gabaston and Bernard Leconte (eds.), 
Sports and Television. Regards croisés (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000), pp. 247–265, here p. 250.
3 Gaboriau, Philippe (1995), Le Tour de France et le Vélo histoire sociale d’une épopée contem-
poraine (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), p. 16.
4 Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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produces a “specific sociability,” “a need for community,” “the oceanic feeling” 
of being immersed in the immensity of an audience without borders.5 
Using a formulation used to describe the f iction effect, we can speak here 
of a process of “mise en phase,” but it is not a matter here of swaying to the 
rhythm of events as they are recounted (the broadcast has not started). 
Rather, the café resonates with the millions of spectators who are also about 
to watch the Tour at the same time. Thus we have to do with a spectatorial 
“mise en phase.”
The broadcast is on France 3. The title of the programme, “En direct du 
tour,” sets the axis of relevance on which I am invited to register, at the 
intersection of the sports communication space and that of live broadcast 
communication: what I see is happening in real time. Far from leading 
to the erasure of the process of mediation, a live broadcast encourages 
people to become aware of it: it is France 3 that is showing the Tour. It is 
the enunciator, a real enunciator that can be asked questions in terms of 
its identity (what are the differences between France 3’s sports shows and 
those of the other channels?), in terms of truth (I hope what I am told about 
the Tour is true; the channel does everything to convince me of this: expert 
opinions, commentaries by former riders, and so on.) and in terms of ways 
of acting: who is the communication operator? How does it work?
The communication operator can be described as the technical device 
for live television broadcasting, and I must say that it sometimes leaves 
something to be desired: periodically the image freezes, stopping the cyclists 
dead in their tracks; it can also happen that the picture becomes distorted 
or even disappears. The irony is that these problems have a positive effect: 
they serve as a reminder of the liveness effect. Commentators do not seem 
to mind talking about these “vagaries of broadcasting live.” Very often, 
indeed, the commentary is on this system of live broadcasting: the role of 
helicopters, the switch to motorcycle shots, the emphasis placed on the 
organization that all this requires, and on the complexity of the technology. 
This meta (reflexive) dimension stresses the importance of the technical 
operator even as it posits an operator capable of assessing his work. This 
enhances the human dimension of communication.
As a specialist with habits picked up on the job, I cannot help but notice 
that editing violates quite often what they call, in cinema, “the 180° rule”: 
the riders cross the TV screen from right to left and then, in the next shot, 
from left to right. However, there is no sense in which this calls into ques-
tion my experience of the race: it would not occur to me to think that the 
5 Ibid., p. 208.
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riders have turned around, because I know (since I come equipped with a 
cognitive schema) that the race is linear: “space corresponds to a vector” and 
“constraints are of the type ‘to be in front,’ ‘behind,’ ‘close,’ ‘distant.’”6 As 
Colin notes, “the spectator’s knowledge of audio-visual ‘language’ does not 
appear to be suff icient” to understand “spatial relationships in the context 
of a cycling race.”7 They have to know what a cycling race is in the f irst 
place. For a few moments, my positioning was split in two: my experience 
as a f ilm researcher prompted me to question my experience as a spectator. 
But it is the spectator in me that won.
From the f irst shots, France 3 takes me into the world of the Tour (diegeti-
zation): after a wide shot of the peloton from the helicopter, there is a shot 
of the race from the viewpoint of the spectators at the event. Then there 
is a subjective shot from a motorcycle that just about places me in a spot 
where one of the riders would be: I am in the race, right in the midst of the 
peloton. The race itself serves as a grand narrative divided up into a series 
of mini-stories, each of which has its own issues at stake (especially when 
the riders tackle the passes). To watch the Tour is to engage in an eminently 
narrative experience: who will win? The programmes promised to allow me 
not only to attend the race, but to “live the Tour.” And they were not lying. 
The “mise en phase,” this time a narrative process, has taken full hold. Even 
though I am implementing three processes that are found in f ictionalization 
(entering a world, following a story, vibrating to the rhythm of the events), 
my reading does not involve f ictionalizing: France 3 is constructed as a real 
enunciator. My reading deploys two modes: spectacularizing and documen-
tarizing, both of which feature some narration. I am both a spectator and a 
learner (someone eager to have the information I need so I can understand 
the race). At the documentarizing level, the broadcast does not merely 
inform me on how the race is unfolding – it also gives me a “discourse” on 
this story: the voice-over commentary names the competitors, explains 
the strategies of the various teams, provides technical details, and so on. 
For someone like me who has no idea about any of this, the information is 
quite invaluable: it allows me to understand what is at stake in the race. As 
a show, the programme gives me everything I expect: f irst, there is the f irst, 
there is the scenery that the helicopter shots allow me to experience: views 
of gorgeous mountains made even more vivid by the passage of clouds. But 
that is not all: this stage of the race is quite eventful: there is the torrential 
6 Michel Colin, “Comprendre l’événement sportif à la télévision. L’exemple de la course 
cycliste,” Communications, vol. 51 (1990), pp. 79–110, here p. 95.
7 Ibid., p. 103.
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rain that pelted the cyclists, Samuel Sanchez’s coming off his bike – will the 
stunned cyclist get back into the race, the duel between Alberto Contador, 
Andy Schleck, the nice gesture made by the wearer of the yellow jersey, who 
let his rival take the victory lap…. All of this leads me to construct what 
I will call a sports text that includes components of both a documentary 
and a spectacle.
At times, the broadcast of the race cuts to ads, thus switching to the space 
of advertising communication: I leave the live broadcast, while continuing 
to use the documentarizing mode, but it is the commercials that are the 
operators. However, the reference to the space of sports is not abandoned, 
because f ilms often use it to construct their mini-scenarios: two spaces thus 
intersect. It amuses me quite a bit, and I rather admire the designers who 
have been so good at getting the most out of the situation (aesthetic mode). 
Still, I am in the construction, not of the sports text any more, but of a series 
of advertising texts whose aim is to get me out of my position of spectator 
to make a consumer out of me and, by leveraging the prestige of the Tour de 
France and the competitors, to encourage me to make a purchase. I doubt 
that this will work, but you never know….
The broadcast brings me, f inally, into the space of tourist communication, 
which I was waiting for from the start. The tourist part is rather cleverly 
packaged as belonging to the same space of communication as the race 
itself (there is a relationship of inclusion: we are still in the space of sports): 
the helicopter shows me the cyclists passing through the village of Oloron, 
and then flies over the Sainte-Marie cathedral. The next few shots show me 
the portico of the cathedral in all its detail, and take me into the cathedral 
itself. These latest images were shot beforehand, but there is still the sense 
that this is a live broadcast. Here I am, turned into a tourist: it is almost as 
if I was actually visiting Oloron. Sometimes we see a split screen: on the 
left, there is the tourism documentary, while on the right, the race goes on, 
thus making clear that these two spaces of communication are both present 
but that they are also different from each other. The result of all this is the 
construction of a third text: the tourist text.
But my reading does not stop there: while on holiday in the Pyrenees, I 
went to Oloron. The small town thus becomes a communication operator 
that takes me into the space of memory. I recall: my car had had a problem, 
and I had been forced to drive around in the town, miffed at having had 
to fritter away hours of holiday time looking for a repair shop (production 
of meaning in the intimate mode). I had then gone to see the cathedral. 
Keen to understand the architectural work (artistic mode), I had carefully 
read what the Guide bleu had to say on it. I remember very well what I felt 
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as I stood in front of the portico and the cornices; I spent quite some time 
taking them in (aesthetic mode). This forced stop had, in the end, resulted 
in a very interesting experience: the production of a personal text that 
combined the intimate mode, artistic references, and aesthetic feeling. 
For a few moments, I had all but forgotten the race: I must now pick up the 
thread of the sports story.
Interpreting the Reproduction of a Painting
I deliberately gave the previous analysis a personal twist. However, this 
should not imply that semio-pragmatic textual analysis can only ever 
describe an individual experience.
For example, I will try to describe the reading determined by the book 
Art and Life in Renaissance Venice,8 of the Titian painting The Vendramin 
Family Venerating a Relic of the True Cross (1543–1547).
My view in this regard is that Brown’s work serves as the context governing 
the reading of Titian’s painting, and what I am trying to describe is the 
experience of the reader of this analysis and no longer just my own personal 
experience.
The French translation of the book, La Renaissance à Venise, is part of the 
Tout l’Art series put out by Flammarion. This simple mention obliges us to 
broaden the context. Through Brown’s analysis, all the determinations of 
the space of art are conveyed: instructions are given to the reader to focus 
on the proper name of the author of the painting, and to take an interest 
in biographical, thematic, stylistic, and historical questions, and so on.
The Tout l’Art series includes various subcategories: a Grammar of Styles, 
History, Monographs, and Encyclopaedias. In its French translation, the 
book belongs to a series, Context, in which we also f ind La Renaissance à 
Florence, La Renaissance dans les pays du Nord, L’Artiste impressionniste, Le 
Corps photographié, and Le Monde critique. A note introducing the series 
says: “It is the series of initiation and synthesis par excellence, focused on 
illuminating the historical, economic, political and cultural conditions of 
artistic creation.” All of this encourages us to take this definition as the axis 
of relevance starting from which the communication space in which the 
reader is invited to operate is constructed. I will speak here of a “discursive” 
communication space, a space that turns the receiver into a reader who is 
involved in a “discursive” experience.
8 Patricia Fortini Brown, Art and Life in Renaissance Venice (London: Pearson, 2005).
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The communication operator consists of a mix of text and images (maps, 
reproductions of paintings, photographs of monuments, buildings, sculp-
tures, Venetian spaces, and so on). In Chapter VI, “Social Identities and 
Gender Differences” and, more precisely, on page 161 of a section devoted to 
the “cult of the family,” one can read: “The central place of the male lineage 
for patricians is eloquently expressed in Titian’s painting The Vendramin 
Family Venerating a Relic of the True Cross.”9 The number in parentheses 
invites the reader to look at the reproduction of this painting, which oc-
cupies approximately one-third of the following page. The way in which this 
reproduction is introduced, reduced in size and inserted into the text itself 
encourages us to read it as part of the “discourse” on the status of the family 
in Venice in the 1500s (documentarizing mode) and, more precisely, as an 
illustration of the “discourse” on “the central place of the male lineage.” And 
indeed, even if some are adults and others are children, there are only males 
in the painting. The scene shows that the men of the Vendramin family have 
a strong relationship to religion: the characters demonstrate their devotion 
to a cross on the right side of the painting, on an altar (construction of a 
documentary text).
The legend and the commentary in the painting, which act as constraints 
in regulating its reading, give us to understand that it is a portrait of a family 
group created in the Vendramin family’s space of communication of family 
memory. The Titian painting belongs to the lineage of memory operators that 
we analysed in the preceding chapter. Brown’s text includes the elements the 
reader needs to start entering this space and to imagine how this painting 
could be read in this frame (private mode): the presentation of the characters 
(“Behind Andrea, among his brothers, is Leonardo, the eldest son…”), an 
invitation to read the painting as photographic (in the sense I gave this 
expression in the preceding chapter), information on the position of the 
characters in the family (Andrea is painted with her seven sons, but not 
with the seven daughters mentioned in the documents), and the narrative 
of the story that is at the origin of the scene. Andrea Vendramin had been 
responsible for the Scuola di San Giovanni Evangelista in 1369, the date on 
which the brotherhood received the relics of the True Cross… (construction 
of the Family Text).
The analysis indicates that the Titian painting was established as a 
memory operator in the Vendramin family because of the painter’s fame 
as an artist (artistic labelling), and this enhances the status of the family 
that owns one of his works (the space of the family intersects with that of 
9 Ibid., p. 116.
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art). At the same time, the text encourages the reader to locate themselves 
in this latter space and to look at the painting in “full artistic mode.” This is 
the construction of the reader as an art lover. Brown adds that the painting 
is at the National Gallery in London, the Mecca of the Art World if ever there 
was one, and that the canvas measures 210 by 300 cm. She offers pointers 
that guide the artistic interpretation itself: contrary to what one might 
expect, the composition of the Titian draws our attention away from the 
True Cross (which is relegated to the upper-right corner of the painting) and 
towards the members of the family. Brown tells us that the Titian “offers a 
masterful solution that makes it possible to create a portrait of nine people 
in the same scene, even as it keeps each one’s individual character”: refusing 
the traditional formula of the procession, Titian divides the characters 
into groups within the space of the painting. Brown also offers a series of 
comments on Titian’s work with colours, which imparts “the sense of a whole” 
to the pictorial f ield: the light blue of the sky, the brown of the altar, and the 
many characters dressed in black (Gabriele and his six younger nephews) 
make for a contrast with the red outf its the other characters are wearing, 
which range from dark through bright red to pink satin. Construction of 
the text: the art of Titian.
The way Brown praises the work of Titian might give us to believe that she 
would like the reader, too, to admire the painting (the attempt to construct 
an actant who is an aestheticizing interpreter), but pulling off the move to 
the aesthetic space is tricky: even though the reproduction is high-quality, 
it is diff icult to make the aesthetic mode work properly on such a small 
scale (13 x 9 cm). This would probably become possible if the painting were 
reproduced over a full page, but that would mean it would have to be put in 
a separate section of the book, and that in turn would change the hierarchy 
of modes: the aesthetic reading would benefit from thus, but it would then 
take quite some effort to link the table to the “discourse” held by the text 
and to move on to reading in documenting mode. (Not much is needed to 
change the hierarchy of spaces and modes of reading.) The work thus chose 
the solution best suited to its “discursive” aim, even if that meant sacrif icing 
the aesthetic experience.
Collective Academic Research
From 1969 to 1972, three researchers, Claude Bailblé, Michel Marie and 
Marie-Claire Ropars worked to produce an analysis of Alain Resnais’s f ilm 
Muriel (1963). This work led, in 1974, to the publication of a book, Muriel, 
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histoire d’une recherche.10 It is the experience of these researchers, which is 
rare and well worth recalling, that I will now attempt to analyse.
The context is that of a university research team, and it is the constraints of 
this type of structure that regulate the experience lived by its participants as 
well as their textual production. From the “Foreword,” the axis of pertinence 
is posited: “When it was being formed, the group had set itself the goal of 
systematically analysing a f ilm by identifying the categories that regulate its 
functioning and meaning.”11 We are in the communication space of analysis. 
More precisely, we are at the intersection between the space of analysis and 
the space of the university. This relationship to the latter space distinguishes 
the analysis of Muriel from the many critical analyses that have been devoted 
to this f ilm in specialized magazines: on the one hand, the production of 
meaning is subject to constraints of method and scientif icity that the space 
of criticism does not require; on the other, whereas the critic is a cog in the 
space of the cinema (by encouraging audiences to go and see this or that 
f ilm, the critic keeps the cinema machine running), the academic analyst 
is outside this space (the stakes are not in the “domain” of cinema).
This specific status of the academic analyst gives them a particular virtue: 
the strength of externality. Compared to the space in which f ilms are com-
monly viewed (the screening experience), the way analysis happens in the 
academic space is indicated f irst and foremost by a change in temporality: 
in the case of Muriel, the experience of interpretation lasted three years, 
certainly not on an ongoing basis, but in a relation to time that has nothing 
to do with the length of an actual screening. The actantial positioning is also 
no longer the same: researchers are not spectators, but academic analysts. 
The problem becomes more complicated, however, because, on the other 
hand, researchers are also spectators (they go to the cinema), and it is certain 
that they saw Muriel as spectators before starting to analyse it. This double 
actantial role, which produces a superimposition of two spaces of communica-
tion, the spectatorial space and the space of academic analysis, is both the 
necessary condition for analysis and one of the analyst’s major problems. 
(I will come back to this point later on.) In the space of academic analysis, 
the communication operator is no longer the f ilm, but the set of theoretical 
and methodological tools used to produce the analysis. Finally, the mode of 
production of meaning used is no longer the spectacularizing or fictionalizing 
mode, nor even the artistic or aesthetic mode, but the analytical mode.
10 Claude Bailble, Michel Marie and Marie-Claire Ropars, Muriel: Histoire d’une recherche 
(Paris: Galilee, 1975).
11 Ibid., p. 7.
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The analytical mode is a subcategorization of the “discursive” mode (which 
I described above). Indeed, whereas not every production of “discourse” has 
analysis as its primary objective (a “discourse” can be produced to convey 
ideas, to convince, to mobilize…), any analysis involves the production of 
“discourse.” Like the aesthetic and artistic modes, the analytical mode is a 
horizontal structure: it assumes different phases and can be interrupted along 
the way (an analysis may or may not succeed). The phases of the analysis 
depend a lot on the discipline in which it takes place and on the methodology 
called for: here, we are in the context of the textual analysis of f ilms.
To give a correct account of the analysis of Muriel, I believe it is necessary 
to treat these phases as distinct spaces of communication: they are certainly 
subspaces of the space of analysis, but they have their own actors, their own 
operators and their own aim.
The Space of Description and the Construction of the Object of 
Analysis
The researchers start by producing a shot-by-shot breakdown of the f ilm, a 
cut of the f ilm after editing, as it is actually screened. Here, the researcher 
acts as an observer, identifying and categorizing (or categorizing and iden-
tifying). The result is the transformation of the f ilm text into a written 
text that is presented in the form of a table that has no fewer than twelve 
columns. The entries in these columns are the operators used to produce 
the breakdown: the number of the shot, its duration, the situation, how the 
characters move about and which way they look, colour, the scale of view 
(close-up, medium shot, and so on), angle, camera movement, soundtrack 
(sounds, music, dialogues, status of the sound source: on/off).
At the same time, 1,300 photograms illustrate this breakdown, shot by 
shot. As Michel Marie noted, these photograms are “photographic reproduc-
tions of the original photograms from the f ilm,”12 so we cannot say that the 
series of photograms is a reproduction of Muriel (they have nothing to do, 
for example, with the reproduction of the painting of Titian analysed in 
the preceding example). One could speak, rather, of a compression of the 
f ilm: Muriel in 1,300 photos. Unlike the compression made by the sculptor 
Armand, this one results from a process of sampling: one photogram per 
shot was kept, except for complex shots, which are represented by several 
photograms.
12 Ibid., p. 335.
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The f irst function of this combination (the shot breakdown and the 
photograms) is obviously to allow researchers to remember the f ilm 
precisely. The memory of a f ilm is, indeed, something particularly labile, 
and the risk of working on more or less imagined sequences is not negli-
gible. Bellour thus recalls that André Bazin, “who was nevertheless the 
epitome of intellectual consciousness,” stated that Le Fleuve (The River) 
(Renoir, 1950) was made up only of f ixed shots, whereas it comprises 
about twenty camera moves, and that he himself, in analysing Brigadoon 
(Minnelli, 1954), had transformed two f ixed shots into an “admirable 
camera movement” that he had “literally dreamed up.”13 Photograms 
and cutting are there to avoid this type of problem, but their function 
goes beyond that.
Indeed, it is not easy to watch a f ilm as an analyst. All f ilm teachers know 
how diff icult it is to switch from watching as a spectator to watching as an 
analyst, especially if one is a cinephile. Digging out photograms from the 
film and making a shot breakdown (the word itself is violent) entail breaking 
this object of love that is the f ilm, destroying its hold over us, and creating 
the distance needed for analysis.14
On the other hand, with the cutting and the photograms, the temporal 
structure of the f ilm is converted into a spatial structure (a table, a series 
of images). The value for the researcher here is that they can choose their 
interpretive path: they can certainly follow the order of the shots and the 
temporalization of the f ilm, but they can also stop at a photogram – Bellour 
sees in the decision about whether or not to stop at a given image a distinctive 
criterion of the analytical posture15– or engage in a non-linear navigation, 
for instance comparing shot 5 to shots 75 and 122, and coming back from 
shot 375 to 28. They can also “develop hypotheses on the consolidation of 
plans into meaningful units,”16 depending on their scale, the characters 
who are f ilmed, or the framework in which the scene is set. (Between pages 
144 and 145, the book includes four pages of photograms that are interesting 
in the sense that they offer an understanding of the terms under which the 
space has been constructed.)
Finally, the cutting works like a description of the f ilm. Most of the pa-
rameters used in the shot breakdown generally go unnoticed by spectators, 
13 Raymond Bellour, L’analyse du film (Paris: Albatros, 1979), p. 13.
14 Christian Metz, “Le signif iant imaginaire,” Communications, vol. 23 (1975a), pp. 3–54; 
Raymond Bellour, “Le blocage symbolique,” Communications, vol. 23 (1975), pp. 235–350.
15 Bellour, L’analyse du film, p. 10.
16 Bailble, Marie and Ropars, Muriel: Histoire d’une recherche, p. 33.
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who are not concerned with the number of shots, the framing, the camera 
movements, and all the rest. They are focussed on the story, by the f ictional 
work, and if these parameters have an effect on them, they are not aware 
of it. The shot breakdown shows up these parameters explicitly. As for the 
photograms, whereas they themselves engage not in description but in 
monstration (showing), if they are questioned, they provide a considerable 
amount of information that the breakdown does not give: in this sense, 
they participate in the description process.
Shot breakdowns and photograms make us see the film in a different way: 
they constitute a f irst level of analysis of the f ilm, a f irst text correspond-
ing to a f irst reading of Muriel. At the same time, they make it possible 
to continue the analysis by helping the researcher-spectators position 
themselves as analysts and by setting the f ilm up as the object of analysis.
From the Space of Textual Analysis to the Space of Interpretation
The f irst analyses carried out after the shot breakdown are still very 
much in the mode of an overview of the elements of the story: places, 
characters, and events (Chapter I: “Two Stories, No Story: the Narrative 
Material of the Film”) and of sound coding modalities (Chapter III: “A 
Sound Film, a Musical, a Talkie (Studies of the Subcodes Used in the 
Soundtrack)”) or even a systematic overview of the codes involved in 
the construction of space (Chapter IV: “Represented Space/Constructed 
Space”). The difference compared to the shot breakdown is that we are 
taking stock of f igures, processes, and codes, and not isolated settings. The 
analyst seeks to answer questions of the type: Starting from what point is 
the story constructed? How is the space built? How does the soundtrack 
work? The analyst is no longer an observer, but a kind of mechanic: they 
“disassemble” the mechanisms at work in the text. Metz explained well the 
somewhat “sadistic” pleasure that one could take from this positioning: 
“There is no sublimation, as Freud himself insisted, without ‘defusion of 
the drives’” ….
“The cinema is ‘persecuted,’ but this persistence is also a reparation (the 
knowing posture is both aggressive and depressive), a reparation of a specific 
kind…”:17 certainly a very particular experience….
The work of the “textual mechanic” really comes into its own when they 
produce articulations and make connections in an attempt to understand 
17 Christian Metz, “The Imaginary Signif ier” Screen, Vol. 16, no. 2 (1975c), pp. 14–76, here p. 76.
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how meanings and affects are produced. The analysis focuses initially on 
fragments of f ilm. Chapter V, “Two Short Montages,” attempts to account 
for the unease that seizes the spectator as they look at these two passages 
and shows that it “comes from the perceptive behaviour”18 imposed by 
cinematographic treatment, which “makes reading unstable, the present 
painful, and vision uncertain” (bad link shots, changes in outf its, choppy 
links between looks, and abrupt breaks in time). Chapter VI, “Concerning 
a Sequential Analysis: the Work of Writing,” devoted to shots 435 to 471, 
confirms this analysis, thus demonstrating the production of “an increas-
ingly clandestine subversion of reality, corresponding to the search for an 
increasingly direct hold on this reality.”19 The cinematographic work of 
Muriel in this sequence is thus characterized as resting on “the diversion of 
a diegetic system, which, precisely because it is diverted, does not appear 
to be completely destroyed,” and, more generally, as a diversion of classical 
narrative language that values “difference” and works “at the frontier of 
meaning…in an ever-renewed debate about meaning and signif ication.”20 
At this stage, we are faced with a series of texts that offer limited analyses 
of those elements to which they are applied (be it a level or a fragment), 
but also with analyses that constitute tests of sorts or, to be more exact, 
probes that open onto interpretive hypotheses that can have a bearing on 
the entire f ilm.
For its part, Chapter VII, “Muriel, or the time of a story,” presents a “global” 
reading21 of the f ilm. The analysis of the narrative’s temporal system seems, 
in fact, to be the axis that makes it possible to mobilize the results of the 
different approaches taken so far in order to capture the f ilm as a narrative 
whole. This leads Marie-Claire Ropars (who was responsible for this analysis) 
to make a proposition, no longer just about the modalities of the production 
of meaning, but about the very meaning of the f ilm: “I would suggest that 
the f ilm is a story about liquidating the past, which we interpret from the 
double point of expressed by Alphonse’s and Bernard’s stories.”22 The “I” 
here is not innocent: as soon as they venture to define the overall meaning 
of a text, the researcher no longer acts only as a textual “mechanic,” but as 
a Subject who produces their text at the risk that is assumed here of leaving 
the space of analysis to enter the space of interpretation.
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The Space of Ideological Analysis
Up to this point, the analyses carried out have remained internal to the f ilm. 
The interpretation of Muriel goes beyond this approach: “Once deciphered, 
the meaning still has to be evaluated: it is less its nature than its function 
that is subject to debate here.”23 The texts proposed in Chapter 8 are part 
of this movement and are located on an axis of relevance that signals that 
they belong to the space of ideological analysis (the title of the chapter 
is “Meaning and Ideology: the Text of Muriel”): debate on the ideological 
function of the cinematographic form of Muriel; debate on the way in which 
the f ilm speaks of the Algerian war; debate on the political role of the f ilm 
in relation to mainstream and political cinema.
The operator of the analysis here is the (re)construction by researchers of 
three spaces of communication, all rooted historically (the f ilm came out 
in 1963). Naturally, the researchers refer, not to “spaces of communication” 
but to “context,” but these spaces are what it is all about:
– an attempt to describe the experience of the spectator in the 1960s 
during the viewing of Muriel, from analysing either the work of the 
f ilm itself (Ropars: “Text”), or the reactions of the public as these are 
reported in the press (Marie: “Context)”: the construction of the space 
of the spectator
– analysis of “critical reading in 1963” (“Context”24): construction of the 
space of critique
– analysis of all the cinematic practices “of the bourgeois cultural 
apparatus”:25 Bailblé, “avant-texte” and “hors-texte”: construction of 
the space of the cinema in the 1960s.
The analyses reveal differences of opinion on the intervention of Muriel into 
these various spaces. Ropars believes that the f ilm, through its textual work, 
gives the spectator “access to a productive activity”: “the deciphering of an 
unceasingly différant writing makes the signif ied a question the solution to 
which is both proposed and concealed, and shifts the spectacle towards the 
spectator, leaving open the spot where the intervention has taken place.”26 
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Marie shows that, in reality, this writing was one of the reasons for its public 
and critical failure. Finally, Bailblé is the most critical: for him, Muriel “is a 
progressive f ilm for progressives,” not a revolutionary f ilm, and he regrets 
this: “in 1963, Cayrol and Resnais benef ited from a balance of forces that 
allowed them to go farther, to accord a larger place to the people’s positivity, 
to the ideological transformations that are always emerging, even if they are 
controlled and dominated.”27 How can one ignore one’s own convictions 
when engaging in such analyses? The experience of the research work 
overlaps with the commitment of the researcher within society – their 
experience as a citizen. Here the analyst is also a citizen.
The Space of Epistemological Reflection
Compared to the reading of a f ilm by a spectator, the analyses presented 
above are at the meta-level: it is a matter of questioning the functioning of 
the f ilm text and not only of producing it; the analytical text is a text about 
a text. But the experience of interpreting Muriel shows from the beginning 
its will to go farther; it wants to be reflexive, “to try out a method.”28 The 
analytical experience is duplicated and turns back on itself: it is the experi-
ence of an experience. We enter the space of epistemological reflection, a 
meta-meta-level space: reflection on the analysis or, rather, on the operator 
(the method) that produces it: the problem of the relationship between 
general codes and “f ilm’s own codes” (analyses of general codes “do not lead 
to the discovery of the specif ic codes at stake in the movie”;29 reflection on 
the notion of “text,” on the notion of “f ilmic writing,”30 reflection on the 
relations between meaning and signif ication (“signif ication emanates from 
a combinatorial process that decides meaning. None of the materials that 
come into play in this combinatorial process can be analysed in accordance 
with a f ixed system that would belong to it in its own right”);31 recognition 
of the irreducibility of textual analysis to semiological analysis: “meaning 
awakens in the suspension of signs.”32 The analysis thus serves as a challenge 
to the theory of cinema. The analytical text does double duty as a theoretical 
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The Place of Cinema in the Academic Institutional Space
In fine, the experience of reading Muriel is intended to produce institutional 
effects in the university space. For researchers, it is a matter of having cinema 
be an object of research at the university and, more broadly speaking, an 
object worthy of study – that is, to have it recognized by other researchers, 
by other disciplines, and f inally by the institution itself, because if cinema 
already has a presence these days at a certain number of universities, it is 
quite a ways yet from being regarded as a serious academic subject. The 
operator of this undertaking of recognition here is the book: Muriel, histoire 
d’une recherche [Muriel: Story of a Research Project]. It is diff icult to gauge 
its novelty today; but, although at the time (1974) thousands of books were 
devoted to the analysis of one or another literary work, devoting a 400-page 
text to a f ilm constituted a minor revolution. It would take another few years 
for cinema to gain institutional recognition (it would become a recognized 
academic f ield only in the 1990s), but we cannot disregard the possibility 
that the analysis of Muriel had some influence on levels of awareness of 
the cinema among the institutions. The researchers who took part in this 
analytical experiment thus served as actors in the process of the institutional 
recognition of the cinema.
What I will retain above all from these three analyses is the plurality of the 
spaces of communication and the receiving actants that were constructed, 
the plurality of the operators and of the modes of production of meaning 
that were deployed, the plurality of the relational, “discursive,” ideological, 
and theoretical effects, institutional and memory effects produced, and the 
plurality of the texts created during each of these readings.
Semio-pragmatic analysis dismantles the immanentist illusion that there 
is a single text and a single reading. Both pluralization and heterogenization 
are at work, as opposed to what happens with immanentist analysis. Every 
reading experience is a palimpsest of readings.
Finally, semio-pragmatic analysis shows that, even without the migration 
of production into different contexts (as was the case in the previous chap-
ter), any reading experience engages the reader in a migratory movement 
from one space of communication to another, each involving a change in the 
mode of production of meaning and emotions and, more broadly, a change 
of their role. Every reading experience is an adventure.
 Conclusion
Pragmatics has been the subject of a lot of critiques. In Impersonal Enuncia-
tion, Metz waxes ironic about those who “…volubly criticize Saussure and 
‘structuralism’ for the sins of immanentism and ignorance of the Social but 
is careful to support its conclusions with purely textual analyses, linguistic 
intuition, or invented examples that are inserted into contexts that them-
selves are contrived.”1 Pierre Sorlin remarks, in a similar vein: “In the absence 
of a clear def inition of the audience, the theory of the f ilm runs the risk of 
erring on the side of an abstract pragmatism for which the spectator will in 
fact only be the analyst trying out on themselves and those around them the 
provocative and blocking effects that are placed throughout the f ilm.2 Here 
is one last example: for Eliséo Véron, “pragmatics imagines, on the one hand, 
increasingly complex situations of enunciation (which are not, for all that, 
any less arbitrary) and introduces, on the other, a set of rules and principles 
of sociality whose status, origin and cultural validity remain uncertain.”3 
More recently, in La pensée communicationnelle, Bernard Miège draws up 
a list of the limits encountered by what he calls the “general theories” of 
communication, in which he includes, perhaps “most” pragmatic approaches: 
reductionism, abstraction, the primacy accorded to a single paradigm, the 
confusion of the instances envisaged, the futurological deviation, and the 
absence or inadequacy of empirical verif ication procedures.4
I will not seek to respond directly to these criticisms, some of which (such 
as the futurological deviation) clearly do not concern the semio-pragmatic 
model. What I will say is that they provide a framework for reflection that 
is really useful for providing a better understanding of the theoretical 
positioning of the proposed model.
It is true that the semio-pragmatic model can give rise to the reproach that 
it is too abstract: its top-down approach leads to a positing, a priori, of the 
1 Metz, Impersonal Enunciation, p. 198.
2 Sorlin, Esthétique de l’audiovisuel, pp. 14–15.
3 Eliséo Veron,”Il est là, je le vois, il me parle,” Communications, vol. 38 (1983), pp. 98–120, here 
p. 101.
4 Bernard Miège, La pensée communicationnelle (Grenoble: PUG, 1995), pp. 83–86.
Odin, R., Spaces of Communication: Elements of Semio-Pragmatics. With an Introduction by 
Vinzenz Hediger. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022
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parameters it takes into account. My view is, though, that we should accept 
this abstraction without hesitation: semio-pragmatics does not try to do the 
same thing as historical, sociological or ethnomethodological analyses. The 
type of validity specific to semio-pragmatics can be compared to that which, 
according to Metz, characterizes the psychoanalytic approach as well as the 
f ilmic enunciative approach: “In each case, assuming the analyst has the 
necessary training (i.e., knowledge, methodology), the entire value of the 
work depends on his personal qualities, because he is both the researcher 
and (along with the f ilm) the very terrain of research. He can declare that 
the specif ic pleasure of the f iction f ilm is derived from a fetishistic process 
of splitting and a mix of belief and unbelief. He does not need to survey 
people who might have great diff iculty in responding on such an issue. It is 
a truth that is general or, more exactly, generic. It concerns THE spectator. 
Everyone can f ind this truth in himself. It does not tell us, for example, in 
the case of so-and-so that belief clearly prevails over unbelief or that unbelief 
dominates in another case. There is no contradiction here. The generic 
f inding remains interesting and, in my opinion, more so than f indings that 
pay attention to its variations or local modalities.”5
The semio-pragmatic approach aims to build generic tools, from large 
systems of production of meaning and emotion that anyone can f ind in 
themselves (modes), to the spaces of communication: as a theorist, I (re)
construct spaces of communication from my own experience of reality. 
Their system of constraints resides within me. Thus René Loureau describes 
the self as a “bric-a-brac of institutions.”6 We can say that the tools of 
semio-pragmatics are phenomenologically elaborated.
However, the tools proposed in the semio-pragmatic model do not claim 
any psychological or cognitive existence. Even if they have a phenomenologi-
cal starting point (you have to start somewhere), once they are written into 
theory they take on a purely heuristic status. Their evaluation will be based 
on their effectiveness in shedding light on communication processes.
It seems to me that two criteria are needed to evaluate this effectiveness.
(a) A heuristic model is all the more effective if it makes it possible to ask 
the greatest number of questions. We have seen that, from the outset, 
this concern guided the choice of form for the model, a model of non-
communication that involves questioning the constraints that allow 
communication (cf. the Introduction).
5 Metz, Impersonal Enunciation, p. 23.
6 Réné, Lourau, L’analyse institutionnelle, (Paris: éd. de Minuit, 1970), p. 48.
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(b) A heuristic model is all the more effective if it makes it possible to make 
the greatest number of differentiations: semio-pragmatics thus makes it 
possible to show up differences among the various types of constraint 
(Chapter 1), among the modes of production of meaning (Chapters 2 
and 3), and among the contexts of communication and the readings 
they generate (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
This concern to produce questions and differentiations explains why the 
semio-pragmatic model is “rigid”: notions are defined in the most restrictive 
way possible. Here again, I think we must assume this reductionist position.
A heuristic model is essentially a body of definitions, a “methodological 
language, def ining the descriptive concepts,” as Greimas puts it.7 Using 
the term “concept” would certainly be putting things too strongly here. As 
we have seen, I prefer to use “tool,” but the Greimasian formula does sum up 
my conception of the semio-pragmatic model. These def initions generally 
lead to a series of questions that serve to unpack and clarify them: What 
form should the model take? How should modes be constructed? How does a 
particular mode work? How should a space of communication be analysed? 
At the end of this journey, the reader thus has at their disposal a whole set 
of tools (cf. the list on the next page) that will be able to help them (or at 
least I hope so) to examine the functioning of communication in context. 
And, as the last three chapters of the book have shown, this abstract model 
aims to study communication as it works in reality.
7 Greimas, Structural Semantics, p. 15.
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